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PROLOGUE
"Gender Discrimination in Employment"
Deborah is a seventh-year associate in a small but well-established
law firm. The managing partner calls her into his office. "I'm sorry,"
he says. "And you know I personally think you'd be a great partner,
but the consensus here is that you should look elsewhere." "Why?,"
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Deborah asks. 'Well, the general feeling in the building is that you
don't always have the right attitude, and attitude is important to the
kind of close-knit place we've always been around here." Deborah sus-
pects that her "attitude" would be viewed differently if she were a man.
Deborah speaks to a law school classmate, Joel, who practices em-
ployment law. Joel listens to her story and says, "So you're thinking it
might be gender discrimination? Well, tell me how they treat the
other women in the firm."' Deborah tells him that she is the only
woman in her associate "class," and that there are only two or three
women associates in the firm. "That's a problem," Joel says. "A jury
may just think you're difficult. It would be easier if we could show
some type of pattern so they believe it's not you, but how the firm
treats all women." Deborah is frustrated. "That's the whole point:
there are no other women," she explains. "They always beat up on one
person at a time. They're just a bunch of good old boys. I mean, last
year, they said some Jewish associate was difficult, and the year before
it was the 'attitude' of some African-American attorney."2
"Racism in the Courts"
After meeting with Deborah, Joel goes to a bar association com-
mittee meeting. The president is discussing a large number of studies
from other jurisdictions on "racial bias" in the profession. The presi-
dent asks Joel to chair the committee. Joel hesitates and states:
I don't really know enough about race. My practice deals exclu-
sively with gender discrimination, and I'm not sure how much we
can really analogize between these two problems. This calls for an
African-American attorney. If we were studying sexual orientation,
we'd want someone who specialized in lesbian and gay law.
"Ingroups and Outgroups": The Social Science Paradigm
Joel decides to ask his college roommate, who now teaches psy-
chology at a major university, for help. He wants "some kind of expert
on sexism" for Deborah's case, and "another expert on racism" for his
bar study. The psychology professor sends him an article about in-
groups and outgroups. The article surveys sociological and psycholog-
ical research from the 1940s to the present. The work traces how
social scientists have studied the way that ingroups have advantages
that outgroups lack. Theorists have disagreed about exactly how and
why outgroups are disadvantaged. Some early psychoanalytic scholars
thought that individuals developed a prejudiced personality based on
1 Joel's advice follows the conventional wisdom of attorneys. See infra note 84.
2 See, e.g., Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: Womens Advance-
ment in theLegalProfession, 64 FoRDHAm L. REv. 291, 324 tbl.II.10 (1995) (finding that in the
firms studied in 1992, 86% of female attorneys and 94% of male attorneys were white).
The data forJewish representation in contemporary American society is less uniform. See
infra note 8.
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authoritarian family structures; this early development embedded into
their psyches an unconscious desire to act out against those perceived
as weak, be they women, Jews, or foreigners. 3 Others believed that,
for whatever reason, some individuals have a tendency to generalize
more than others, or are more likely to stick to generalizations about
"others"-the various outgroups. 4 As experimentation gained popu-
larity in the social sciences, those scholars who termed themselves so-
cial psychologists tested the way that individuals view people like
themselves as superior in a variety of ways; often if individuals had
nothing in common besides being assigned to the same side of a
room.5 Other psychologists described the way in which individuals
tend to associate the label of ideal doctor, lawyer, or secretary with a
particular image; those who do not fit the ideal image might simply
not register on an individual's radar screen.6
"Ingroups and Outgroups": The Legal Translation
Joel spends hours reading the report. He sends his professor
friend an urgent e-mail: "This stuff is great. It's very readable. I've
heard second-hand about a lot of this stuff. So basically, you could
testify before the bias commission: Lots of racism is unconscious; peo-
ple aren't aware of it."
A Social Scientist's Reply: "Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism?"
"Poor Joel," the professor might well think. "Why do lawyers see
things so differently?" The professor's point is not that discrimination
occurs at an unconscious level, although the professor might agree
with that statement. Rather, the professor's point is that lawyers habit-
ually dissect behaviors into "different" types of discrimination or ine-
quality, whereas social scientists often see those same behaviors as
intimately related. This inclination to connect types of discrimination
is shared by a wide range of scholars over a long period of time. It
typifies both scholars who emphasize personality and those who em-
phasize social and institutional context,7 it also typifies scholars who
emphasize conscious discrimination and those who emphasize uncon-
scious discrimination. It even describes scholars who use economic
reasoning to describe rational discrimination.
The professor might try a more historical approach to explain
related discrimination. "Whatever happened to anti-Semitism?," the
professor might ask. "Why do we hear so little aboutJews and discrim-
ination?" Joel might say that Jews have "succeeded"; they no longer
3 See infra Part III.B.1.
4 See infra Part IH.B.2.b (explaining Allport's theory of the prejudiced personality).
5 See infra Part Ill.C.2 (describing the minimal group experiments of social
psychologists).
6 See infra Part m.C.6 (discussing theories of prototype and exemplar decision
making).
7 See infra note 8.
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face discrimination or unequal opportunity.8 The professor might
agree with Joel's statement, but he could invoke a different explana-
tion: many who set out to study "anti-Semitism" concluded that it is
often better understood as prejudice in general. The professor might
relate the story of The Authoritarian Personality.9 In the wake of the
German Nazis and the Holocaust, the American Jewish Committee
gave lavish funding to a study of anti-Semitism during the 1940s.10
8 For example, consider the following dialogue between African-American sociolo-
gist Cornel West and Jewish Rabbi Michael Lerner:
G.W. But what Black folk see is the reality of Jewish success.
M.L. There's something in the formulation of that statement that assumes
that what is real is material success. The Marxists were unable to pick up on
Jewish oppression, hence we were totally unprepared for the rise of fascism,
which focused on anti-Semitism. Why? Because for the Marxists, the funda-
mental reality was economic oppression. Well, Jews seemed to be doing
alright economically in 1920s' [sic] Germany, so Marxists didn't see them
as a group whose interests needed to be protected. That's because Jewish
oppression does not take the form of economic oppression. So does that
mean they're not really oppressed? Or does it mean that Marxism's theory
of what constitutes oppression is inadequate?
MICHAEL LERNER & CoRNEL WEST, JEws AND BLCcKs: LET THE HEALING BEGIN 124 (1995).
For further analyses of Jewish material success in certain fields, see RICHARD L.
ZNVEIGENHAFr & G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, DrvERsrrv IN THE PowER ELrrE: HAvE WOMEN AND
MrNoRr Es REACHED THE Top? 39 (1998) ("AlthoughJews may still be underrepresented in
some business sectors within the corporate community,... Jews are overrepresented over-
all in the corporate elite ... [and] also now overrepresented in both the Senate and the
House.... ."), and STUART SVONrIN,JEws AGAINST PREJUDICE: AMERICANJEwS AND THE FIGHT
FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES 180 (1997) ("There were exceptions to the rule (such as the persis-
tence of anti-Jewish discrimination in certain social clubs and at the executive level of some
major corporations), but as a group, American Jews had indisputably attained a remarka-
ble degree of success and acceptance." (footnote omitted)). Nevertheless, many Jews fre-
quently report encounters that they perceive as anti-Semitic. See LEONARD DINNERSTEIN,
ANTISEMITM IN AMERICA 280-44 (1994) (reporting that Jews in America today still fre-
quently face anti-Semitism).
Other scholars share West's emphasis on the divergence in economic interests be-
tween African Americans and Jews; some historians largely attribute the cause of the per-
ceived split between some African-American and Jewish leaders to this type of economic
explanation. See SVONRIN, supra, at 192 (suggesting that "[i]ntergroup relations workers
tended to target the psychological roots of prejudice rather than the social, political and
economic conditions that fostered inequality" and therefore failed to address "more basic
problems, roofed in a lack of political power and economic opportunity").
Many of the works examined in this Article, however, attempt to use both psychologi-
cal and social analyses. One of the earliest psychological scholars emphasized these social
influences. See CORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 514 (1954) (concluding
that prejudice is a function of both personality and social structures). Similarly, the Frank-
furt School, with its emphasis on the role of history and society, largely influenced the
various authors who contributed to a series of books comprising the Studies in Prudice,
which were funded by the American Jewish Committee. See MARTIN JAY, THE DrAECrCAL
IMAGINATION: A HISTORY OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RE-
SEARCH 1923-1950, at 227-29 (1973) (acknowledging the widespread perception of the psy-
chological emphasis of the Studies in Prejudice but emphasizing the lingering elements of
social analysis).
9 T.W. ADoRNo Er AL., THE AtrrHoRITARIAN PERSONALrrY (1950).
10 See infra note 190.
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This study culminated with the publication of The Authoritarian Person-
ality. However, its authors ultimately reported that they could not
study anti-Semitism except as a part of the larger question of preju-
dice in general." Since the publication, academic psychology depart-
ments have de-emphasized the particularities of the authors' theories.
This may have resulted in part because the theories heavily rely on
Freudian psychoanalysis; psychology departments have become in-
creasingly enamored of differences in social contexts associated with
psychology, 12 and disenchanted with the studies of individual person-
ality differences that psychoanalytic theory emphasizes. Despite these
shifts, the study's focus on ingroups, outgroups, and prejudice in gen-
eral still accurately describes how many sociologists, psychologists, and
economists view prejudice today. These theorists continue to focus
not merely on "different" kinds of discrimination but instead on how
prejudice in general often privileges an ingroup at the expense of all
others.' 3
I
INTRODUCTION
The stories in the Prologue depict everyday lawyering practices,
but depend on deep assumptions about the nature of prejudice and
the relationship between "different" kinds of discrimination. Many
cases turn on the question of how lawyers themselves frame the ques-
11 See ADoRNo Er AL., supra note 9, at 3 ("[F]rom the start the research... supposed
(1) that anti-Semitism probably is not a specific or isolated phenomenon but a part of a
broader ideological framework, and (2) that an individual's susceptibility to this ideology
depends primarily upon his psychological needs."). Although social scientists have contin-
ued to study prejudice in general, some Jewish organizations in the 1960s began to speak
more frequently of anti-Semitism rather than prejudice in general. See SvoNmN, supra note
8, at 184-85. Nevertheless, many Jewish organizations still focus on prejudice in general.
For example, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nal B'rith uses its polling data to emphasize
that anti-Semitic Americans are more likely to be racists and be intolerant of immigrants,
women, lesbians, and gays than the general public. SeeAnd-Defaiation League, Anti-Semi-
tism and Pridudice in America; Highlights from an ADL Survey; Most Anti-Semitic Americans Also
Tend to Be More Intolerant on Other Issues (Nov. 1998) (visited Oct. 26, 1999) <http://
www.adl.org/antisemitism%5Fsurvey/surveyijv-chart.intolerance.htm>.
12 See generally, e.g., BOB ALTEMEYER, RIGHT-WING AUTHORITRANISM 6-10 (1981)
(describing the influential claim that social context is more relevant in explaining authori-
tarianism than differences in personality, and refuting this critique of the personality trait
of authoritarianism); LEE Ross & RIcHARD E. NIsarr, THE PERSON AND THE SrruATION:
PERSPECrrEs OF Socs.r PSYCHOLOGY (1991) 2-8 (presenting a more recent critique of the
emphasis on personality).
13 See infra note 239 and accompanying text (discussing how contemporary statistical
studies of attitudes continue to show that those who are very hostile to one outgroup tend
to be very hostile to a wide range of outgroups). The relevant ingroup may be different at
different times or at the same time in different contexts, such as within different institu-
tions or within parts of an institution. See infra Part IH.C.8 (noting that psychologists agree
that discrimination is often a function of preference for an ingroup, but have not carefully
studied how to define the relevant ingroup).
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tion, "Who else might have faced the same situation my client
faces?" 14 Like Joel, the lawyers in those cases will rarely consider this
question. Perhaps ironically, when social scientists study how preju-
dice occurs, they rarely consider the question of whether they focus
on sexism, racism, or homophobia. The lawyer and the social scientist
will both take the fundamental question for granted. The lawyer just
"knows" that discrimination occurs in certain "obvious patterns," such
as "racism," "sexism," and "homophobia." The social scientist also just
"knows" that ideas like "discrimination," "prejudice," or "stereotyping"
largely cut across different -isms. A lawyer working on a "race case"
rarely considers examining how women are treated; a social scientist
writing about stereotypes often overlooks the fact that some of the
studies he cites involve experiments with women, others with gays, and
others with African Americans. 15
How society, social scientists, and lawyers categorize discrimina-
tion both affects how we resolve claims of discrimination and impli-
cates profound theoretical questions in legal theory and social
science. Unlike some attempts to compare law with other disciplines,
this Article does not suggest that the lawyers and legal scholars "get it
wrong" and other disciplines have the correct answer. Although it fo-
cuses on the limitations of current legal understandings, the Article
suggests instead that both law and social science must recognize vari-
ous forms of discrimination.
A. Atomized and Generalized Discrimination
Most of us, including lawyers, assume that discrimination occurs
when an individual intends to harm another person whom they see as
a member of a particular group, such as when an employer refuses to
hire African Americans because he dislikes African Americans.' 6
14 See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
15 See infra note 274 (highlighting examples of current research that mixes what law-
yers normally would consider different forms of discrimination).
16 In my earlier work, I identified this pervasive unquestioned assumption of atomized
discrimination in legal scholarship, the structure of legal education, and the structure of
legal research. See Clark Freshman, Note, Beyond Atomized Discrimination: Use of Acts of Dis-
crimination Against "Other" Minorities to Prove Discriminatory Motivation Under Federal Employ-
ment Law, 43 STAN. L REV. 241, 247-48 (1990); see also Kathryn Abrams, Complex Claimants
and Reductive MoralJudgments: New Patterns in the Searchfor Equality, 57 U. Prrr. L. Ray. 337,
337-38 (1996) (describing a "civil rights paradigm" in which, among other things, claim-
ants must "invok[e] a particular characteristic-such as race or gender-which has been
associated with a sufficient history of stigma, concrete disadvantage, and political marginal-
ization, as to entitle those who bear it to some degree of legal protection"). Many critical
race theory scholars, who historically emphasized the condition of African Americans, have
recognized that discussions of race may sometimes be too narrowly focused. See, e.g., An-
gela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REv. 741, 775 (1994)
("Race-crits' understanding of 'race' and 'racism' might also benefit from looking beyond
the struggle between black and white."); cf. Francisco Valdes, Foreword Latinalo Ethnicities,
[Vol. 85:313
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While other authors may define the concept of "atomized" more
broadly as "individualized" or "isolated," this Article uses the term in a
particular way. What I call the paradigm 17 of "atomized discrimina-
tion" presupposes that people discriminate against those with a partic-
ular set of traits associated with a fairly discrete group, such as African
Americans, and that this is not necessarily how they would treat indi-
viduals from some "other" group, such as women, Korean Americans,
older people, or lesbians.
I term this paradigm of discrimination "the theory of atomized
discrimination" to emphasize several features. First, it assumes that
there is some natural boundary of the group,' 8 just as scientists
once emphasized the natural boundary of an atom. Second, this
boundary may mask meaningful divisions for other purposes; for ex-
ample, the so-called "intersectional" groups such as African-
American women 19 or gays of color 20 in the context of discrimina-
tion might be analogous to overlapping electron clouds between
neighboring atoms. Third, like the atoms of a molecule, different in-
stances of atomized discrimination may also be part of a larger and
intrinsically related system of discrimination. 21 Fourth, "atomized"
Critical Race Theory, and Post-Identity Politics in Postmodern Legal Culture: From Practices to Pos-
sibilities, 9 LA RAzA LJ. 1, 24-27 (1996) (discussing the role of Latinos and Latinas in critical
race theory).
17 See generally THOMAS S. KuHN, THE STRucTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 167-73
(2d ed. 1970) (explaining how paradigms frame the way we see the world).
18 See, e.g., AvMm SOrFER, LAW AND THE COMANY WE KEEP 147 (1995); PATrICIA J.
WILLi AS, TiE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 8 (1991).
19 See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140.
20 See, e.g Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and
Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse 29 CONN. L. REV. 561 (1997); Francisco Valdes,
Queer Margins, Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory, and
Politics of "Sexual Orientation, "48 HASTINGS LJ. 1293, 1296-97 (1997).
21 Many critical race theorists have long emphasized the way in which "different" sys-
tems of oppression, like racism and sexism, may be related; that differs from the notion
that what appear to be different systems often are better understood as some type of gener-
alized discrimination. For instance, some scholars use the Koosh ball to represent the way
in which systems of oppression may be related. See STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE RE-
VEALED: How INVisRiLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 22-24 (1996); see also Hutchinson,
supra note 20, at 640 ("Multidimensional analysis also reveals the multiple dimensions of
social identity categories and offers a comprehensive framework for conceptualizing sexual
subordination that neither 'destroys' nor 'fragments' our lives." (footnote omitted)); Peter
Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS LJ. 1257, 1280 (1997)
("Cosynthesis offers a dynamic model whose ultimate message is that the multiple catego-
ries through which we understand ourselves are sometimes implicated in complex ways
with the formation of categories through which others are constituted."); MariJ. Matsuda,
Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1183, 1189
(1991) ("[A]ll forms of subordination are interlocking and mutually reinforcing."); Fran-
cisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities & Inter-Connectivi-
ties, 5 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 25, 46-65 (1995) (discussing "inter-connectivity" of
different kinds of subordination).
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captures how this boundary is not "natural," but rather socially
constructed.22
This Article explores the less familiar paradigm that I call "gener-
alized discrimination."23 Generalized discrimination describes a situa-
tion when ingroup members, such as white Protestant males in
Deborah's firm, receive unfair advantages over all others, be they Afri-
can Americans, Jews, or women. (In other instances, generalized dis-
crimination might mean only Korean Americans had a realistic
opportunity to get certain jobs.) Although the ingroup will often re-
semble the demographic characteristics of a numerical majority, the
ingroup frequently may not be so much "like us" but rather "like who
we would imagine ourselves to be."24 Sometimes generalized discrimi-
nation manifests itself as "generalized ingroup sympathy." Often this
describes the way ingroups like white men in Deborah's firm may pre-
fer each other. A firm's ingroup might be Irish-Americans who prefer
each other. In a second form of generalized discrimination, "out-
group hostility," ingroup members despise "all of them." The Nazi
Holocaust typifies such outgroup hostility.25 Arguably, that behavior
which people describe as ingroup sympathy is in actuality merely a
cover-up for covert outgroup hostility in disguise.26
Nevertheless, this Article discusses theories and evidence of in-
group sympathy separately from those of outgroup hostility. Many
22 Much of this paragraph builds on the typology of atomized and generalized dis-
crimination that I began to develop elsewhere. See Freshman, supra note 16, at 244-50.
However, my earlier description left unanswered several questions that this Article ad-
dresses: (1) What other forms of generalized discrimination might exist besides what this
Article calls "ingroup sympathy"? (2) What support is there in social science for
frameworks of generalized discrimination? (3) If social scientists see discrimination as gen-
eralized and lawyers see discrimination as atomized, what explains this difference, particu-
larly if attention to generalized discrimination would help lawyers win cases?
23 Again, as with the use of the term "atomized discrimination," I acknowledge that
other scholars have used the term "generalized discrimination" in different ways. In partic-
ular, many have contrasted generalized discrimination in society as a whole to discrimina-
tion by a particular individual or organization. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-99 (1989); Betty B. Fletcher, The Death Penalty in America: Can Justice
BeDone?, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 811, 827-28 (1995).
24 For example, Nazi Party members with brown eyes may idealize those with blue
eyes. Allport's study of prejudice draws a distinction between people like ourselves, which
he calls an "ingroup," and people in a group to which we would like to belong, which he
calls a "reference group." See ALLPORT, supra note 8, at 37-38.
25 See infra note 189.
26 I am grateful to Mark Kelman and Steve Winter for pressing this point. I agree that
much ingroup sympathy might mask covert outgroup hostility.
Nevertheless, ingroup sympathy and outgroup hostility are analytically distinct. Like
many analytic distinctions, this division may be difficult to discern in certain scenarios. In
individual situations, such as litigated cases, external behavior may be consistent with
either ingroup sympathy or outgroup hostility. Similarly, either ingroup sympathy or out-
group hostility could explain many social science experiments. See infra notes 345-60 and
accompanying text (discussing various explanations of why those exposed to negative com-
ments about fat people subsequently tend to rate thin African Americans more negatively).
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may dismiss outgroup hostility as irrelevant to the bulk of contempo-
rary cases; they may view outgroup hostility as simply a fringe phenom-
enon from a bygone era, or a modem one confined to extremists like
neo-Nazis.27 In contrast, evidence of ingroup sympathy may seem
more consistent with modem examples of inequality, particularly
among elite environments such as law firms and upper-level manage-
ment. Additionally, many theorists have treated ingroup sympathy as
less pernicious than outgroup hostility.28 This Article explicitly argues
that ingroup sympathy violates both existing antidiscrimination judi-
cial doctrine, 29 as well as prominent antidiscrimination theories.30
To some degree generalized outgroup hostility, generalized in-
group sympathy, and various forms of atomized discrimination all in-
volve assumptions about how discrimination operates that are difficult
to test.31 Some circumstances will be consistent with either atomized
or generalized discrimination. Alternatively, some instances will in-
volve a combination of the two. More precisely, this type of situation
may reflect some kind of generalization that connects an injustice
with other injustices-a generalization within several dimensions. 32
Situations reflecting various types of discrimination are particularly
common when decisions require different people in an institution to
render judgments or necessitate judgments made at different times.
Perhaps some individuals described in the Prologue voted against
making Deborah partner, because they did not like women (reflecting
atomized discrimination); perhaps other partners wanted to make
one of the "good ol' boys" a partner instead (reflecting generalized
ingroup sympathy discrimination).33 Perhaps some partners even re-
sented all of "them" (generalized outgroup hostility).
27 See Wi _DaN, supra note 21, at 12 ("'White supremacy' is associated with a lunatic
fringe, not with the everyday life of well-meaning white citizens.").
28 See infra notes 150-58 and accompanying text (offering theoretical critiques of in-
group sympathy).
29 See infra Part II.B.2 (surveying case law that treats ingroup sympathy).
30 See infra Part m.C.1 (presenting a normative critique of ingroup sympathy).
31 See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Doff, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. CmI. L. Riv. 1057, 1059 (1990) ("Awork of literature may have more than one
'correct' ending, mathematical systems may proceed from different unprovable postulates,
and a line of constitutional decisions may fit accurately within more than one
abstraction.").
32 See id. at 1067 ("Although we have described the enterprise of designating funda-
mental rights as a question of how abstractly to portray rights, we do not posit a single
dimension along which abstraction must be measured."); see also Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyp-
ing, Preudice, and Discrimination, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 377
(Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) ("[G]iven at least minimal knowledge and
familiarity, people are probably capable of combining nearly any category with any other to
create a subtype.").
33 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231-37 (1989) (involving an
employer's decision not to promote a female senior manager to partnership based on votes
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In theory, generalized discrimination may take a variety of forms.
One such form involves different ingroups at different organizations
within the same society. For example, an ingroup may be limited to
Protestants in a Georgia law firm; an ingroup in Maryland may in-
clude Catholics; an ingroup in New York might include Jews. As seen
in the Prologue, when a particular person like Deborah makes a claim
against a specific firm, lawyers like Joel may need to investigate care-
fully before concluding (1) how to describe the relevant ingroup, and
(2) whether to describe the case as involving ingroup sympathy or out-
group hostility. Despite these complications, this Article frequently
analyzes ingroups that track familiar patterns, such as an ingroup de-
fined as white, Protestant males. This analysis is necessary for two rea-
sons. First, the Article seeks to use social science data to bolster the
claim that generalized patterns of discrimination are not merely logi-
cal possibilities, but are frequently the reality in contemporary society.
Second, although ingroups may theoretically take many patterns, they
will often correspond to such recurring patterns. The notion of atom-
ized categories such as race does provide a meaningful concept in cer-
tain circumstances, just as the atom does in natural science. But the
combination of atomized categories provides another useful way to
analyze discrimination, just as the relevant frame in scientific study
may have to include molecules that combine atoms, or organisms that
combine molecules.34
These same issues of generalized and atomized discrimination
also apply to various "critical" approaches to discrimination, includ-
ing feminism, critical race theory, and critical legal studies. Some of
these critical theorists suggest that the law more clearly ban "uncon-
scious" discrimination; a number of these scholars advocate ex-
panding the types of cases in which discriminatory effects,
independent of proof of any discriminatory intent, are illegal. 35 Simi-
from predominantly male partners); see also infra note 394 (discussing how various individ-
uals may affect any given court decision).
34 In other circumstances, the relevant problem may combine in more complex ways.
For example, in the case of some illnesses, a virus may invade parts of many cells. One will
not label the virus by combining such disparate concepts as heart disease and brain dis-
ease. Similarly, a form of generalized discrimination might attack only parts of atomized
categories. For example, one might imagine a prejudice that disadvantages only those who
are relatively unassimilated, such as Orthodox Jews, African-American women who wear
their hair in certain ways, or Hispanics who speak only in Spanish. See generally Devon
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Wo*ingldentity, 85 CoarNLL L. Rnv. (forthcomingJuly 2000) (sug-
gesting that some members of outgroups will try to assume identity of ingroups); Kay
Deaux & athleen A. Ethier, Negotiating Social Identity, in PREJUDICE: THE TARGcT's PERSPEC-
TwE 301, 316-20 (Janet K Swim & Charles Stangor eds., 1998) (discussing "identity negotia-
tion" in the context of Hispanic students entering elite U.S. universities).
35 See, e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REv.
899 (1993); Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotping Per Se as a Form of
Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REv. 345 (1980); cf. Charles R Lawrence III, The Id, the
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larly, others would abandon the current antidiscrimination law and
mainstream legal theory's emphasis on individual actors, and instead
would emphasize the history of societal and, in particular, institutional
discrimination.3 6
All of these theories, however, must still address the question of
atomized versus generalized discrimination. Even if we focus on socie-
tal or institutional discrimination, we still must determine the extent
to which the history of society or a particular institution reflects (1)
hostility to particular groups, (2) hostility to all outgroups, or (3) ex-
cess sympathy for a narrow ingroup. Does Deborah's firm reflect insti-
tutionalized sexism or institutionalized preference for "good ol'
boys"? If we focus on unconscious discrimination, we still must resolve
the extent to which we see some variety of atomized or generalized
discrimination. We might believe that unconscious discrimination
exists, but might maintain that it is atomized against only African
Americans and not Jews.37 Alternatively, one might emphasize con-
scious discrimination, but suggest that it involved generalized hostility
against all outgroups. Although Parts II and IV of this Article empha-
size how a theory of generalized discrimination would supplement ex-
isting antidiscrimination law and more conventional legal theory,
critical scholars will still profit from the evidence of generalized dis-
crimination presented in Part IV, as well as the discussion of barriers
to coalitions in Part V. For similar reasons, these Parts should also
interest scholars with other theoretical perspectives on discrimination;
these theorists believe that it may be rational to rely on statistical gen-
eralizations.38 Nonetheless, they must consider whether the categories
for those generalizations should be relatively generalized or atomized.
Epstein thinks some groups work better together:39 Does this make it
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324 (1987)
(proposing "a new test to trigger judicial recognition of race-based behavior" that focuses
on "'cultural meaning'"). Criticism of the intent requirement is also associated with both
critical legal studies and critical race theory. See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine 62
MrNe. L. REv. 1049, 1052-57 (1978) (advocating that law should forbid discriminatory acts
because these acts create victims regardless of whether a perpetrator intended to cause
harm).
36 See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Race, Gender, and the Law in the TweniFz-Irst Century Workplace:
Some Preliminary Observations, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L. 639, 663 (1998).
37 For example, Lawrence's classic analysis of unconscious discrimination discusses
one psychological account of anti-Semitism that suggests that people who despise Jews are
projecting their discomfort with their own "Ego," but those who despise African Americans
are projecting their discomfort with their own "Ids." See Lawrence, supra note 35, at 333-34.
But see infra note 227 (exploring various stereotyped images of Jews).
38 See generally, e.g., Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent
Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 790-98 (1994) (describing and
criticizing the notion that it is efficient to make generalizations if the generalizations are
statistically accurate).
39 See infta note 151.
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"efficient" to exclude some particular different groups (a la atomized
discrimination) or to seek out "similar" people who "work well to-
gether" (a la generalized ingroup sympathy)?
B. The Litigant Payoff: The Lily White Organization and
Intersectionality's Sibling
Recognizing generalized discrimination allows us to understand
discrimination when other lawyerly views of discrimination fall short.
The smaller the number of people "like the plaintiff' in an organiza-
tion, the harder time a fact-finder will have in determining what really
happened to the plaintiff. In an organization with a very few people
like the plaintiff, it would be easy to assume that the plaintiffs pecu-
liarities, rather than impermissible discrimination, really explain her
misfortune. To return to the Prologue, juries may easily label
Deborah as "difficult." If Deborah expands her group to include
others, such as Jews or African Americans, whom her firm has likewise
treated in unfair ways, juries may more easily reach an informed opin-
ion about whether discrimination took place.40 Even if lawyers look-
ing for atomized discrimination find some comparable examples, they
could often find more examples by looking for generalized discrimi-
nation; more examples in turn give factfinders more confidence in
their conclusions. 41
Under different circumstances, defendants may also find evi-
dence of generalized nondiscrimination helpful. Sometimes proof
that employers did not discriminate in other cases may provide some
evidence of nondiscrimination. For example, if a plaintiff blames a
firm for her supervisor's harassment, the employer may offer its effec-
tive antiharassment policy as an affirmative defense. 42 In a similar
way, such a policy may reduce the likelihood of an award of punitive
damages.43 If a white woman like Deborah in the Prologue claims
that partners harassed her, and the firm has never investigated harass-
40 Opinions vary on the question of whether these other examples justify relief or
merely constitute evidence of discrimination. For a discussion of effect and intent tests
under existing law, see infra notes 88-96.
41 See, e.g., Pollis v. New Sch. for Soc. Research, 132 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 1997)
("The smaller the sample, the greater the likelihood that an observed pattern is attributa-
ble to other factors and accordingly the less persuasive the inference of discrimination to
be drawn from it."); Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World
of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 385, 398 (1985) ("[A] subjective probability derived
by a legal factfinder is more accurately described as an 'estimate' based on a small portion
... of information rather than as a true value derived from an analysis of all possible
information."). However, at a certain point, the number of examples or the way in which
they are presented may be so overwhelming that they are no longer needed. See infra note
889 and accompanying text (discussing such limits on admission of evidence).
42 See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
43 See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2128-29 (1999).
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ment involving white women, it may wish to offer evidence that the
firm investigated and remedied harassment involving other groups,
such as African-American men.44 As detailed in Part IV below, how-
ever, opposing parties may still attempt to show that evidence of gen-
eralized antidiscrimination does not preclude the existence of more
atomized discrimination. Nevertheless, the evidence will still have
some relevance.
In many ways, the concept of generalized discrimination is a sib-
ling paradigm of intersectionality, a term associated with critical race
theory.45 Intersectionality does not purport to be a theory of all dis-
crimination.46 Instead it reveals how those atomized categories might
neglect individuals who fall into two atomized categories; for example,
African-American women may face discrimination even if African-
American men and white women do not.4 7 On a theoretical level,
intersectionality and generalized discrimination both depend upon
the notion that patterns of discrimination that are not neatly confined
within atomized categories may exist. Intersectionality divides existing
classifications like race and gender into hybrid categories such as "wo-
men of color" and "black men." In contrast, generalized discrimina-
tion combines several situations often seen as different; for example,
identifying how a firm prefers a white Protestant male ingroup might
create generalized discrimination.
44 In this sense, use of generalized discrimination is largely independent of one's rela-
tive sympathy for plaintiffs or defendants, or for left-wing or right-wing political views. Cf
JOHN HART ELY, DFmocRAcy AND DIsrnusr: A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW 3-5 (1980) (argu-
ing that notions ofjudicial activism andjudicial restraint do not neatly correspond to par-
ticular constitutional theories, such as interpretivism).
45 In contrast, others have criticized intersectionality in ways that suggest that it has
outlived its usefulness. Compare Kwan, supra note 21, at 1263-64 (asserting that theories of
intersectionality may create "a theoretical barrier to and a distortion of the complex ways
whereby race, gender, homosexuality, and other categorical notions are often dependent
in their mutual constructive modes"), with Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexual-
ihation of Race: Heteronormativity, Citical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BuFF. L. Rv.
1, 11-12 (1999) (noting that intersectionality theories have been limited to understanding
patriarchy and racism, and expanding their range to include sexual identity).
46 See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Vio-
lenre Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1244 (1991) ("[lintersectionality is not
being offered here as some new, totalizing theory of identity.").
47 See Crenshaw, supra note 19; Crenshaw, supra note 46; see also Jerome McCristal
Culp, Jr., Small Numbers, Big Problems, Black Men, and the Supreme Court. A Reform Program For
Title VII After Hicks, 23 CAP. U. L. Rxv. 241, 242-54 (1994) (identifying black men as an
intersectional group neglected by the Supreme Court's disparate impact analysis in the
recent Title VII cases); Melanie Kaye/Kantrowitz, The Issue Is Power: Some Notes on Jewish
Women and Therapy, in JEWISH WOMEN IN THER SEEN BUT NOT HEARD 7, 15 (Rachel
Josefowitz Siegel & Ellen Cole eds., 1991) (describing howJewish men might not represent
the interests of Jewish women without specifically using the term "intersectionality"); cf.
Social Security Is Accused ofJob Bias, MmAM HERALD, Apr. 20, 1999, at 6A [hereinafter Social
Security] (reporting a class-action lawsuit based on charges that black men get fewer promo-
tions and more unsatisfactory job evaluations than warranted by their numbers at Social
Security Administration headquarters).
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Intersectionality and generalized discrimination are also siblings
in the sense that both address different factual scenarios in which at-
omized discrimination fails. Specifically, intersectionality is associated
with the development of large institutions that are diverse in some
ways, such as including a substantial number of African-American
men and white women. Intersectionality shows that such institutions
may still harbor inequality for intersectional groups, such as African-
American women. Intersectionality analysis proves less helpful when
an institution is relatively homogenous, such as "lily white" or all Asian
men. In these cases, generalized discrimination may reveal institu-
tional practices by illustrating a pattern of disadvantage of all individu-
als who do not fit a "lily white" or other narrow mold. This result is
particularly true of smaller organizations, and evidence exists that
such organizations discriminate often.48
Generalized discrimination theory may also apply in a second cir-
cumstance where an intersectionality analysis falls short. Intersection-
ality functions most effectively when one can identify a common
history and experience among the intersectional group.49 For exam-
ple, as Jerome Gulp has emphasized, many people may deem African-
American men fit only for certain jobs, and African-American women
fit only for other jobs.50 On the other hand, generalized discrimina-
tion may be more illuminating when an individual differs from an in-
group in a variety of ways, but those differences are not shared by
48 See HARRY J. HOLZER, WHY Do SMALL EsABLIsHmENTS HIRE FEWER BLAcKS THAN
LARGE ONEs? 16-17 (Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper No. 1119-97, 1997),
available in Recent JRP Discussion Papers (visited Oct. 28, 1999) <http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/
irp/dplist.htm> (concluding that even with size-specific factors taken into account, small
firms hire smaller proportion of black employees than larger firms); Alfred W. Blumrosen,
Society in Transition II: Price Waterhouse and the Individual Employment Discrimination Case,
42 RUTGERS L. REv. 1023, 1026 (1990) ("The most significant improvement in minority/
female opportunities has been with larger employers who are government contractors. But
that improvement is uneven. There remain employers who have been impervious to legal
pressures generated over twenty-five years to improve opportunities for minorities and wo-
men." (footnotes omitted)); Gene Koretz, Bias Still Blocks Black Progress: Why Lawmakers
Should Take Heed, Bus. Wit, July 7, 1997, at 30 (reporting study by economist Harry J.
Holzer of Michigan State University that "small businesses were far less likely to hire blacks
than larger companies," and that "[a]mong companies with fewer than 50 employees,
blacks held only 13% of jobs requiring less than a college degree," but "[fln companies
with more than 500 employees, blacks held 26% of such jobs").
49 See, e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 DuKE LJ. 365, 394-96; Dana Y. Takagi, Maiden Voyage: Excursion into Sexuality
and Identity Politics in Asian America, in AsIAN AMEImcAN SExuALrrns: DIMENSIONS OF THE GAY
AND LESBIAN EXPERIENCE 21, 22-23 (Russell Leong ed., 1996) (suggesting that identities at
intersections are not merely "additive," but are a special experience).
50 See Culp, supra note 47, at 252 ("Particularly in the South, it has been the tradition
that some jobs were black male or femalejobs. Black women were, and still are, the maids
for white people and black men acted as 'bootblacks,' yardmen, and janitors."); see also
Crenshaw, supra note 19 (emphasizing the inattention to, and theoretical erasure of, the
position of African-American women as a group).
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enough people to constitute a common history or widely recognized
pattern of common characteristics. For example, a Jewish Israeli
woman who works in the United States may face generalized discrimi-
nation as someone "different," but there may not exist history of dis-
crimination involving Jewish Israeli women. 51
C. The Societal Payoff: Coalition Effects, Empathy, and
Prevention
Paying greater attention to generalized discrimination would not
only affect the outcome of particular disputes, but also alter societal
consideration of "analogies" between "different" kinds of discrimina-
tion and "coalitions" between "different" minorities. Deborah's expe-
rience with sexism may not be analogous to an African-American
male's encounter with racism; the identical prejudice in favor of white
males may hold both of these individuals back.52 People often see
themselves as a "us" when they believe all group members share a
common enemy or common source of oppression. 55 In the context of
the Prologue, if Deborah sees how the firm's idealization of a narrow
group of white Protestant males excludes not only her and other wo-
men, but also Jews and African Americans, she may viewJews, African
Americans, and women like herself as part of the same group fighting
the same injustice. This more inclusive mind-set will have significant
impact on analysis of discrimination; it has become almost a mantra in
many discussions of bias, particularly among more critical scholars, to
state matter-of-factly something like, "Of course in talking about A
(e.g., racism), I don't suggest it is parallel to B (e.g., sexism)." 54
51 See, e.g., Javetz v. Board of Control, Grand Valley State Univ., 903 F. Supp. 1181,
1190 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (holding that there was no discrimination against a woman from
Israel based on national origin, religion, or sex).
52 See Clark Freshman, Re-visioning the Dependency Criis and the Negotiator's Dilemma:
Reflections on the Sexual Family and the Mother-Child Dyad, 22 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 97, 117-21
(1997) (reviewing MARTHA ALBERTSON FiNEmAN, THE NEuTrER.D MoTHER, THE SExuAL FAm-
ILY AND OTHER TWEN-mT CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995)) (arguing that describing coalitions
between "us" and "them" understates differences among "us" and similarities between "us"
and "them").
53 Cf Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., The Woody Allen Blues: "Identity Politics, "Race, and the
Law, 51 FLA. L. Ray. 511,525 (1999) (claiming that if individuals "are to protect themselves
from political oppression, they must form coalitions around their oppression").
54 See, e.g., Kimberly Christensen, "With Whom Do You Believe Your Lot Is Cast?" White
Feminists and Racism, 22 SiGNs 617, 620 (1997) ("I am not suggesting that patriarchy/sexism
and white supremacy/racism are 'parallel oppressions' or anything of the sort."); Trina
Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of Making
Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other -Isms), 1991 DUKE LJ. 397, 401; cf Kenji
Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L.
Ray. 1753, 1832-33 (1996) (suggesting that there might be negative reaction to analogies
because they represent an attempt to appropriate the suffering of another). However, one
who has suffered from discrimination has not necessarily had the same experience as
someone else. It may still make sense to recognize the limits of our ability to understand
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These effects should not be overstated. As Part II details, if we
want to identify discrimination, we sometimes have to consider gener-
alized discrimination. At other times, however, it still makes sense to
draw distinctions between individuals that reflect atomized,
subatomized, or other distinctions. Sometimes it may be appropriate
to focus more on atomized categories, such as race, gender, or sexual
orientation, when thinking about mediating for a particular "commu-
nity,"55 crafting voting districts, 56 or framing class actions.57
To return again to the Prologue, imagine what would happen if
Joel uses the treatment of Jews, African Americans, and other out-
groups to show that the firm favors those perceived as white Protestant
males. Deborah, those "other" witnesses, and jurors may see how "dif-
ferent" minorities suffer from exactly the same source of inequality.
The experience may encourage these "different" minorities to treat
each other more decently. Recognizing generalized discrimination in
some instances may therefore promote future equality, the prime pur-
pose of antidiscrimination law.58
D. Racism, Prejudice, and the Metaphors of Disease
In a famous metaphor, Charles Lawrence called racism a dis-
ease.59 This metaphor illustrates both the potential and the limits of
someone else's experiences and the virtue of avoiding projecting our own situation on to
theirs. Nevertheless, these problems arise from the difference between individuals and
individual situations. Even if we confine ourselves to an atomized view of discrimination,
we may fail to recognize the different situation of others within the same atomized category
as ourselves. See MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELX. IDENTITY, PoLrncs, AND THE LAW
57 (1997) (asserting that an emphasis on identity politics may "force individuals to
subordinate their own multiplicity"); IRIS MARION YOUNG, INTERSECTING VOICES: DILEMMAS
OF GENDER, PoLTcAL PHILOSOPHY, AND Poucy 45 (1997) ("Even when they find their rela-
tions defined by similarly socially structured differences of gender, race, class, nation, or
religion, individuals usually also find many ways in which they are strange to one an-
other."); Mark Kelman, Reasonable Evidence of Reasonableness, in QUESTIONS OF EVIDENCE:
PROOF, PRACTICE, AND PERSUASION ACROSS THE DiscIPLINEs 169, 180 n.10 (James Chandler
et al. eds., 1994) (arguing that once one criticizes a category, such as gender, for obscuring
one kind of difference, such as race, there may be "no reason why [one] wouldn't test all
the sociological predictors of 'attitude' (religious belief, income, party affiliations, and so
on) in deconstructing the needlessly large category, 'women'"); Martha Minow, Not Only for
Myself: Identity, Politics, and Law, 75 OR. L. REv. 647, 674 (1996) ("All of us have been
betrayed at times by those who claim to be like us .... ").
55 See Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex "Mariage" Through AlternativeDispute Resolu-
tion: Community-Enhancing Versus Communit-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1687,
1695, 1760-69 (1997) (discussing "community-enabling mediation").
56 See infra note 75.
57 See infra note 74.
58 See, e.g., Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2129 (1999) ("The [Ti-
tie VIII's 'primary objective' is 'a prophylactic one'...." (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975))).
59 In one of the earliest works associated with critical race theory, Charles Lawrence
made the famous observation that "racism is... a disease." Lawrence, supra note 35, at
321. Lawrence also recognized, however, that his focus on racism might also apply to other
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all paradigms of discrimination, including generalized discrimination.
First, diseases vary. For example, one might cough not only when she
has a cold, but also when she is developing lung cancer. Second, phy-
sicians who treat diseases usually ask questions-take a "history"-and
run tests before giving a diagnosis. Third, even when patients have
very clear ideas about their illness, their doctor may label their malady
differently. Fourth, even the labels that doctors apply often involve a
degree of ambiguity. Sometimes all doctors would dismiss minor
coughing as a mere symptom of a cold, and often all physicians would
agree that a stopped heart involves heart disease. Other times, doc-
tors disagree about diagnoses, or may classify a disease differently. For
instance, doctors may classify diseases by asking whether they are viral
or bacterial, whether they involve a particular kind of virus, whether
they attack a particular organ, or whether they can spread easily to
others.
Fifth, a doctor's classification of a disease may have important so-
cial consequences; this may affect the amount of funding available for
research, or may place patients under restrictions such as a quaran-
tine.60 Study of any disease, however, may create conflicting goals: At
times a general concept, such as bacterial infection, may help develop
a general treatment method, like penicillin. At other times a more
targeted approach, such as research that focuses on breast cancer,
HIV infection, or prostate cancer, will better help some individuals.
When Deborah complains about not making partner, Joel and
society face similar choices. First, Deborah might not have made part-
ner for some kind of illegal discriminatory reason or for another non-
discriminatory reason such as bad luck, poor performance, or her own
idiosyncratic personality defects. 61 Second, before Joel, the courts, or
society reaches a conclusion, they will want to perform a thorough
investigation, just as a doctor takes a patient's complete history. Medi-
cal doctors recognize that this history should not narrowly focus sim-
ply on the individual patient, but must involve her family as well
kinds of discrimination such as gender discrimination. See id. at 322 n.22; see also Charles
1. Lawrence III, The Epidemiology of Color-Blindness: Learning to Think and Talk about Race,
Again, 15 B.C. TiuRD WoRLn LJ. 1, 4 (1995) (acknowledging that his earlier study of un-
conscious racism was "part of a larger and more important project.., of anti-subordina-
tion, and human liberation"). Lawrence also noted that "anti-semitism, like... racism, is
best understood as a societal disease." Id. at 15.
60 See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public's Health: A Study of
Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 59 (1999) (discussing different
accounts of disease and their implications in public health law).
61 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) ("Title VII elimi-
nates certain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise preserving em-
ployers' freedom of choice."); Kahn v. United States Secretary of Labor, 64 F.3d 271, 279
(7th Cir. 1995) ("It is weli-settled in this circuit and other circuits that an employer may
terminate an employee for any reason, good or bad, or for no reason at all, as long as the
employer's reason is not proscribed by a Congressional statute.").
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because of relevance of her family medical history. Much of this Arti-
cle suggests that the scope of investigations of discrimination should
similarly expand because "other" discrimination may really be just one
of additional examples of the same generalized discrimination.
Third, an individual might sincerely blame her fate on one form of
prejudice, such as sexism, while an outside investigation might fault a
different kind of discrimination, such as a form of generalized dis-
crimination. Fourth, classifications of prejudice vary in different con-
texts. The same individual may identify different forms of prejudice
in different circumstances, different individuals may reach different
conclusions about the type of prejudice in some of the same circum-
stances. Fifth, the classification of types of prejudice may have various
social consequences for different individuals.
This Article highlights generalized discrimination for its potential
significance in the current legal and social environment. Undoubt-
edly, other scholars and lawyers would describe this theory's features
in different ways, just as doctors might diagnose the same patient dif-
ferently. Additionally, some scholars may eventually conclude that
generalized discrimination can mutate into other forms, just as dis-
ease-causing organisms may mutate.62
E. Overview and Roadmap
The remainder of this Article explores several aspects of genera-
lized discrimination. Part II shows how attention to generalized dis-
crimination leads to improved results in individual cases, sometimes
to the advantage of plaintiffs and sometimes to the advantage of de-
fendants. Part III illustrates the way in which generalized discrimina-
tion has fit within otherwise disparate social science theories and
research since at least the 1940s. Part IV considers in detail whether
courts should more heavily rely upon evidence of generalized discrim-
ination and whether the law should limit defendants' use of this evi-
dence. Together, Parts II, III, and IV raise a very important question:
If generalized discrimination fits within a vast number of social sci-
ence explanations, and if this theory might enable attorneys to win a
significant number of cases within existing doctrine, why has genera-
lized discrimination attracted so little attention? Part V then consid-
62 This disease mutation may even occur in response to treatment, as the develop-
ment of drug-resistant infections illustrates. See, e.g., Gostin et al., supra note 60, at 99
("[W]idespread use of broad spectrum antimicrobial medication cultivates new forms of
drug-resistant organisms."); Stephen D. Moore, Glaxo, U.S. Firm Go on Research Blitz to Un-
ravel Riddle of HIVs Resistance, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1997; Michael Waldholz, Drug-Resistant
HVBecomes More Widespread, WALL ST.J., Feb. 5, 1999, at B5 (reporting the new evidence of
drug-resistant AIDS virus "as a result of the widespread... use of the new drug therapies,
as well as... the virus's stubborn ability to alter its chemical structure to thwart the drugs'
effectiveness").
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ers barriers to recognizing generalized discrimination and, more
broadly, obstacles that allow individuals to believe that different kinds
of discrimination truly exist. As Part V details, individuals often resist
seeing discrimination against their group as part of a pattern of gener-
alized discrimination, because they implicitly assume that only one
way exists to define groups for all purposes and for all times. Once
people recognize that individuals may make conscious choices about
how to define groups in different ways for various purposes, genera-
lized discrimination may establish its rightful place as a tool for under-
standing the prevalence of discrimination.
II
GENERALIZED DISCRIMINATION AND PROOF OF
DISCRIMINATION TODAY
This Article does not require yet another critique of Supreme
Court doctrine. Lawyers for both plaintiffs and defendants could
more effectively deploy evidence of generalized discrimination in trial
courts regardless of the outcome of any combination of reform pro-
posals, including the abolition of the discriminatory intent require-
ment. Therefore, this Article examines how the habitual fixation on
atomized discrimination prevents lawyers, 63 like Joel in the Prologue,
from seeing how concepts of generalized discrimination would help
them investigate 64 or ultimately prove discrimination.
63 My interviews and discussions with lawyers suggest that many lawyers do not con-
sider the possibility of generalized discrimination; those that do entertain the possibility
reject it as impractical. See Interview with Jeff Goldman, employment discrimination law-
yer, in Miami, Fla. (Dec. 1, 1998); Interview with Susan Stefan, Professor, University of
Miami School of Law, in Miami, Fla. (Apr. 6, 1998).
64 Some investigators genuinely seek to discover whether discrimination occurred;
others invoke their formal role as investigators simply to mask their real role as advocates-
either for their employer, or for outgroup employees or potential employees. See Susan
Bisom-Rapp, Scripting Reality in the Legal Workplace: Women Layers, Litigation Prevention Meas-
ures, and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 6 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 323 (1996); Lauren
B. Edeiman et al., Legal Ambiguity and the Politics of Compliance: Affirmative Action Officers'
Dilemma, 13 LAw & POL'Y 73, 84 (1991) (discussing commitment to substantive goals of
outgroup representation); id. at 89 (noting that some investigators see their roles as neu-
tral, advocating neither those making discrimination claims nor their employers). In addi-
tion, some lawyers always demand to investigate cases before agreeing to defend a client
against charges of discrimination. See, e.g., PAUL M. BAR-rrr, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE
STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA 168 (1999) (describing how an African-American attorney main-
tained that she would not defend a law firm against charges of racism unless she concluded
the charges were in fact baseless). Compare Monroe H. Freedman, The Lauyer's Moral Obli-
gation of Justification, 74 T~x. L. REV. 111, 111-12 (1995) (asserting that "lawyers have a
moral obligation to justify" why they represent a particular client), with Michael E. Tigar,
Defending, 74 TFx. L. REv. 101, 110 (1995) (arguing that an attorney should not have to
justify his decision to represent a particular client).
Cynics might note that the skillful advocate wants to appear as if she only defends
clients in whom she believes, even if in reality she concludes that they are highly culpable.
See David Chamy & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiencq-Wages, Tournaments, and Discrimination: A The-
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This Part provides an overview of the way that courts, lawyers, and
legal theorists currently view generalized discrimination, including
their treatment of ingroup sympathy. It also argues that greater atten-
tion to generalized discrimination does not necessarily affect affirma-
tive action. This Part also addresses how generalized discrimination
plays an even larger role in various kinds of alternative dispute resolu-
tion (ADR), because ADR generally admits far more evidence than
the courts.65 Moreover, an increasing share of civil rights cases involve
such alternative fora.66
A. Why This Article Does Not Address "Substantive"
Antidiscrimination Law
When used in court, theories of discrimination implicate at least
two distinct and important sets of questions. Substantive questions de-
fine what conduct constitutes discrimination; procedural questions in-
clude how we prove such conduct. This distinction between
procedural and substantive is often difficult to ascertain. 67 Substan-
tive questions dominate civil rights scholarship: (1) Should antidis-
crimination law require any proof of intent?68 (2) If discrimination
ory of Employment Discrimination Law for "High-Level"Jobs, 33 HAv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 57, 66
n.38 (1998) (stating that being a majority group member may not be a matter of physical
appearance, but may depend on revealed attitudes, which, "[f] or minority group members
at a firm .... may mean pretending not to be concerned with issues of discrimination in
the workplace or civil rights issues in general" (citation omitted)).
65 See infra note 422 and accompanying text.
66 Both the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
encourage the use of ADR, see Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12212
(1994) (encouraging the use of ADR for disabilities claims); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (advocating the use of ADR for other civil rights
claims), and the Clinton Administration has particularly supported the use of mediation.
See Steven A. Holmes, Jobs Discrimination Agency Lightening Its Load, N.Y. Timxs, Feb. 22,
1999, at Al (describing how the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission promotes
the use of mediation and arbitration to resolve employment discrimination suits).
67 See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Substance-ofProcess, 42 OHIo ST. LJ. 131, 137 (1981); Fresh-
man, supra note 52, at 1727 (describing how "thick procedure" refers to the way in which
"procedure in practice embodies contested normative views"); Deborah C. Malamud, The
Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2229 (1995) ("It is no
secret that the Supreme Court's Tide VII jurisprudence cloaks substance in the 'curious
garb' of procedure.") (footnotes omitted)); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yr.Eu L.J. 1063, 1070-71 (1980) ("If process is consti-
tutionally valued, therefore, it must be valued not only as a means to some independent
end, but for its intrinsic characteristics . . . . Process itself, therefore, becomes
substantive.").
68 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1242 (1995) (argu-
ing that proof of employment discrimination should only require that an impermissible
factor, such as race, played a causal role in the employer's discrimination, rather than
requiring proof that racial bias motivated a particular decision maker).
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must be intentional, must it also be conscious? 6 9 (3) Should antidis-
crimination laws or constitutional principles prohibit discrimination
based on a particular atomized basis, such as sexual orientation?70
Courts typically classify such questions as legal, which means appellate
courts should review these questions de novo.71 Concepts of genera-
lized discrimination may help answer these questions, and they may
even undermine such fundamental concepts as applying different
levels of scrutiny for "different" bases of discrimination. 72
Generalized discrimination may shed some light on the afore-
mentioned three questions, but such inquiries may involve additional
considerations. For example, whether courts want to modify or aban-
don varied levels of scrutiny may depend not simply on whether
groups face prejudice, but also on how well various sets of individuals
may overcome prejudice in the political process.73 Similarly, the coali-
69 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 35, at 322 ("[A] large part of the behavior that pro-
duces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.").
70 See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915 (1989) (developing a constitutional
equal protection argument for protecting rights of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals). Courts
will sometimes frame a complaint as if it were alleged on a certain basis, even when the
claimants themselves did not advance that theory; in one case, a court characterized a
male's claim as based on antigay discrimination even when the plaintiff never alleged that
he was gay. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Confla-
tion of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L.
Rnv. 1, 156-58 (1995); see also Mary Anne C. Case, Desegregating Gender from Sex and Sexual
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudenc4 105 YAILE LJ. 1, (1995)
(arguing that prohibitions against gender discrimination should extend to effeminate
men, who are often presumed to be gay even if they are heterosexual). More recently, in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989),
and several sexual harassment cases decided in 1998, the United States Department of
Justice concluded that it would apply gender discrimination laws to cases in which discrimi-
nation involved plaintiffs, such as effeminate men, who did not conform to dominant gen-
der stereotypes. See Data Lounge, Dep't of Justice to Pursue Gay Bias Complaints (Nov. 25,
1998) (visited Oct. 30, 1999) <http://www.datalounge.com/templates/news/
record.html?record=2928>.
71 See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 76-77 (1998) (not-
ing that facts are irrelevant to the purely legal question of whether harassment by males of
another male may constitute sexual harassment); Johnson v. Community Nursing Servs.,
932 F. Supp. 269, 271 (D. Utah 1996) (holding that the question of whether same-sex
sexual harassment violates Title VII is a legal question).
72 See generally, e.g., Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection
Jurisprudence: Recognizing the Co-Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes 89 (Mar. 31,
1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (suggesting that courts might "apply
heightened scrutiny when official discrimination targets relatively vulnerable groups for
the denial of fairly important rights, even if the class is not deemed to be suspect and the
right is not determined to be fundamental").
73 In an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff often prevails if she can show that
a particular employer ever disadvantaged her in some legally impermissible way. In con-
stitutional cases, however, the question of whether a particular classification is suspect de-
pends more generally on a showing that the classification often results in harm that the
legislature cannot remedy. SeeJohn Hart Ely, If at First You Don't Succeed, Ignore the Question
Next Time? Group Harm in Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia, 15 CONST.
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tion effects of reliance on generalized discrimination theory might
lead to the use of larger groups, such as outgroups, as a basis for class
action representation 74 or voting districting.75 However, such uses
raise additional issues. For example, both the class action and voting
districting depend on the idea that individuals see themselves as shar-
ing common interests. The potential coalition effects of generalized
discrimination, however, do not guarantee that one individual today
could adequately represent another group member in a class action,
or that one group of individuals today could sufficiently unite to elect
a representative.
In lieu of such substantive questions, this Article applies concepts
of generalized discrimination to an everyday procedural practice: Us-
ing examples of the treatment of others like Deborah in the Prologue
to determine whether her firm discriminated. Although the Article
emphasizes how generalized discrimination limits the way in which
Deborah in the Prologue and other outgroup members work, also
generalized discrimination limits opportunities in renting apart-
ments, 76 service in restaurants, and juror selection.
COMMENTARY 215, 220, 222 (1998) (noting the Supreme Court's focus in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), on "the question whether black children generally were
harmed" by school segregation, rather than on harm to the particular plaintiffs in the
case); cf. David L. Hamilton et al., Perceiving Social Groups: The Importance of the Entitativity
Continuum, in INTERGROUP COGNITION AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 47, 64-65 (Constantine
Sedikides et al. eds., 1998) (asserting a difference between the extent to which a group of
individuals acts like a group, and the degree to which individuals outside that group will
think that individuals in that group are alike and will otherwise discriminate against such
individuals). As Part V of this Article suggests, however, the same barriers to coalitions that
explain why some atomized groups resist recognizing generalized discrimination also ex-
plain how tensions within atomized groups may limit a group's ability to act within the
political process.
74 For a highly controversial application of the requirement that class action repre-
sentatives represent the entire class, see Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475 (9th
Cir. 1983). See id. at 480 (concluding that African-American woman cannot adequately
represent African-American men or white women in a Tide VII class action); see also Allen
v. City of Chicago, 828 F. Supp. 543, 549-54 (N.D. InI. 1993) (denying class certification to a
proposed class of workers comprised of African Americans, Hispanics, and older workers).
For the classic critique of the Moore decision and other similar cases, see Crenshaw, supra
note 19, at 143-46.
75 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986) (holding that, in order to state a
claim for violation of fair districting principles, a "minority group must be able to show that
it is politically cohesive," because, "[i]f the minority group is not politically cohesive, it
cannot be said that the selection of a multimember electoral structure thwarts distinctive
minority group interests"); Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits
of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 337-45 (1995) (discussing the enforce-
ment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Thornburg v. Ginges).
76 See, e.g.,JAMEs A. KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING: DIscRIMINATION IN REAL ESTATE, COMMU-
NYIY DEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZATION § 3.08, at 168-69 (2d ed. 1995) ("Evidence is admis-
sible and often available that the defendant has engaged in other acts of discrimination
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This Article focuses on procedural questions for two reasons.
First, because trial courts have more leeway procedurally, generalized
discrimination may offer an immediate and practical payoff to those
involved in litigation. In principle, advocates have more room to ar-
gue about generalized discrimination to trial courts; courts of appeal
usually state that they would review trial courts' decisions on evidence
and discovery deferentially.77 Additionally, trial courts often have the
final word on evidentiary issues, because litigants rarely appeal these
decisions.78
Second, focusing on these relatively easy procedural moves allows
us to analyze why lawyers and individuals describe discrimination in
certain ways. For example, why does Deborah in the Prologue think,
"It's because I'm a woman" rather than "It's because the firm does not
see me as a straight, white, Christian man without any apparent disa-
bilities"? Why does Joel, her lawyer, quickly agree with her view when
a doctor would quite often be skeptical of a patient who concluded
she had, for example, strep throat rather than a cold, flu, or some
other disease? If we ask why individuals do not undertake the tortur-
ous appellate road of restructuring substantive questions, such as un-
conscious discrimination or reading sexual orientation into statutes,
there are too many simple answers. Such litigation takes much more
time and money. Private lawyers rarely have the incentive to bring
such suits, 79 and public lawyers rarely possess the independence or
motivation to take these cases.80 Public interest lawyers, as we shall see
in Part V, may also be too committed ideologically or professionally to
77 See infra note 391 and accompanying text. In practice, appellate courts overturn
such decisions more often than their stated standard of review might suggest. See infra note
392 and accompanying text.
78 This point should not be overstated. Parties may settle based in part upon predic-
tions of how the appellate court would decide the case. Cf Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ. 950, 997
(1979) ("[M]ost [claims] are settled out of court ... [T]he preferences of the parties, the
entitlements created by law, transaction costs, attitudes toward risk, and strategic behavior
will substantially affect negotiated outcomes.").
79 In a sense, this scenario reflects a collective action problem. The private lawyer
who establishes an important legal principle only gets paid for a particular case, potentially
with some premium for the difficult issues involved. Other private lawyers can become
free riders on the innovative lawyer's success. For example, Thurgood Marshall cannot
charge a royalty to every lawyer who brings a case based on the principles established by
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
80 See BaAuN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE
DEPARTmENT oFJusTncE 119 (1997) ("The desire to avoid error could lead the [Civil Rights
Division of the Department of Justice] into an overabundance of caution."); see also
Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Emplo)-
men 45 UCLA L. REv. 1401, 1403 (1998) ("T]he government has repeatedly failed in its
role as a vigorous advocate for those seeking to be free from discrimination.").
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organizations that often become entrenched 1 along atomized lines.8 2
In contrast, if attorneys do not rely on a theory of generalized discrim-
ination in easier discovery issues8 3 or do not provide evidence of other
acts of discrimination, the fixation with atomized concepts of discrimi-
nation becomes more curious. Regardless of their other incentives,
lawyers want to win; if evidence of generalized discrimination will help
lawyers win, the legal community must clearly ponder other forces
that might shape the way lawyers see discrimination.
B. How Concepts of Generalized Discrimination Help Prove or
Disprove Discrimination in Particular Cases
Whenever we discuss discrimination, we implicitly put an individ-
ual in one group and compare how she was treated in comparison to
those outside that group.8 4 In cases like Deborah's, lawyers try to
81 The American Jewish Committee's work against generalized discrimination, rather
than solely against anti-Semitism, is a notable exception. See infra note 190 and accompa-
nying text.
82 See infra notes 451-52 and accompanying text. This is not to say that public interest
lawyers simply pursue careerist motives or slavishly follow the directions of organizations
for which they work. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an
Understanding of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERiNG:
POLITCAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 31, 47 (Austin Sarat & Smart
Scheingold eds., 1998) ("[W]e know remarkably little about what actually makes lawyers
commit themselves to particular causes, particular people, or particular issues .. ").
83 I say "easier" hesitantly, because there may be practical problems in presenting
evidence of generalized discrimination even in the absence of substantial doctrinal or ideo-
logical reasons, such as the nature of liberalism. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing practical
and theoretical questions about limits on the ability to recognize generalized discrimina-
don). However, I do wish to distinguish my argument here from arguments that assume
that legal change requires examination of fundamental assumptions and doctrines.
84 See, e.g., BARBARA LiNDEMANN ScHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIscPJWmNA-
TION LAW 1147-96 (1976) (examining the type and extent of proof necessary to establish a
claim of employment discrimination); 2 PAUL H. TOBIAS ET AL., LITIGATING WRONGFUL Dis-
CHARGE CLAIMs § 1311, at 150-51 (Supp. 1997) (suggesting that interview of potential plain-
tiff should not only identify "[n] ames of other employees outside the protected group (e.g.,
white males, younger employees) who have received preferential or more favorable treat-
ment than you and other members of the protected group, (e.g., blacks, females, employees
over 40)," but also produce "[a]ny evidence of a pattern where members of a protected
group have been... treated unfairly" (emphasis added)); 2 TOBIAS ETAL., supra, § 10:10, at
16 (advising a plaintiff's attorney to consider, among other things, "evidence of discrimina-
tion (e.g., were similarly situated employees treated differently?)" when evaluating whether
to file suit).
Empirical studies confirm that many attorneys follow this conventional wisdom. In
one study, 77.8% of opinions in race discrimination cases and 64.8% of the sex discrimina-
tion cases referred to past discrimination. See Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race,
Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases
ChallengingJob Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1073, 1112 n.112 (1992). This figure is a low
estimate because some cases might have involved evidence of past discrimination, but
judges might not have included this evidence in their written decisions. See id. at 1112-13
n.112.
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compare how a firm treats people like her to how it treats others.8 5 As
the Ninth Circuit stated, "[i] t is clear that an employer's conduct
tending to demonstrate hostility towards a certain group is both rele-
vant and admissible where the employer's general hostility towards
that group is the true reason behind firing an employee who is a mem-
ber of that group."8 6 Although some theorists would disagree,87 the
same question arises when the claim is not hostile discrimination, but
discrimination in favor of those in a certain group. This seemingly
mundane statement of black letter law, however, begs the serious
question: How do we define "that group"?
1. Proving Discrimination and the Small Numbers Problem
The question of how we define the group "like the plaintiff' ap-
plies to both of the principal methods of proving discrimination. To
somewhat simplify, one can distinguish two general tests of discrimina-
tion: intent tests and effects tests.88 Under intent tests, such as the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause,8 9 a
defendant has violated the Constitution only if the defendant inten-
tionally treated individuals differently based on a set of forbidden dis-
tinctions, such as race.90 Alternatively, effects tests allow the trier of
fact to worry less about the defendant's actual intent. Under this
method, a violation, or a presumption of a violation, occurs when an
employer's practice disproportionately affects a group regardless of
85 Cf Krieger, supra note 68, at 1166 ("Cases tell stories. Indeed, judicial opinions
and the legal theories they expound function somewhat like a society's core stories, struc-
turing the interpretation of experience and providing the authors and audiences of future
stories with commonly recognized plots, symbols, themes, and characters.").
86 Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
87 See infra Part II.B.2 (surveying case law on discrimination in favor of a group); infra
notes 134-63 and accompanying text (offering a theoretical critique of outlawing discrimi-
nation in favor of a group); infra Part III.C.1 (describing why ingroup sympathy is wrong).
88 These tests overlook distinctions that are important for other purposes, but are not
crucial for the current study of how we categorize types of discrimination. For example,
courts in age or gender discrimination cases often accept evidence of stereotyping alone as
proof of a violation, but require further proof of intent in race discrimination cases. See
Krieger, supra note 68, at 1168-69. Similarly, courts will find liability in both religious dis-
crimination and disability cases if an employer fails to make reasonable accommodations;
however, despite the similarity of language of their opinions, courts often reach different
results on similar facts in religious discrimination and disability discrimination cases. See
Susan Stefan, Employment Discrimination, People with Psychiatric Disabilities and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (Oct. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
89 U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1.
90 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266-68 (1977) (requiring proof of racially discriminatory intent to show an equal protec-
tion violation); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("[O]ur cases have not em-
braced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects
a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially dispro-
portionate impact.").
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whether the defendant intended such effect. 91 Recently, fewer cases
relied on effects tests. 9 2
Under both the effects and intent models, litigants generally ad-
dress how a defendant disadvantaged others like the plaintiff. In in-
tent cases, parties often will offer evidence of other "bad" acts, such as
the passing over of other women for promotion or the turning away of
other African Americans from a restaurant.93 For instance, if a firm
denies partnership to an African-American associate with "too few cli-
ents," the plaintiff might offer examples of white associates promoted
with the same or fewer clients. 94 Sometimes, plaintiffs offer statistical
evidence, such as the number of truck drivers in general and the
number of male and female truck drivers promoted.95 In effects
cases, parties will always have to define the relevant group that suffers
some adverse effect of a superficially neutral practice; litigants might
demonstrate that a particular kind of strength test tends to exclude
women and is not necessary for a job.96
As both the Prologue and Part I suggest, the problem of small
numbers may prevent meaningful analysis in cases using both kinds of
proof. If Deborah tries to show that her firm only mistreated women,
she will likely fail if the firm has too few women from which to draw
91 Under the disparate impact doctrine used in employment discrimination cases
brought under the federal antidiscrimination law of Title VII, the effects test is compli-
cated in two ways. First, plaintiffs must identify a specific practice, such as height and
weight requirements, that has a disparate effect, such as tending to exclude females. See,
e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i) (1994); Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988). Second, the employer has the opportunity to
escape liability if he can show that the practice in question is "job related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i).
92 From January 1985 to March 1987, less than 2% of employment cases in federal
courts used a disparate impact theory. SeeJohn J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The
Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 998 n.57
(1991).
93 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
94 See BARRr, supra note 64, at 200-01.
95 This type of statistical evidence is also admissible in cases brought as disparate treat-
ment claims by individual employees. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
805 (1973) ("[S] tatistics as to petitioner's employment policy and practice may be helpful
to a determination of whether petitioner's refusal to rehire respondent in this case con-
formed to a general pattern of discrimination against blacks."); Stratton v. Department for
the Aging, 132 F.3d 869, 876-77 (2d Cir. 1997) (relying on statistical charts to prove
discrimination).
96 Even if one confines proof to a single atomized group, such as women, the statisti-
cal analysis involves a large number of variables; these include how to define the relevant
job, how to define the relevant part of the organization, how to define the time period for
comparison, and how to define the pool of potential employees. See, e.g., WALTER B. CON-
NOLY, JR. ET AL., USE OF STATISTICS iN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY LITIGATION
§ 11.10[2],at 11-32 ("In practice, it is often physically impossible to reconstruct with exacti-
tude the complete range of alternatives faced by the employer, or, if possible, not economi-
cally feasible. In such circumstances, one can only examine the employer's decisions with
a lens more or less clouded.").
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meaningful comparisons.97 This dearth of evidence occurs when one
or more of the following scenarios exist: (1) small organizations with
few employees, (2) organizations of any size, but involving claims by
individuals within a smaller unit of the organization, (3) situations
with few persons from the same atomized category in similar posi-
tions, or (4) relatively homogenous organizations. In small organiza-
tions, there are often too few current or past employees to make
persuasive comparisons. In larger organizations, a sufficient number
of employees may exist, but the number of employees that give rise to
(what courts will label) meaningful comparisons may be small. Under
current case law, courts often restrict comparisons to employees per-
forming similar functions, employees with similar supervisors, and rel-
atively recent actions. 98 As one court noted, "[there] are only a
limited number of potential 'similarly situated employees' when
higher level supervisory positions for medical doctors are involved." 99
Therefore, the pool of potential comparisons in cases involving large
organizations may be as small as those available in smaller organiza-
tions. Moreover, large organizations may have a limited pool of com-
parisons if the relevant part of the organization only includes those
97 In an ADEA case against a university, the Seventh Circuit held that in order to
prove age discrimination, the plaintiff needed to offer more than a single case of another
older professor who was turned down for tenure. See Kuhn v. Ball State Univ., 78 F.3d 330,
332 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A plaintiff who wants a court to infer discrimination from the em-
ployer's treatment of comparable cases has to analyze a goodly sample.... What a plaintiff
... has to do is subject all of the employer's decisions to statistical analysis to find out
whether age makes a difference."); see also Vore v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 32 F.3d 1161,
1164 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiffs did not prove racial harassment when the
alleged harasser was the only African-American employee in the workplace, and the plain-
tiffs could not provide a parallel example where there was only one white employee, sur-
rounded by black employees who were treated differently in the face of harassment
charges); Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1156 (10th Cir. 1990) (admitting evi-
dence of discrimination against other employees).
The Seventh Circuit's view, however, goes even further than that of the Supreme
Court: the Court has never explicitly required statistical proof in disparate treatment cases,
but rather only requires sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent from some source. See,
e.g., George Rutherglen, Claims of Employment Discrimination Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, in STATISTICAL METHODS IN DISCPaMINATION LmGATION 33, 53 (D.H. Kaye &
Mikel Aickin eds., 1986) (concluding that the Supreme Court's disparate treatment cases
only show "that the plaintiff bears the normal burden of proof in a civil case: to present
evidence from which a reasonable inference of intentional discrimination may be drawn
and to persuade the judge by a preponderance of the evidence to draw that inference").
In a similar way, skeptics have dismissed studies of bias in the courts and the legal profes-
sion by characterizing instances of bias as mere anecdotes. SeeJudith Resnik, Singular and
Aggregate Voices: Audiences and Authority in Law and Literature and in Law and Feminism, in 2
LAW AND LrrRATuE 687, 718 (Michael Freeman & Andrew D.E. Lewis eds., 1999) ("Indi-
vidual stories are rebuffed as idiosyncratic or out-of-date anecdotes.").
98 See infra Part IV for an examination of this trend in courts, and a survey of several
criticisms.
99 Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1563 (l1th Cir. 1997).
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employees in a narrow group, such as those perceived 00 as able-bod-
ied white, Protestant, heterosexual males. As studies of the glass-ceil-
ing phenomenon suggest, this includes many high-level positions. 10 1
If Deborah works for a large international firm, the partners in that
firm may be largely white Protestant males, presumed to be heterosex-
ual and free from disability. Moreover, even if she identifies problems
that other women faced, the firm may convince a court that these
womens' experiences do not matter, because they work in other de-
partments in the same office, or offices in other cities, or worked for
the firm too long ago.
In all of these small-number scenarios, both plaintiffs and defend-
ants often have difficulty proving their cases. It is easy for the law firm
in the Prologue to claim that it denied Deborah partnership
because she was truly "difficult" if Deborah is unable to point to
the firm's treatment of other women because there are no
other women in her partnership class.' 0 2 Similarly, if an employer
faces a claim for harassment based on how a particular supervisor
treated a Hispanic employee in an area with few Hispanics, for exam-
ple, the employer may have trouble proving the affirmative defense of
an effective anti-harassment plan if he can only show how he handled
complaints by other Hispanics rather than how he handled com-
plaints by white women and African-American males.'0 3 As discussed
100 People may treat individuals as if they are a certain way, such as gay or disabled,
even if this perception is inaccurate. See, e.g., Freshman, supra note 16, at 266 n.120.
101 See FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMM'N, GOOD FOR BusiNEss: MAKING FuLL USE OF THE
NArION's HUMAN CAPrrAL 7 (1995) (noting the general consensus that "a glass ceiling
exists and that it operates substantially to exclude minorities and women from the top
levels of management"); Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VI to Jobs in High Places, 95
HARV. L. REv. 945, 948 (1982) (observing that "[b]lacks have made only limited progress
... in gaining access to 'upper level' jobs"); Tracy Anbinder Baron, Comment, Keeping
Women Out of the Executive Suite: The Courts'Failure to Apply Title VII Scrutiny to Upper-Level Jobs,
143 U. PA. L. REv. 267, 267 (1994) (remarking that "the upper reaches of most professions
remain disproportionately male").
102 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1989) (involving an alleged
claim that a woman was not promoted to partnership because of her difficult personality);
cf. Holifiel, 115 F.3d at 1563-64 (addressing an employer's claim that an African-American
doctor who supervised other doctors "displayed unprofessional behavior" and "caused con-
flict," but noting the difficulty in finding "similarly situated employees").
103 See generally Vitug v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 88 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996). In Vitug,
the Seventh Circuit gave greater weight to similar evidence when an Asian Catholic plain-
tiff alleged discrimination based on national origin and religion; the court noted that not
only the percentage of Asians in the employer's workforce, but also the percentage of
minorities in general in its workforce matched or exceeded the percentage of minorities in
the national workforce. See id. at 514 ("[The employer]'s challenged hiring practices actu-
ally have a favorable rather than a negative effect on minority applicants in general, and
Asian/Pacific Islanders in particular."). As noted above, additional evidence about the
presence of generalized discrimination may enhance a court's confidence about the pres-
ence of discrimination even if other atomized evidence is also available. See supra note 38
and accompanying text.
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further below,' 0 4 parties in both scenarios may try to argue that courts
should give less weight to other acts of discrimination because of the
possibility of atomized or subatomized (intersectional) discrimination.
Evidence of generalized discrimination, or nondiscrimination, may
still be helpful to make sense of these situations. As the remainder of
this Part shows, many courts and lawyers rarely confront these ques-
tions directly; lawyers rarely seek to introduce evidence of discrimina-
tion on what they see as "other" bases, and courts rarely consider the
possibility of generalized discrimination. In an unusually explicit dis-
cussion of this issue in the concurring opinion of an "age discrimina-
tion" case, Second CircuitJudge and former dean of Yale Law School,
Guido Calabresi, went out of his way to suggest that, as he framed the
question, evidence of discrimination against one minority might be
evidence of discrimination against another minority.105 The brief
concurrence, however, did not elaborate on how he would reach this
conclusion; the remainder of this Part and Part Im bolsterJudge Gala-
bresi's intuition with more specific arguments and evidence of genera-
lized ingroup sympathy and outgroup hostility.
2. The Prohibition Against Ingroup Sympathy and Its Stereotyped
Application
Because many recent social science perspectives discuss ingroup
sympathy, a threshold question is whether the law does, and should,
prohibit it. Currently, courts and lawyers treat ingroup sympathy in
an odd way: Both usually assume that ingroup sympathy violates an-
tidiscrimination law, but recognize ingroup sympathy only when some
"ethnic" outgroup favors its own. The language of Supreme Court
cases is crystal clear: preference for an individual based on forbidden
characteristics, such as race or gender, usually violates antidiscrimina-
104 See infra notes 270-71 and accompanying text (noting that contemporary psycholog-
ical studies of discrimination recognize that there exist various theories of discrimination
that best explain and describe discrimination in each different circumstance).
105 See Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 172 F.3d 192, 202-04 (2d Cir. 1999) (Cal-
abresi,J., concurring). Although the majority opinion in that age discrimination case dealt
with differences in groups of older persons, Judge Calabresi nevertheless wrote a separate
concurrence to note the potential relevance of "different" kinds of discrimination:
[I]n appropriate circumstances, evidence of discrimination against one
group of people can support an inference of discrimination against an-
other group. For example, if statistical or other evidence indicated that an
employer discriminated against Asian-Americans, Asians, Chicanos, and Af-
rican-Americans, it might be reasonable to deem that evidence relevant to a
claim that the same employer had discriminated against a Native American
or a Nigerian. This would especially be so if the available data were insuffi-
cient to establish a pattern of behavior toward the plaintiff's class specifi-
cally, as might be the case if the plaintiff had been the only Native
American or Nigerian in the defendant's employ.
Id. (Calabresi, J., concurring).
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tion laws. 10 6 Witness the Supreme Court's language describing dispa-
rate treatment discrimination in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins.10 7 "[T] he
most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply
treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion [or other protected characteristics.]"1 0 8 Similarly, in
holding thatJews and Arabs were protected under post-Civil War civil
rights legislation, the Supreme Court turned to the law's legislative
history; the majority quoted one representative who explained that
the legislation forbade preferences such that "the States shall not
hereafter discriminate against the immigrant from China and in favor
of the immigrant from Prussia, nor against the immigrant from
France and in favor of the immigrant from Ireland." 0 9
Religious discrimination cases also illustrate the prohibition
against ingroup sympathy. A party can prove religious discrimination
by demonstrating that someone preferred only members of a certain
religion; a party need not show that the defendant particularly dis-
liked members of other specific religions. For example, in Rasul v.
District of Columbia,110 the court held that a prison could not limit
106 There remain exceptions to this general rule. For example, religious organizations
may prefer members of their own religion for certain limited jobs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
1 (a) (1994) (making the statutory prohibition on discrimination inapplicable to "a reli-
gious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the em-
ployment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the
carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activi-
ties"). Under another exception created by judicial interpretation of various treaties, for-
eign-owned companies may prefer their own nationals for certain important positions,
even within the United States. See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176,
188-89 (1982) (holding that the exception for foreign companies under a treaty to discrim-
inate in favor of its own nationals in the hiring of high-level personnel only applies to
companies incorporated under the laws of the foreign country signing the treaty, not to
their local subsidiaries incorporated in the United States); Papaila v. Uniden Am. Corp., 51
F.3d 54, 55-56 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that a U.S. subsidiary may discriminate in favor of
Japanese nationals under the treaty rights of its Japanese parent corporation); Fortino v.
Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that, to the extent dictated by the
Japanese parent corporations, that its U.S. subsidiary could discriminate in favor of Japa-
nese nationals for certain high-level positions under a friendship treaty between Japan and
the United States). See generally Tram N. Ngnyen, Note, When National Origin May Constitute
A Bona Fide Occupational Qualification: The Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty as an
Affirmative Defense to a Title VII Claim, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 215 (1998) (contrasting
the various approaches of the circuits to the question of when foreign companies may
discriminate in favor of their own nationals, and suggesting that it should turn in part on
different forms of corporate governance in different countries).
The question of affirmative action presents a separate question that does not turn on
theories of atomized versus generalized discrimination. See infra Part II.C.1.
107 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
108 Id. at 609 (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
335 n.15 (1977)) (alterations in original).
109 Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (emphasis added).
110 680 F. Supp. 436 (D.D.C. 1988).
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prison chaplains to Protestants."' Although a Muslim brought the
case,112 the court noted that the prison also did not employ Jews. 11
The court never required a showing that the policy reflected hostility
toward Muslims, Jews, or members of any other particular religion. 114
Additionally, in EEOC v. Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate,1 5 the Ninth
Circuit held that a school could not hire only Protestants; it described
the plaintiff simply as "not a Protestant.""16
Despite the clarity of this language and associated doctrine, lower
court decisions present an odd pattern. On the one hand, lawyers
regularly allege that members of some historic outgroup, such as Ital-
ian Americans, favor other Italian Americans to the detriment of
those from anywhere other than Italy.117 In these cases, courts regu-
larly accept that proof of this type of preference constitutes discrimi-
natory motivation. 118
On the other hand, one sees a very different picture for prefer-
ences that involve historically advantaged ingroups, such as those per-
ceived as white, Protestant, heterosexual, able-bodied, and of
Northern European origin. Few reported instances of lawyers bring-
ing such cases exist; indeed, I have identified only two cases in which a
party sought to introduce evidence of ingroup sympathy based on its
belief that a defendant preferred some traditionally advantaged in-
group. In one of these cases, the district court admitted proof on gen-
eralized lines, and in the other, a different judge did not.119 Thus, an
1 See id. at 441-42.
112 See id. at 437.
113 See id. at 441 n.7.
114 See id. at 441-42.
115 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1993).
116 Id. at 459; see also Vitug v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 88 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 1996)
(considering allegation that employer preferred only "born-again Christians," but conclud-
ing that evidence did not support the claim).
117 See, e.g., Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297, 1302-04 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that a preference for Italian Americans in company's stockholder preference
plan is a violation of Title VII); Thomas v. Rohner-Gehrig & Co., 582 F. Supp. 669, 674-75
(N.D. IIl. 1984) (holding that the plaintiff's claim of employer's preference for persons of
German or Swiss origin creates a Title VII cause of action). But see Ali v. National Bank,
508 F. Supp. 611, 613-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that the plaintiff's claim of the em-
ployer's preference for light-skinned Pakistanis does not establish a prima facie case of
employment discrimination).
118 See, e.g., infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text (discussingJudge Posner's opin-
ion in which he assumed that a preference for Korean Americans, if proven, would proba-
bly violate antidiscrimination law).
119 Both cases involve district court judges in the District of Columbia. In Abramson v.
American University, 48 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 38,439, at 54,500 (D.D.C. 1988), the
district court held that an Eastern European Jew could offer testimonies by two Muslims,
one African American, and one Belgian to prove that the dean of the college wanted to
.. reimpose a "Christian ethic".. . and to create a more "homogeneous faculty" that ex-
cluded the faculty 'who were not white, Christian and Anglo-Saxon in origin.'" Id. at
54,501 (quoting the plaintiff's complaint). The court explained:
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analysis of the reported cases suggests that attorneys rarely argue that
their clients suffered because they were outside a preferred group that
resembled those who have historically been the most privileged in the
most circumstances. As Part III.C shows, however, attorneys some-
times do try to use examples of discrimination involving other atom-
ized groups to prove discriminatory motivation, but they apparently
do so without offering an explanation.
C. The Unexamined Assumption of Atomized Discrimination:
"Logic," Burden Shifting, and Law by Stereotype
Several opinions deny discovery or exclude evidence of discrimi-
nation, on the ground that it involves victims of some "other" form of
discrimination. For example, a court may rule that a white woman
cannot rely on evidence of discrimination involving an African-Ameri-
can man, because it involves a "different" form of discrimination. In
these cases, the courts generally reject such attempts in two ways.
In the stronger form of rejection, the courts simply assert that no
relationship exists between two "different" kinds of discrimination.
For example, in Finch v. Hercules Inc.,120 the court stated that a plaintiff
who alleged age discrimination had properly withdrawn a request for
"information relevant to types of discrimination other than age," be-
cause "there is no logical connection between instances of age dis-
crimination and instances of race or gender discrimination."112 The
court simply assumed the atomized logic that discrimination occurs
only against particular groups, such as persons of a certain age. Alter-
natively, the court could have made the equally logical assumption
that discrimination tracked more generalized forms, such as discrimi-
nation in favor of younger men who were presumed vigorous and am-
Although it is true that plaintiff's witnesses are neitherJewish nor [of] East-
ern European background, evidence that [the dean of the school] discrimi-
nated against other minority groups is surely relevant towards the issue of
his discriminatory intent in general, since relevant evidence "means evi-
dence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of con-
sequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."
Id. (citation omitted).
In the second case, a white woman alleged that a hotel discriminated against her be-
cause it "thought only a certain category of people are fit to manage [its] hotel business,
namely, white males-or at least non-American Negro males." Freshman, supra note 16, at
262 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court nonetheless declined to accept
evidence of how the employer treated African Americans. See Rauh v. Coyne, 744 F. Supp.
1181, 1183, 1186 (D.D.C. 1990).
120 149 F.R.D. 60 (D. Del. 1993).
121 Id. at 63 n.3; see also EEOC v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 420 F. Supp. 244,
247 (D. Md. 1976) (holding that because the claim alleged sex discrimination and the
plaintiff was white, "information identified by race is not relevant").
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bitious enough for demanding work. 122 In certain settings, the most
presumably fit group might be young African-Americans and
Latinos. 123
Other courts simply assert that no relationship exists between dif-
ferent forms of discrimination, without even invoking logic. 124 In this
weaker form of rejection, courts engage in unspoken burden shift-
ing: 25 Courts suggest that plaintiffs have not shown that two atomized
categories, such as women and African Americans, are related. 126 For
example, when the plaintiff in Duncan v. Maiyland'27 alleged race dis-
crimination, the court denied a request for statistics based on gender
" [i]n the absence of any explanation by plaintiff of the relevance of
information by sex."128
122 For a similar assumption in an otherwise carefully documented argument for the
need for broader discovery in employment discrimination cases, see Susan K. Grebeld-
inger, How Can a Plaintiff Prove Intentional Employment Discrimination If She Cannot Explore the
Relevant Circumstances: The Needfor Broad Workforce and Time Parameters in Discovery, 74 DENY.
U. L. REv. 159, 192 (1996).
123 See supra note 50.
124 See Smith v. Airborne Freight Corp., No. 95-15348, 1996 WL 509574, at *6 (9th Cir.
Sept. 6, 1996); General Ins. Co. of Am. v. EEOC, 491 F.2d 133, 136 (9th Cir. 1974) (label-
ing an EEOC subpoena overbroad for seeking "evidence going to forms of discrimination
not even charged or alleged"); McClain v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 85 F.RD. 53, 63 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (stating that, in a case where an African American alleges racial discrimination, in-
formation "[w]hether [the defendant] discriminates against employees on the basis of reli-
gion, creed, gender or national origin is wholly irrelevant").
Smith is a particularly interesting case because the facts of the case hint at a possible
basis for alleging generalized discrimination. The Ninth Circuit court viewed the case sim-
ply as one involving discrimination against African Americans. Testimony that the court
held should have been excluded showed that one employee referred to African Americans
as "they." Smith, 1996 WL 509574, at *4. Use of this term suggests generalized outgroup
hostility. "they" are bad, and "they" might not only refer to African Americans, but to all
those outside some narrow group of "we," the good guys. Nevertheless, the court also
excluded evidence involving another employee by classifying that evidence as discrimina-
tory merely "on the basis of age, which was not in issue" in the case. Id. at *6; see also id. at
*6 n.3 (distinguishing a case admitting similar evidence on the ground that the other case
involved "other witnesses [who] testified to the same type of discrimination (i.e., age
discrimination)").
125 See generaly RicHARD H. GAsIUNs, BuRDENS OF PROOF IN MODERN DIscOuRsE 3
(1992) ("In the current rhetorical climate, shifting the burden of proof to our opponents
becomes an irresistible argument strategy.").
126 For example, in Prouty v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 99 FR.D. 545 (D.D.C.
1983), a plaintiff alleged race discrimination and sought information on race on the
ground that the absence of such data might "distort" the statistical analysis. Id. at 546.
However, the plaintiff did not elaborate on how it might distort the analysis, and the court
denied the plaintiff's request. See id.
127 78 F.R-D. 88 (D. Md. 1978).
128 Id. at 96. One line of cases, however, provides a limited exception to the general
rule. In these cases, courts considered the question of whether a plaintiff can raise a claim
in court on one atomized basis, such as race, when he has relied on a different atomized
basis in an administrative process, typically that of the EEOC or a local equivalent. In some
cases, the courts held that the failure to allege the "other" basis before the relevant admin-
istrative agency bars such additional claims; in other cases, the courts have allowed the
claims. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 462-64 (5th Cir. 1970)
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Both the stronger and weaker rejection of generalized discrimina-
tion reflect the selective attention by both judges and attorneys to in-
group sympathy. Lawyers regularly allege discrimination in favor of
historic outgroups, and judges regularly accept such allegations.
Judges, however, fail to see the possibility of ingroup sympathy for his-
toric ingroups. Moreover, the reported decisions suggest that lawyers
often cannot articulate the relationship between different kinds of dis-
crimination.129 Alternatively, (though it seems unlikely) lawyers may
so thoroughly understand discrimination as generalized that they can-
not understand that an explanation is necessary. One might blame
lawyers themselves for not presenting a simple logical relationship,
such as ingroup sympathy. In fairness, however, both lawyers and
judges may be caught up in the far broader phenomenon of selective
inattention to ingroup sympathy. 130 This selective inattention is
analogous to a more familiar phenomenon of discrimination: Individ-
uals praise the behavior by ingroup members, such as "frugality" by a
Protestant, but condemn the same behavior by outgroup members,
such as Jewish "cheapness." Likewise when outgroup members like
Korean Americans favor their own, they are "clannish,"1 3' but when
members of ingroups, like white males, prefer their own, this behavior
remains invisible and sometimes even draws praise as "sticking to-
(allowing the plaintiff's claim, although the plaintiff checked the box labeled "sex" instead
of "national origin" when filling out an EEOC administrative charge form); Gausmann v.
City of Ashland, 926 F. Supp. 635, 639 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (holding that when a plaintiff
filed an administrative claim for age discrimination, she could also sue for gender discrimi-
nation on the ground that one might reasonably expect her former claim to lead to evi-
dence of the latter).
Additionally, in EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1977), the Sixth Circuit
refused to let the EEOC bring suit for religious discrimination when the person filing a
complaint with the EEOC did not allege that she herself had been the victim of religious
discrimination. One can also analyze these cases under a theory of generalized discrimina-
tion: if much discrimination is generalized, then an allegation of discrimination before the
EEOC necessarily raises the question of whether there is some kind of generalized discrimi-
nation. Under that interpretation, the additional claims are not truly additional, but are
part of the same claim. Nevertheless, the cases seem to turn more on various equitable and
ad hoc considerations than on abstract theories of the level of generality of discrimination.
For instance, courts appear more likely to allow a plaintiff's additional claims if the plaintiff
was poorly educated or unrepresented by counsel.
129 One can see an unsuccessful attempt at creating this connection in Welker v.
Smithkline Beckman, No. 89-866, 1989 WL 121894, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 1989). In this
case, an older woman alleged both age and sex discrimination. The court held that a
request for information on the racial makeup of employees was "irrelevant" even though
the plaintiff alleged that the employer gave less favorable termination packages to African
Americans, women, and older persons. Id. One may infer that the court imagined that
there were entirely separate explanations for why a firm would mistreat African Americans
and why it would mistreat older women.
130 See infra Part V.
131 See infra text accompanying note 221 (noting the stereotypical notion that out-
groups are clannish).
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gether."' 32 Therefore, Part H turns to the simple question of deter-
mining the evidence of how different forms of discrimination are best
understood as different or intrinsically related. To avoid misunder-
standing, however, we must first turn to two points: the separate case
of affirmative action, and theoretical and practical limits on the defini-
tion of generalized discrimination.
1. The Separate Case of Affirmative Action
The argument that generalized discrimination, including in-
group sympathy, deserves greater attention is largely separate from
the question of how the law should treat affirmative action. Broadly
speaking, antidiscrimination laws forbid preferences that track race,
132 This idea of invisible preferences is also described by "critical white studies" schol-
ars who use the rhetoric of "whiteness." See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I
See: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement ofDiscriminatory Inten4 91 MxcH. L. REv. 953
(1993); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HAtv. L. REv. 1707 (1993); Martha R.
Mahoney, The Anti-Transformation Cases: Whiteness, Class, and Interest (Aug. 30, 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). However, such whiteness scholarship often
tends to focus on the condition of African Americans or those "of color" on the one hand,
and "whites" on the other.
Again, we must remember that discrimination may occur in different patterns: some-
times it may focus on a particular outgroup at some level of relative specificity, at other
times the discrimination may reflect more generalized ingroup sympathy or outgroup hos-
tility. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 18-19, 45-47 & 59-62; infra text accompanying
note 272. As I explained in earlier work,
[t]here is no need to choose a single theory of generalized or atomized
discrimination as the appropriate description of discriminatory intent for
every case. Discrimination may be directed toward members of a more par-
ticularized group, members of a certain race, for example, and may also be
directed toward members of some more general group, such as those who
are "different."
Freshman, supra note 16, at 246. John 0. Calmore also warns that to ignore the paradigm
of black/white dichotomy as a "historically racialized framework" is to risk "being co-opted
or converted into token, honorary white people and, as such, buy into an individualist and
assimilationist worldview and orientation." John 0. Calmore, Exploring Michael Omi's
"Messy" Real World of Race: An Essay for "Naked People Longing to Swim Free," 15 LAW & INEQ.
25, 62 (1997).
In other circumstances, however, the rhetoric of whiteness may obscure the presence
of more generalized discrimination, including various broader kinds of ingroup sympathy.
For example, while the ingroup may often be white, rather than African American or of
another color, it will also often include only those seen as able-bodied and free from
mental illness. If we look only to "race" and the construction of those who are "white" and
those who are "of color," we will tend to overlook the way individuals may see others as
physically or mentally disabled. At a recent conference on "discrimination" and "inequal-
ity," a speaker spoke eloquently of invisible preferences and "whiteness." The next day, a
woman who spent ten years confined to a wheelchair told me the room in which the
speaker discussed invisibility was not accessible to wheelchairs. For two examples of works
that avoid this problem, see Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political
Lau'yeringPractice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MicIH. L. REv. 821, 891-92 (1997), and The-
resa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 Wis. L RF-v.
1237.
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gender, or similar characteristics. 133 These principles also typically
forbid ingroup sympathy, including preferences in favor of historically
disadvantaged groups, such as African Americans. 3 4 The exception
to this rule is that courts will sometimes treat preferences as benign
and not actionable when they benefit victims of past discrimination or
when they promote diverse representation of historically under-
represented groups.'3 5 This Article's focus is the general rule, and
thus it does not address the proper scope of an exception for benign
133 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (prohibiting
discrimination based on, among other things, race without specifying protection only for
persons of certain races).
134 See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 285-96 (1976) (hold-
ing that a white person could maintain an action under § 1981 for discrimination in favor
of an African American). However, the circuit courts disagree about how one must prove a
reverse discrimination case. The Seventh Circuit applies the same burden-shifting test
used in ordinary discrimination cases: if an employer fires a white person, for example, and
replaces her with an African American, this raises a presumption of discrimination under
the Seventh Circuit test. See, e.g., Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176, 1178
(7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a plan to run a business division "managed by minorities"
could violate civil rights law); Drake v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 884
(7th Cir. 1998) (noting that "employment discrimination claims are available to employees
of all races.., so long as the discrimination is 'because of such individual's race'" (cita-
tions omitted)); Perdomo v. Browner, 67 F.3d 140, 144-46 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
although the term "protected group" originally referred to minorities, any discrimination
on the basis of race is unlawful, making burden-shifting appropriate in reverse discrimina-
tion cases).
Other courts assume that reverse discrimination is rare, and insist that reverse discrim-
ination plaintiffs must meet a different evidentiary standard. See, e.g., Notari v. Denver
Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585, 589 (10th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he presumption that unless other-
wise explained, discrimination is more likely than not.., is valid for a reverse discrimina-
tion claimant only when the requisite [unusual] background circumstances exist.");
Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67-68 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming
summary judgment on the ground that there was no evidence of the unusual background
circumstances to suggest reverse discrimination); Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652
F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (allowing no presumption on a white employee's claim of
discrimination because "it defies common sense to suggest that the promotion of a black
employee justifies an inference of prejudice against white co-workers in our present soci-
ety"); Slaughter v. Howard Univ., 971 F. Supp. 613, 614-15 & n.6 (D.D.C. 1997) (holding
that an American-born plaintiff did not establish unusual circumstances by showing six of
thirteen full-time faculty were foreign-born). But see Ellison v. Chilton County Bd. of
Educ., 894 F. Supp. 415, 419 (M.D. Ala. 1995) ("[Section] 1981 protects all persons, Cauca-
sian and non-Caucasian alike .... [A] plaintiff may withstand summary judgment if he or
she constructs a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Once the plaintiff makes such a
showing, a presumption of discrimination arises .... " (footnote omitted)).
135 See City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1989) (O'Connor,
J.) (concluding that a stronger proof of past discrimination was necessary to justify race-
conscious set-asides); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945-46 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e see
the caselaw as sufficiently established that the use of ethnic diversity simply to achieve
racial heterogeneity.., is unconstitutional."). Apart from the way courts treat benign
preferences, many scholars, including myself, question the efficacy of changing to mer-
itocracy from those favoring ingroup members and diversity. See, e.g., Clark Freshman,
Were Paticia Williams and Ronald Dworkin Separated at Birth2, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1568, 1607-
09 (1995) (reviewing RicHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw (1995)) (criticizingJudge Pos-
ner's account of merit).
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discrimination; the desirability of an exception to the general rule is a
separate issue.136
Multiple arguments about affirmative action exist independent of
atomized and generalized discrimination, just as various arguments
about conscious and unconscious discrimination exist independent of
distinctions between atomized and generalized discrimination. Some
advocates of affirmative action may worry that it hurts the cause of
affirmative action whenever we begin talking about the consequences
of ingroup sympathy. This fear, however understandable, should yield
to the overwhelming reality that ingroup sympathy for historically ad-
vantaged groups, such as relatively privileged white, Protestant males,
causes great harm to disadvantaged minorities. 137
2. Caveat Lawyer: Theoretical and Practical Limits on Evidence of
Generalized Discrimination
At this juncture in this Article, it may seem tantalizingly easy to
deploy evidence of generalized discrimination in pending cases.
Many cases use such theories when the generalized discrimination in-
volves preferences for an "ethnic" ingroup, such as recent immigrants.
Few cases explicitly reject attempts to use this reasoning to show pref-
erences for a historically advantaged ingroup.'38 Moreover, the cases
that reject what one might view as evidence of generalized discrimina-
tion do not appear to explain how this evidence actually reflects gen-
eralized discrimination. 39 Thus, the solution to the problem of
136 Proposed legislation to forbid preferences would not change antidiscrimination
law, but would simply close the exception. See, e.g., Equal Opportunity Act of 1995, S. 1085,
104th Cong. § 8(2) (defining the term "grant a preference").
137 See infra Part llI.C.1 (describing why ingroup sympathy harms outgroups by deny-
ing material opportunities and inflicting psychic pain). One distinction between affirma-
tive action for disadvantaged minorities and ingroup sympathy for privileged groups is that
affirmative action only modestly affects the chances for success of those who would not be
advantaged by an affirmative action plan. SeeJohnJ. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis
in Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. Rzv. 1583, 1608 (1992) (reviewing
RxcHrAR A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GRouNDs: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DisCaUWnATIoN
LatWs (1992)) (acknowledging the documentation of unequal opportunity for historic out-
groups, and criticizing Richard Epstein for "offer[ing] nothing but words in support of his
view that reverse discrimination is a significant problem"). That distinction, however, re-
mains stronger to the extent that we narrowly define those eligible for the affinnative ac-
tion pool. See generally Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STA'N.
L. REv. 855 (1995) (discussing who should qualify for affirmative action).
Depending on how one defines ingroups in a particular setting-a thorny issue dis-
cussed in Part Il.C.8 below-existing definitions of those given affirmative action may
need reconsideration. One rationale for affirmative action, recently well articulated by
Linda Krieger, holds that affirmative action is necessary because ingroup sympathy is too
difficult to detect. See infra note 164. That rationale, however, may include many more
different individuals than the current beneficiaries of affirmative action. A full considera-
tion of such questions is beyond the scope of this Article.
138 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
139 See i&
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compelling courts to accept evidence of generalized discrimination
might be to offer the type of logical explanation of generalized dis-
crimination that this Article provides. To a large extent this solution
may be so easy that the most interesting academic issue might be the
consideration of why lawyers do not try to use generalized discrimina-
tion more often. Part V of this Article addresses this point in the con-
text of barriers to "coalitions." There, I suggest that the phenomena
often reflects a careless analysis of the costs and benefits in a particu-
lar case. Nevertheless, these explanations should not be exaggerated.
There are theoretical and practical caveats limiting the use of evi-
dence of generalized discrimination.
The first caveat addresses the potential theoretical objection:
'qchoa, won't anyone be able to prove discrimination by showing that
there is a preferred group out there that disadvantages him?" 140 The
general answer is: no more readily than under our existing law. At its
core, this Article makes the relatively narrow claim that those seeking
to prove discrimination under an existing category, such as racism in-
volving African Americans should be able to rely on proof of discrimi-
nation that would involve (what would seem like) a different category
forbidden by existing substantive law, such as sexism involving women.
Plaintiffs could then easily state a discrimination claim that is suffi-
cient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Cur-
rent law prohibits not only discrimination against minorities, but
discrimination against nonminoriies; any time an employee is re-
placed with someone from a different group on an atomized basis-a
different race, age, religion, and so on-this dismissal may create a
discrimination claim. 141 The present article does not address the
question whether substantive law should be interpreted (or modified)
to make independently actionable bases such as class or sexual orien-
tation, where existing substantive law would not.
Under current law, however, preferences that may not themselves
be forbidden, such as nepotism, may help prove liability if they help
prove a forbidden kind of discrimination or, when the relevant law
allows proof by an effects test, they produce a discriminatory effect.142
140 For similar objections to the notion of intersectional discrimination, see, for exam-
ple, DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Division, 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976)
("[T]his lawsuit must be examined to see if it states a cause of action for race discrimina-
tion, sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of both."), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977), and Roy L. Brooks & MaryJo Newborn,
Critical Race Theory and Classical-Liberal Civil Rights Scholarship: A Distinction Without a Differ-
ence?, 82 CAL. L. REv. 787, 832-34 (1994).
141 See supra note 134 (discussing proof of discrimination against nonminorities).
142 SeeWards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 655 n.9 (1989) ("This is not to
say that a specific practice, such as nepotism, if it were proved to exist, could not itself be
subject to challenge if it had a disparate impact on minorities."); Holder v. City of Raleigh,
867 F.2d 823, 827 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he presence of family preferences as a factor in a
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Thus, as under existing law, some preferences may not give rise them-
selves to legal action but may make the odds of losing an action involv-
ing other parties more likely. But this substantive flexibility is limited.
For example, an individual could not allege discrimination based on a
preference for people who wash their hair before their body. Body-
washing sequence is not a protected classification under antidis-
crimination law. In principle, one might try to show that a preference
for a certain body-washing sequence really masked some other kind of
bias or had an impermissible disparate impact, but similar grooming
claims have rarely succeeded. 143
A second potential theoretical objection is that theories of gener-
alized discrimination offer a new or additional method of proof, and
there are enough theories already. This objection really only reflects
discomfort with broad typical principles of modem civil procedure
and the common law. Unlike common law writ practice, modem pro-
cedure permits a plaintiff to allege multiple theories; similarly, a de-
fendant may defeat a claim by offering a variety of defenses.'4 Apart
from the nature of modem civil procedure, civil rights principles stem
from open-ended concepts that welcome new theories of proof in a
variety of fields. 145 These concepts include the commitment not to
promotion might be part of the evidence upon which an inference of invidious motive may
be drawn.. . ."); Gibson v. Local 40, Supercargoes, 543 F.2d 1259, 1268 (9th Cir. 1976)
("Since the relatives being preferred were disproportionately white, the nepotism discrimi-
nated against blacks whether or not appellees acted with a discriminatory purpose."); Local
53 of Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1054 (5th Cir. 1969)
("While the nepotism requirement is applicable to black and white alike and is not on its
face discriminatory, in a completely white union the present effect of its continued applica-
tion is to forever deny to negroes and Mexican-Americans any real opportunity for mem-
bership."). But cf. Taken v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1370 (10th Cir.
1997) (holding that favoritism does not violate Title VII unless it is based on a prohibited
classification); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 119-20 (5th Cir. 1972)
(holding that evidence of nepotism does not necessarily indicate discriminatory bias).
143 SeeHollins v. Atlantic Co., 993 F. Supp. 1097, 1098,1100-03 (N.D. Ohio 1997), affd
in part and rev'd in part, 188 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding no evidence of discrimination
based on disciplining of African-American woman who wore hair "too different" to fit the
company's grooming policy). Similarly, one court held that a practice that had a disparate
impact on physicians trained in Mexico did not violate Title VII because physicians trained
in Mexico were not a protected class under Title VII; however, the court did not consider
whether physicians trained in Mexico might disproportionately be of foreign origin. See
Muzquiz v. WA. Foote Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 70 F.3d 422, 429 (6th Cir. 1995).
144 SeeFED. R. Cw. P. 8(e)(2).
145 Cf RoNI.D DwoRMN, TAMNG RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (rev. ed. 1978) (discussing how
highly abstract right to equality "in the design and administration of the political institu-
tions" would generate different critiques from various perspectives). Legal realists and crit-
ical legal scholars recognize similar points. See MARK KELumAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES 46-47 (1987) (contrasting the realists' claim that language cannot be precise with
the critical legal scholars point that one can make language more precise, but only at the
risk of drawing arbitrary lines).
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discriminate on various bases 146 and the commitment not to use un-
fair competition. In antitrust, for example, plaintiffs may offer a
plethora of reasons why different competitive practices are unfair.
Likewise, defendants may offer a variety ofjustifications for their prac-
tices.147 Antitrust concepts, like concepts of antidiscrimination, inher-
ently allow the evolution of many theories of proof: New practices may
create new theories or new theories may be necessary to explain why
old practices have become unreasonable. 148 Similarly, defendants
might suggest why practices once deemed unreasonable have become
reasonable. Microsoft recently utilized this strategy in its claim that
the merger of America Online and Netscape legitimized certain of
Microsoft's practices. 149
The final theoretical hurdle is the more complicated question of
whether ingroup sympathy is normatively wrong. In particular, promi-
nent law-and-economics scholars Richard Epstein and Richard Posner
have argued that ingroup sympathy is not as bad as outgroup hostil-
ity.150 Epstein takes the more consistently radical view that prefer-
ences are not bad because they may promote efficiency; individuals
146 See Donohue, supra note 137, at 1612 (noting that "Congress has been quick to
endorse the Supreme Court's expansive interpretations of antidiscrimination law" through
concepts such as sexual harassment and disparate impact theory). Other scholars have
noted that Congress rejected a proposed Title VII amendment to add the word "solely" to
modify the list of characteristics upon which a Title VII claim may be based. See Brooks &
Newborn, supra note 140, at 835 n.236. This legislative history is consistent with reading
antidiscrimination commitments to include more than atomized discrimination; it sup-
ports recognition of both sub-atomized discrimination, such as intersectionality, and gen-
eralized discrimination.
147 For example, a defendant corporation may claim that the marketplace requires
such behavior.
148 See, e.g., 7 PHILuIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPUCATION 1 1501, at 369 (1986) (explaining that "the use of unelaborated
common law words and references simply invested the federal courts with a new jurisdic-
tion that inevitably required them to receive, apply, and develop the common law in the
same way that a new jurisdiction customarily does . . . in the dynamic common law
tradition").
149 See, e.g., Benny Evangelista, Netscape, AOL Deal Could Aid Microsoft, S.F. CHRON., Nov.
24, 1998, at D1; Jube Shiver, Jr. & Ashley Dunn, AOL-Netscape Deal Could Help Microsoft, L.A.
TiMEs, Nov. 24, 1998, at C3.
150 See infra notes 152-58 and accompanying text. Larry Alexander also offered a par-
ticularly dramatic account of this claim:
Our traditions and our preferences for them in large part define who we
are both individually and as a community. All traditions contain some
tainted history and disparately impact some groups. Thus, to ask people to
repudiate such preferences is to ask them to create their preferences and
thus themselves ex nihilo.
Larry Alexander, Wat Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes,
and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 189 (1992). If Alexander's argument proves anything, it
proves too much: one may assert that outgroup hostility is also natural. As Larry Lessig has
suggested, a racist may cling to his discriminatory attitudes as part of his fundamental per-
sonality. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943, 1003
(1995) ("[]t is not incoherent to imagine the racist saying that hejust doesn't want to
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have fewer miscommunication problems with people more like them-
selves.' 51 Posner, as usual, takes a more contextual view. 152 In EEOC
v. Consolidated Service Systems,153 Posner offered a tribute to the virtues
of recent immigrants who set up businesses and then hired other new
immigrants from the same country. 54 Despite this language, Posner's
opinion did not hold that preferences for Korean Americans, if
proven, would be permissible. 55 Instead, he narrowly concluded that
the district court did not clearly err in its factual conclusion that evi-
become a nonracist. That he, for example, would not be himself if he were forced to
become a [noniracist.").
151 See RIcHARD A. EpsrEN, FORBIDDEN GRouNDs: THE CAsE AGAINsr EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CMINATIrON LAWs 34, 67-68 (1992). Other economists make a related observation about
screening costs: people may have trouble discerning certain intangible factors, such as reli-
ability or persistence, and imagine they can "screen" these factors in the verbal and non-
verbal cues of those from their "same-group." Drucilla Cornell & Wiliam W. Bratton,
Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic Wrongs of Nativism: Economics, Freedom, and Legal Suppression of
Spanish, 84 CopNELL L. REV. 596, 651 (1999) (arguing that employers may be "neutral, but
do have a cultural type and more readily can identify good and bad types of their own
cultural type because of better information"). Notice two implications. First, similar con-
siderations will apply beyond the employment context: people may rent to those in their
"own cultural type" because they can discern characteristics like maintaining apartments.
Second, decision makers may favor their own because they believe they can discern certain
intangible characteristics, even if they are mistaken in this belief. (In a competitive market-
place, this mistaken confidence may survive if others have similar mistaken confidence.)
152 Posner has recently made a virtue of the way in which he avoids general, highly
abstract theory in favor of what he styles as more philosophically pragmatic decisions. See,
e.g., RxicRD A. PosNER, OVERCOMING L W at viii (1995). Under Posner's philosophy,
"overcoming law" would mean overcoming all that is pretentious in favor of more concrete
considerations, including empirical and pragmatic considerations. id. Others have criti-
cized this philosophy, alleging that Posner's narrow theory is in principle undesirable, or
that Posner simply fails to correctly characterize the facts in particular arguments, or both.
See Michael C. Doff, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARv. L. REv. 4, 53
n.278 (1998) (noting Posner's analytical reliance on his mistaken classification of animals);
Martha Albertson Fineman, The Hermeneutics of Reason: A Commentary on Sex and Reason,
25 CoNN. L. REv 503, 506 n.16 (1993) (listing examples of Posner's mistaken empirical
assumptions about sexuality); Freshman, supra note 135; Jeffrey Rosen, OvercomingPosner,
105 YALE L.J. 581, 603 (1995) (reviewing RicHARD A. PosNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995))
(criticizing Posner's avoidance of general theory).
153 989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1993).
154 Judge Posner stated:
In a nation of immigrants, this must be reckoned an ominous case despite
its outcome. The United States has many recent immigrants, and today as
historically they tend to cluster in their own communities, united by ties of
language, culture, and background. Often they form small businesses com-
posed largely of relatives, friends, and other members of their community,
and they obtain new employees by word of mouth. These small businesses
... have been for many immigrant groups, and continue to be, the first
rung on the ladder of American success. Derided as clannish, resented for
their ambition and hard work, hated or despised for their otherness, recent
immigrants are frequent targets of discrimination, some of it violent. It
would be a bitter irony if the federal agency dedicated to enforcing the
antidiscrimination laws succeeded in using those laws to kick these people
off the ladder by compelling them to institute costly systems of hiring.
Id. at 237-38.
155 See id. at 236.
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dence of a preference for Koreans was insufficient.156 Similarly, an-
other Posner opinion affirmed a summary judgment that the record
included insufficient evidence that ajapanese company preferred Jap-
anese employees in its United States operations. 157 Posner reached
this conclusion despite evidence that a high-level employee said "all
Americans are stupid" and that some officials spoke Japanese in front
of American employees without translations. 158
Despite these two opinions, a third Posner opinion demonstrates
that Posner also sometimes sees how ingroup sympathy may wrongly
perpetuate inequality. In Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co.,159 Posner held
that a firm could not deny individuals the right to sue for discrimina-
tion, based merely on the ground that a collective bargaining agree-
ment said all disputes would be subject to arbitration, with the union
deciding when to arbitrate and when to settle.' 60 Posner explained:
We may assume that the union will not engage in actionable dis-
crimination against minority workers. But we may not assume that
it will be highly sensitive to their special interests, which are the
interests protected by Title VII and the other discrimination stat-
utes, and will seek to vindicate those interests with maximum
vigor.' 61
Thus, despite the current law's treatment of ingroup sympathy as dis-
criminatory, at least in principle, Epstein, Posner, and other promi-
nent scholars raise questions highlighting the need for the in-depth
analysis of ingroup sympathy that Part II below provides.
Apart from these various theoretical questions, several. pxactical
obstacles may also limit the use of evidence of generalized discrimina-
tion. First, although in principle preferences establish discriminatory
motivation, courts may narrowly view what constitutes acceptable
proof of a preference. For example, in Mungin v. Katten Muchin &
Zavis,' 62 an African American filed suit against a prominent law firm
that denied him promotion to partnership. The District of Columbia
Circuit held that the evidence that firm partners gave white associates
better opportunities and mentoring does not establish discriminatory
motivation.' 63
156 See id. at 237.
157 See Wallace v. SMG Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1397 (7th Cir. 1997).
158 Id. at 1396. Unlike the first case, a deferential standard of review cannot explain
this opinion, because a court reviews summary judgments de novo. Nevertheless, Posner
himself acknowledged that "the case pushes against the outer boundaries of the permissi-
ble use of summary judgment under current law." Id. at 1397.
159 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 912 (1997).
160 See id. at 363.
161 Id. at 362-63.
162 116 F.3d 1549 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
163 See id. at 1554-58. The record and reported decision are not particularly illuminat-
ing because the plaintiff's attorney was inexperienced in appeals and was in the midst of an
356 [Vol. 85:313
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Nevertheless, it is not clear that proving preferences is much
harder than proving hostility given contemporary doctrine and cul-
tural attitudes. In an otherwise very nuanced and carefully docu-
mented study of social psychological aspects of how different groups
relate, Linda Hamilton Krieger asserted that existing law may make it
very difficult to prove ingroup sympathy.' 64 In part, Krieger's skepti-
cism about proving ingroup favoritism reflects a far larger skepticism
about the ability to prove that an individual engaged in discrimination
of any kind. Instead, she attempted to show that proof of individual-
ized discrimination will leave so much discrimination unproven that
society must rely upon affirmative action to remedy some of that prej-
udice. 165 Many scholars agree with this critique of the law's current
focus on individual action.' 66 Even in a system in which other reme-
dies, such as affirmative action or proportional representation, play a
larger role, the issue of atomized and generalized discrimination still
arises despite these concerns. If an employer always hires the same
proportion of group X as exists in the relevant population, one must
still define X Is X; for example, comprised of African-American wo-
men, African Americans, people of color, nonwhites, or some other
category? To the extent that such classifications reflect the suspicion
that underrepresentation of groups demonstrates bias, the law will
need to address this practical hurdle of defining the existing combina-
tion of atomized and generalized bias.
A second practical hurdle remains: Once a plaintiff introduces
evidence of generalized discrimination, a court may be more likely to
permit a defendant to use evidence of generalized nondiscrimina-
unpleasant dissolution of his firm while the appeal was being briefed and argued. See BAR-
aRT, supra note 64, at 262-63. At least one other case reached a conclusion similar to that
of Mungin. See Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176, 1178-79 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that lack of managerial training was not a racial discrimination because firm
never trained low-level employees of any race, sex, or national origin).
164 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirma-
tiveAction, 86 GAL L. REv. 1251, 1326 (1998) ("Ingroup favoritism manifests itself gradually
in subtle ways. It is unlikely to trigger mobilization of civil rights remedies because in-
stances of this form of discrimination tend to go unnoticed.").
165 See id. at 1327-29 (arguing that because existing law is very ineffective at identifying
much discrimination, including ingroup favoritism and other individual motivation, af-
firmative action should not be abandoned).
166 See, e.g., Charny & Gulati, supra note 64, at 77-78 (arguing that antidiscrimination
law will not remedy discrimination because, in response to a perceived lack of opportuni-
ties, rational minority workers will not invest in developing their human capital, and ra-
tional firms will be less likely to hire workers who have invested less in their human
capital); Freeman, supra note 35, at 1054-55; D. MarvinJones, No Time for Trumpets: Title VI,
Equality, and the Fin de Siecle, 92 MIcm. L. Rxv. 2311, 2360 (1994). See generally Freshman,
supra note 16, at 271-72 (arguing that, although generalized discrimination may fit within
existing doctrine and may illuminate the presence of discrimination in particular cases
more effectively than atomized discrimination, some might prefer an account of genera-
lized discrimination that goes beyond the current doctrine's individualistic focus).
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tion.167 Plaintiffs may reasonably fear evidence of generalized nondis-
crimination: particular jurors may be less likely to find discrimination
against a relatively unpopular outgroup, such as African-American
males, if they see that a relatively popular outgroup, such as white
women, do not face discrimination. Some jurors may infer that those
who do not treat white women badly will not treat African-American
men badly; other jurors may simply engage in jury nullification and
disregard discrimination that only affects African-American men but
not white women.168
The pervasiveness of the atomized way of viewing discrimination
creates a third practical hurdle. Judges and jurors may view the use of
generalized discrimination as a desperate attempt to prove prejudice
or as a signal that no better evidence exists. 169 In an analogous situa-
tion in tort law, modem procedure invites litigants to plead in the
alternative. For example, a plaintiff might claim that the defendant
hit him intentionally and, if not, that he hit him negligently; similarly,
a defendant might assert that he never hit the plaintiff and that, even
if he did, the plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages. 170 Nevertheless,
conventional wisdom holds that juries may dislike such alternative
pleading, and thus litigants may succeed more often by sticking to one
story.171
3. Legal Questions for Social Science Theories of Discrimination
Overall, current legal practice both in and out of the courtroom
raises two important questions. First, law tries to identify the relation-
ship between different kinds of discrimination. For instance, attor-
neys desire an answer because it affects their search for relevant
evidence to persuade investigators, arbitrators, courts, and adverse
parties that discrimination did or did not occur based on circum-
167 Indeed, an employer might still be able to offer generalized evidence of nondis-
crimination even if a plaintiff did not invoke a theory of generalized discrimination. See
infra note 405-16 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, an employer might not consider
looking for this evidence until the plaintiff ventures outside the usual atomized categories.
168 See generally Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the NullifyingJwy, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 877
(1999) (emphasizing the potential benefits ofjury nullification in criminal cases).
169 See Interview with Susan Stefan, supra note 63.
170 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
171 SeeJavetz v. Board of Control, Grand Valley State Univ., 903 F. Supp. 1181, 1189
(W.D. Mich. 1995) ('Plaintiff admits that although she believes she is the victim of unfairly
disparate treatment, she knows not whether the discrimination is based on her national
origin, religion, or sex." (emphasis added)). The court did not consider the possibility
that students and faculty may have labeled the plaintiff as a difficult person because she
was different although they may not have thought of her as Israeli, Jewish, or a woman. See
id. at 1190. See generally THoMAS A. MAUET, PRETRAL& 111 (3d ed. 1995) ("Keep in mind,
however, that since pleadings can be read to the jury during trial, alternative or inconsis-
tent pleadings may cast the party in a poor light. Hence, drafting must also be done with
an eye toward the impression the pleading will have on the jurors.").
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stances in similar cases. This knowledge is especially important in
small organizations and larger organizations with a relatively homoge-
neous work force. Social science not only answers, but also reframes
the question: social science suggests that when a woman like Deborah
faces unequal opportunity, that inequality often reflects not merely
sexism but also broader patterns of inequality that harm women and
all those outside a narrow ingroup. Second, law and popular dis-
course ask, "What is wrong with ingroup sympathy anyway?" Here,
too, social science provides important evidence about how often in-
group sympathy promotes unequal opportunities even without any
convincing evidence of hostility.' 72 The next Part of this Article ex-
plores this social science approach in depth, and Part IV returns to
the legal significance of such data in greater technical detail.
III
GENERALIZED DISCRIMINATION IN TH= SOcIAL SCIENCES:
INGROUP AND OUTGROUP PARADIGMS
This Article departs from the usual legal scholars' stance toward
social science paradigms of discrimination. Much legal scholarship
taps only a relatively narrow discourse within the social sciences. 173
172 See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing why ingroup sympathy is normatively wrong).
173 For example, several fine pieces of legal scholarship on prejudice and civil rights
implicitly take discrimination theories with relatively narrow scope within a larger dis-
course about prejudice as if they constituted the universe of scientific truth. See, e.g., Jody
Armour, Stereol'pes and Prjudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83
CAL. L. Rxv. 733 (1995); Krieger, supra note 68.
Legal scholars in other topics also sometimes treat arguments from other disciplines,
such as history and philosophy, as if they simply gave the "correct" answer that legal schol-
ars somehowjust "got wrong." See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American
Constitutionalism, 95 COLuM. L. Rxv. 523 (1995); Martin S. Flaherty, Relearning Founding
Lessons: The Removal Power and Joint Accountability, 47 CASE W. REs. L. Rxv. 1563, 1571-75
(1997); Mark Tushnet, "Everything Old Is New Again"." Early Reflections on the "New Chicago
School;" 1998 Wis. L. REv. 579, 583 & n.12. See generally J.M. Balkin, Interdisciplinarity as
Colonization, 53 WAsH. & LEE L. Ray. 949 (1996) (discussing the problems with interdiscipli-
nary legal scholarship).
However, as I have written elsewhere, legal scholars should not simply defer to special-
ists within particular disciplines; these specialists in each discipline have their own peculiar
assumptions that reflect such things as the limited range of their personal experiences. See
Freshman, supra note 135, at 1606 (when male philosophers label some intuitions "plausi-
ble," it may, at least partially, reflect their limited experiences); see also Martha Fineman,
Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking,
101 HI- v. L. Ray. 727, 764-65 (1988) (criticizing legal writers and decision makers for
simply deferring to those in the helping professions for custody decision making). More-
over, writers outside law may develop theories that also respond to the professional incen-
tives of their own academic departments. See infra note 332 and accompanying text
(describing how cognitive psychologists may describe discrimination as normal behavior,
in part because academic psychology departments will reward the study of the majority's
psyches more readily than the psyches of a relatively small group of discriminators). For a
detailed critique of the way that historians try to avoid serious substantive questions by
raising methodological concerns, see Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, A Book of Laughter and Forget-
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Such work often seems to assume that the law must have gotten it
wrong; the solution is to mimic another discipline that got it right.174
This Article instead explores how both law and various discourses
within social science have struggled with the question of understand-
ing the generality of prejudice and unequal opportunity.
Although other scholars claim that social science has always por-
trayed all discrimination as generalized, 175 it is more accurate to say
that since at least the 1940s, social science has consistently recognized
various kinds of prejudice.' 76 Nevertheless, the underlying assump-
tions of law and social science have diverged in their balance of gener-
alized and atomized discrimination. At least since the publication of
The Authoritarian Personality in 1950, social science has understood that
much discrimination is relatively generalized. Although other fea-
tures of theories of discrimination have evolved, largely in response to
more general methodological shifts such as social psychology's dis-
placement in popularity of psychoanalysis and other theories of per-
sonality,177 the attention to some type of generalized discrimination
has persisted. Thus, an overlapping consensus that generalized dis-
crimination explains much discrimination exists in social science, par-
ticularly in psychology and sociology.
As developed in political theory, the idea of an overlapping con-
sensus offers an avenue to avoid needlessly contentious debates. John
Rawls and other scholars have invited us to build a just society based
ting- Kalman's "Strange Career" and the Marketing of Civil Republicanism, 111 HARv. L. REv.
1025, 1083 (1998) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM
(1996)); cf. Maurice Allais, An Outline of My Main Contributions to Economic Science, Am.
ECON. REV., Dec. 1997, at 3, 8 ("[I]t is only through the constant questioning of 'established
truths' and the blossoming of new ideas suggested both by empirical evidence and by crea-
tive intuition, that science can truly progress.... Dominant ideas, however erroneous they
may be, end up, simply through continual repetition .... .").
174 See Balkin, supra note 173, at 959 ("[M]uch of what people call interdisciplinary
work often involves answering questions in one discipline by applying its disciplinary meth-
ods to the materials usually studied by another, or by selectively invoking techniques found
in one discipline to answer questions posed wholly within another.").
175 See ELisABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, THE ANATOMY OF PREJUDICEs 7-26 (1996).
176 Allportes discussion of different approaches to prejudice also emphasizes the way in
which prejudice is best understood from multiple disciplines:
The fact that we shall devote so much time to these [psychological] ap-
proaches perhaps indicates the author's psychological bias. If so, he pleads
with the reader to recognize his attempt to give considerable emphasis like-
wise to historical, sociocultural, and situational determinants. The author
hopes the present volume may be regarded as a reflection of the present
tendency for specialists to cross boundaries and to borrow methods and
insights from neighboring disciplines in the interests of a more adequate
understanding of a concrete social problem. But even a specialist with a
broad intention is likely to overemphasize his own professional field.
ALLPORT, supra note 8, at 206-07; see also infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text (assert-
ing that more recent social psychology literature acknowledges that a variety of different
theories may explain discrimination and prejudice).
177 See infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
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on the overlapping consensus between otherwise competing political
theories, rather than becoming entangled in often intractable
debates.' 7 8
Although objections to an overlapping consensus remain, the
consensus may still likely reflect real value since it tracks many other-
wise diverse disciplines over time; building overlapping consensus is
more persuasive than relying on only one discourse within a single
discipline at a particular time. However, society must still be cautious
because the consensus may merely further entrench bad patterns of
thinking. With appropriate caution, the law, individual lawyers, and
their clients may also all profit from borrowing from the overlapping
consensus within the social science the idea that much discrimination
is generalized. 179
178 SeeJoi-N RAWLS, PoLmcA. LIBERALISM 155 (1993) (asserting that individuals may
agree about particular practical questions despite their disagreement on broader concep-
tual issues); cf Ian Ayres, Never Confuse Efficiency with a Liver Complaint, 1997 Wis. L. REv.
503, 512-13 (arguing that one should avoid abstract debates about different methodolo-
gies, such as law and economics versus law and society, in favor of figuring out the best
account of particular phenomena); Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rationa Norma-
tive and Cognitive Perspectives in the Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 475, 475-76
(claiming that one might best understand the phenomenon of decision making by drawing
on a variety of complementary paradigms).
Like any methodology, the idea of an overlapping consensus has a weakness: this over-
lapping consensus may simply be a common mistake. In particular, the common mistake
may reflect metanarratives in society that needlessly narrow many disciplines. See MARTHA
ALBERTSON FnEmN, THE NEUTEREt MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TwENwrEH
CENTURY TRAGEDIES 145 (1995) (stating that the metanarrative of the sexual family-the
idea that the family most worthy of support is a union of two adults, rather than an adult
and a dependent-runs through the law, various psychological theories, and society gener-
ally, thereby preventing needed reform to care for dependents). Margaret Jane Radin's
feminist pragmatism offers similar cautions. See MargaretJane Radin, The Pragmatist and the
Feminist, in PRAGNAIsM IN LAw AND Socum-i 127, 149 (Michael Brint & William Weaver
eds., 1991) ("The best critical spirit of pragmatism recommends that we take our present
descriptions with humility and openness, and accept their institutional embodiments as
provisional and incompletely entrenched.").
179 In this Article, I have chosen to address generalized discrimination primary from a
relatively modernist stance. One may also read much of this Article from a perspective of
postmodern discourse, such as that of Angela Harris:
A "discourse" refers both to a system of concepts-the set of all things we
can say about a particular subject-and to the relations of power that main-
tain that subject's existence. The project of post-structuralist theory is to
tell stories about how certain discourses emerge, shift, and submerge again.
Harris, supra note 16, at 774; see also Fineman, supra note 173. Barenberg also discusses the
value of discourse:
Compelling recent theoretical and empirical writing suggests, however, that
political interests (or any other "self-interests") cannot be reliably ascribed
to a group apart from the group's contingentjudgment of its interests; and
the group's historically received, contested ideology shapes that judgment.
Work in discourse theory, cognitive psychology, and the sociology of knowl-
edge demonstrates that language and other symbolic systems, discursive
practices, and ideological maps are not merely communicative, but in part
constitutive, of individual and group perceptions, interests, and identities.
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A. The Overlapping Consensus That "Different" Kinds of
Discrimination Often Really Reflect Generalized
Discrimination
This Part highlights the way in which generalized discrimination
runs through several different social science enterprises. Early theo-
ries saw prejudice at a more general level than did the law, cutting
across law's atomized boundaries such as race, religion, and national
origin. However, many of these older theories had other limitations,
such as blindness to how generalized discrimination affects women,18 0
people with disabilities, 181 and lesbians and gays. 182 Roughly speak-
Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the WagnerAct: Power, Symbol and Wor*place Coopera-
tion, 106 H.v. L. Rzv. 1379, 1431-32 (1993) (footnote omitted).
180 SeeYouN-BRuuut., supra note 175, at 67-68 (noting the Adorno group's neglect of
prejudice against women, compared to its focus on racial or ethnic prejudice). In fact,
THE AuTHoarrcRLAN PmEsoNA.rIY, ADoRNo ET A., supra note 9, includes a tiny and very
qualified discussion of women:
Can the attitude that "women's place is in the home" be considered a preju-
dice? It would appear that it is, to the extent that people with this attitude
have others which are more obviously ethnocentric. A more conclusive proof
would require a detailed study of ideology regarding women, oriented
within a general theory of ethnocentric vs. nonethnocentric approaches.
DanielJ. Levinson, The Study of Ethnocentric Ideology, in ADoRNo ET sA.., supra note 9, at 102,
107 (emphasis added). Other works in Studies in Preudice also neglect stereotypes of femi-
ninity. This omission is striking given some of the data these studies contain, alluding to
the potential link between stereotyped views on Jews and women. See Nathan W. Ackerman
& Marie Jahoda, Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder- A Psychoanalytic Interpretation
104, 112 (1950) (describing a patient who thought that Jews were "castrated and less po-
tent," and another patient who made an "[u]nconscious accusation[ ]" thatJews were "cas-
trated"). Such a preoccupation with masculinity is clearly related to inequality for women
who seem so dearly to lack masculine traits. More recent scholarship recognizes the link
between stereotypes ofJews and stereotypes of women. SeeJonathan Boyarin, AnotherAbra-
ham:Jewishness and the Law of the Father, 9 YAtEJ.L. & HuMAN. 345, 392 (1997) ("The associ-
ation of the Semitic with the feminine was a commonplace of nineteenth-century
European progressive ideology.").
181 The Authoritarian Personality's list of biased statements includes only one cryptic ref-
erence to disabilities: "We are spending too much money for the pampering of criminals
and the insane, and for the education of inherently incapable people." Levinson, supra
note 180, at 106 tbl.2(IV) (listing common negative remarks toward minority groups other
than Jews and African Americans). See generally Stefan, supra note 88 (discussing employ-
ment discrimination against people with psychiatric disabilities).
182 Some texts tended to treat homosexuality itself as a disorder, rather than treating
the fear of, or hostility to, those perceived as lesbian or gay as a disorder of homophobia.
SeeAcRmAN & JAHODA, supra note 180, at 99 (utilizing a reference to an "overt homosex-
ual"); id. at 103 (noting patient's "only friendship in his early adolescence, involving overt
homosexual relations"); Else Frenkel-Brunswik, The Interviews as an Approach to the Preudiced
Personality, in ADoRNo ET AL., supra note 9, at 291, 316 (analyzing homosexuality as a
"problem" related to "the different ways of failure in resolving the Oedipal conflict and the
resultant regression to earlier phases"). This attitude is not surprising given how most
psychologists viewed lesbians and gays at the time. See Marshall Kirk & Hunter Madsen,
After the Ball: How America Will Conquer Its Fear and Hatred of Gays in the '90s at 32-33
(1989) (describing the relatively recent decision by mental health professionals to stop
classifying homosexual orientation as a mental disorder). Remarkably, some older texts do
treat hostility to lesbians and gays as improper. See ADoRNo ET AL., supra note 9, at 15
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ig, earlier theories viewed generalized discrimination as a product of
what I term outgroup hostility: many prejudiced individuals simply
dislike anyone whom they do not consider as a member of their in-
group, regardless of whether a common race, gender, or religion
make such outsiders different from "one of them." Subpart B de-
scribes these earlier accounts of outgroup hostility.
More recent theories similarly pay some attention to the out-
group hostility, but place greater emphasis on what I call ingroup sym-
pathy: in which individuals have warmer feelings toward, and give
better treatment to, people in their ingroup, often without any hostil-
ity. Subpart C focuses on ingroup sympathy. Again, one should not
misunderstand the ingroup sympathy. Although ingroup sympathy
might mask outgroup hostility, focusing on ingroup sympathy may
render generalized discrimination more recognizable than when rely-
ing on outgroup hostility, which may be dismissed as a problem only
for extreme fringe groups like neo-Nazis. Additionally, ingroup sym-
pathy warrants separate treatment in order to confront theorists who
treat ingroup sympathy as an acceptable, even laudable, behavior.
Subparts B and C also analyze two secondary points. First, schol-
ars have often explicitly theorized the existence of atomized features
of discrimination, despite their focus on generalized features of dis-
crinination.18 3 Second, close inspection of accounts of atomized dis-
crimination reveals that conclusions from these accounts are far from
natural or inevitable readings of the data. 84 Instead, such data may
(noting that people who agreed with the statement "'[h] omosexuality is an especially rot-
ten form of delinquency and ought to be severely punished'" tended to agree with state-
ment "that members of some minority group are basically inferior"); ALLPORT, supra note
8, at 398-99 (noting that "tolerant" personalities were "less condemnatory of social misde-
meanors, including violations of sexual standards" (emphasis added)); see also RL Nevitt San-
ford et al., Vie Measurement of Implicit Antidemocratic Trends, in ADorNO ET AL., supra note 9,
at 222, 244-47 & thl.3(VII) (presenting data that reveal that the interview question regard-
ing homosexuality generated a wide gap between those agreeing and disagreeing, corre-
sponding to a gap between agreement and disagreement with various anti-Semitic
comments). But see id. at 272, 278 (offering evidence that both an interviewee labeled low
prejudice and an interviewee labeled high prejudice had negative attitudes about gays).
Very recent studies confirm that those who score high on authoritarianism scales report
more highly negative attitudes towards lesbians and gays than the general population. See
infra note 239 and accompanying text.
183 See ALLPORT, supra note 8, at 73 ("[We must not assume that a general psychody-
namic trait of prejudice tells the whole story, though it tells a lot. Special reasons may exist
for special forms of ethnocentrism in special localities."); id. at 408 ("We are likely to forget
that there are plenty of mixed or run-of-the-mill personalities in whom prejudice does not
follow the ideal pattern [of psychoanalytic prejudiced personality] here depicted.").
184 One way to understand the need for an interpretive leap is to recognize the limits
of language in describing groups-a perspective often associated with postmodernism and
deconstruction. See, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, THE PoLrncs OF FRIENDSHIP at vii (1997)
("What happens when, in taking up the case of the sister, the woman is made a sister?").
Unfortunately, critics often collapse such postmodern perspectives about the plasticity of
categories into the notion that any version of postmodernism pulls every rug out from
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be interpreted along different categories, such as discrimination af-
fecting only Eastern European Jews.
B. Outgroup Hostility
1. The Authoritarian Personality
Although a study of generalized discrimination might begin with
other sources in the United States, 185 or the global history of ideas,186
The Authoritarian Personality87 provides a good starting point for sev-
eral reasons. First, The Authoritarian Personality is historically a widely
influential book within both social science and the law.188 Specifi-
cally, this work spurred other social scientists to consider prejudice as
a generalized phenomenon. Second, the context in which the au-
thors viewed prejudice as generalized is significant. The study took
place in the wake of the brutal Nazi extermination of, among many
under every notion ofjustice, empathy, and compassion. See Mark Lilla, The Politics ofJac-
quesDerrida, N.Y. REv. Booxs,June 25, 1998, at 36, 39 ("If deconstruction throws doubt on
every political principle of the Western philosophical tradition-Derrida mentions propri-
ety, intentionality, will, liberty, conscience, self-consciousness, the subject, the self, the per-
son, and community-are judgments about political matters still possible?"). As I have
tried to suggest elsewhere, however, other versions of postmodernism use postmodernist
insights to expand the range of possible values from a needlessly cramped set of values; for
example, they open up the range of possible definitions of communities rather than
merely rely on unfettered individualism. See Freshman, supra note 55, at 1715 & n.74. In
that same manner, we may begin by noting how various atomized accounts are not natural,
but we may end by using this insight to reconstruct a more useful way to understand dis-
crimination, as this Article attempts to do.
185 The African-American abolitionist, Frederick Douglass, for example, saw women's
rights as intimately entwined with the plight of African Americans. See generally FREDERICK
DOUGLASS, FREDERICK DOUGLASS ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS (Philip S. Foner ed., 1976) (provid-
ing a collection of Douglass's writings and speeches on women's issues).
186 See, e.g., KARL MARx, On the Jewish Question, in SELECTED WRITINGS 39, 44 (David
McLellan ed., 1977) (arguing that Jews should not merely seek emancipation from anti-
Semitism, but "human emancipation"); JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, ANTI-SEMrrE AND JEW 149
(GeorgeJ. Becker trans., 1948) ("[D]istinctions between rich and poor, between laboring
and owning classes . .. are all summed up in the distinction between Jew and non-Jew.
This means that anti-Semitism is a mythical, bourgeois representation of the class strug-
gle."). Moreover, The Authoritarian Personality acknowledged its affinity with Sartre's Anti-
Semite and Jew. See AnoP.No ET AL., supra note 9, at 971 n.l.
187 ADoRNO ET AL., supra note 9.
188 Prior to the publication of The Authoritarian Personality, other theorists also
presented survey evidence that discrimination might occur in relatively generalized pat-
terns. See, e.g., GARDNER MURPHY & RENSIS LIERT, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE INDIVIDuAL: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF STUDENT ATTITUDES ON PUBLIC QUESTIONS, WrrH A RETEST FIVE
YEARS LATER 136-37 (1938) (claiming that "[s]ince national and racial out-groups are re-
garded by the majority group as 'outsiders' (or even as inferiors) it is not surprising that
some students have acquired a generalized anti-out-group sentiment" and describing other
subjects, who by "resisting current stereotypes in a specific case (e.g., the Negro), are
found to have resisted it also in the case of other out-groups"). However, contemporary
scholarship rarely discusses this earlier work.
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other groups, Jews.' 8 9 A prominent Jewish organization funded the
study. 190 The authors received the funding when many of them were
189 The fact that the Nazi holocaust targeted many outgroups for extermination, in-
cluding gay men and people with disabilities, is beyond dispute. See, e.g., Jack Nusan
Porter, The Yellow Star and the Pink Triangle: Sexual Politics in the Third Reich, in ON PRzju-
DicE: A GLOBAL PERSPEcrv 67 (Daniela Gioseffi ed., 1993) [hereinafter ON PREJUDICE]
(discussing gay victims of Nazi persecution); Dora E. Yates, Hitler and the Gypsies: A Genocide
That Must Be Remembered, in ON PREjUDICE, supr, at 103 (discussing Nazi genocide of the
Gypsies); Steven Fogelson, Note, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S. CAL. L.
Rxv. 833, 834 (1990) (noting that, in addition toJews, "[t]he Nazis also targeted Gypsies,
Jehovah's Witnesses, and homosexuals for persecution").
Nevertheless, many interpret the Holocaust solely as an anti-Semitic phenomenon. See
DANiELJoNAH GOLDmAGEN, HrrLr's WILUNG ExEctrnozRs: ORDINARY GERMAS AND THE
HoLoCAusr 375 (1996) (emphasizing anti-Semitic ideology as the source of the Holo-
caust). See generally RiCHARD L. ABEL, SPEAUNG RESPECT, RESPECrNG SPEEcH 123 (1998)
("Just as Jews were umvilling to share the Holocaust with other victims, so some African
American leaders refused to extend the civil rights movement to gays and lesbians."). Re-
cently, several Orthodox Jews sued to prevent the opening of a Holocaust Memorial that
included memorial of gay victims of the Nazi holocaust because they were offended by
"'the elevation of homosexuals to the martyred status of the six million Jews,' who died in
the Holocaust." Suit Against Holocaust Museum, NEWSDAY, Sept. 7, 1997, at ASO. On the
obsession with learning the lessons of World War II, see generally MORTON J. HoRvrrz,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERcIAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CIsIS OF LEGAL ORTHODoxY 250
(1992) ("[M]uch of post-war American thought was obsessed with identifying the 'lessons'
to be learned from the spread of totalitarianism."). However, as Horwitz noted, not all
scholars of the postwar era identified prejudice and discrimination as a problem; Horwitz
argued that consensus theories simply did not confront the problem of racial prejudice
and discrimination. See id. at 257.
190 The AmericanJewish Committee (AJC) funded the various works in Studies inPru-
dice, including The Authoritarian Personality, in a number of ways. See Memorandum on
Implementation of the Studies In Prejudice from the American Jewish Committee 3 (Nov. 8,
1951) (on file with author) (reporting that the AJC spent $175,000 on research and publi-
cation of the Studies in Prejudice). The various works in Studies in Prjudice grew out of a
.conference on religious and racial prejudice" in 1944. Max Horkheimer & Samuel H.
Flowerman, Foreword to Studies in Prudice, in ADoRNo r AL., supra note 9, at v. The AJC
paid a portion of Adorno and other writers' salaries. See Letter from Samuel H.
Flowerman, Associate Director, Institute of Social Research, to R. Nevitt Sanford 1-2 (June
14, 1946) (on file with author) (discussing salary payments); Letter from Samuel H.
Flowerman, Associate Director, Institute of Social Research, to Else Frenkel-Brunswik 1
(Apr. 4, 1946) (explaining that the AJC already had spent $49,000 on the Berkeley Adult
Project, which became part of The Authoritarian Personality, and that the Committee was
anxious for results of the project).
Considering the amount of money involved, there is surprisingly little written record
of any attempt to manipulate the final report. See Memorandum from Samuel H.
Flowerman toJohn Slawson 2 (May 28, 1951) (on file with author) ("[T]he point needs to
be made that the [AmericanJewish] Committee allowed its collaborative investigators con-
siderable academic freedom, almost as much academic freedom as it allows Commentary
magazine."). However, one letter in the AJC records shows tension between understand-
ing prejudice in general and putting anti-Semitism at the center of attention:
During my visit, arrangements have been made to include into the sum-
mary part a special chapter about the function of the Jew in the psychologi-
cal make-up of the Fascist character. Since this is, after all, the center of
our interest, it deserves a treatment of its own. On the one hand, the chap-
ter will show that the Antisemites' aggressiveness and projectivity is largely
unspecific and can be shifted to any other minority group. This can be
corroborated by many interview quotations. On the other hand, it will be
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particularly desperate for financial resources.1 9 ' Thus, one might
have predicted that the authors would have narrowly focused on anti-
Semitism. However, the final version of the book' 9 2 instead treats
generalized discrimination as an uncontroversial fundamental truth.
As discussed below, the book received widespread popular and aca-
demic acclaim, but also quickly drew methodological critiques. More
recent scholarship confirms the study's central thesis of generalized
discrimination and avoids methodological critiques. 193 Although one
could not responsibly conclude an analysis of the extent of genera-
lized discrimination with a study of attitudes nearly half a century old,
this influential work still remains a useful starting point.
a. From "Anti-Semitism" to "Prejudice in General"
The Authoritarian Personality plainly understands discrimination as
generalized discrimination: "Evidence from the present study con-
firms what has often been indicated: that a man who is hostile toward
one minority group is very likely to be hostile against a wide variety of
others." 194 The study claimed to focus on generalized discrimination
from its inception: "[I]t was supposed [by the authors] that anti-Semi-
tism probably is not a specific or isolated phenomenon but a part of a
broader ideological framework... ."195 The evidence supporting this
demonstrated that certain specific features of the stereotypical imagery of
the Jew make for a "priority of hatred."
Letter to Sandy 1 (Nov. 6, 1946) (on file with author); see also JAY, supra note 8, at 234
("[R]elations with officials of the AJC [and the authors of The Authoritarian Personality],
especially near the end of the project, were anything but smooth. Personal frictions played
a role, but theoretical disagreements certainly existed as well.").
191 SeeJA, supra note 8, at 220-21.
192 References to "the book" and "the authors" require an important qualification.
The book was a collective work with individual chapters drafted by different authors. See id.
at 234-35. But f. Max Horkheimer, Preface to ADoRNo ET A.., supra note 9, at ix, xi-xii
("The main concepts of the study were evolved by the team as a whole."). Although the
introduction to The Authoritarian Personality paints discrimination in largely unqualified
generalized terms, certain individual authors introduced varying degrees of nuance. In-
deed, sometimes the same authors emphasized at various points not only the generality of
ethnocentrism and prejudice, but also particular examples, such as anti-Semitism. Compare
Levinson, supra note 180, at 102 (stating that ethnocentrism focuses on prejudice in gen-
eral, not against particular groups), with DanielJ. Levinson, The Study of Anti-Semitic Ideology,
in ADoRNo ET AL., supra note 9, at 57 ("[A]nti-Semitism is particularly important and re-
vealing." (emphasis added)).
193 See infra Part III.B.1.f. (discussing the methodological critique and response of
more recent studies).
194 ADoRNo Er AL., supra note 9, at 9. As Young-Breuhl has observed, The Authoritarian
Personality further developed the generality of prejudice that Adorno and Horkheimer had
developed in their earlier, more theoretical book, Dialectic ofEnlightenment: "Antisemitism
has virtually ceased to be an independent impulse and is now a plank in the platform.'"
YouNc-BRuEHL, supra note 175, at 60 (citation omitted).
195 ADoRNo r AL.., supra note 9, at 3. The unusual phrasing reflects the theoretical
orientation of the Frankfurt School with which the authors were affiliated. Some early
statements by adherents suggest that the authors were misguided in trying to test research
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assertion and subsequent argument take three principal forms: (1)
quantitative studies of polls of prejudiced attitudes, (2) theories of
ethnocentric ideology, and (3) analysis of interviews.' 96 On the basis
of these theories and evidence, The Authoritarian Personality recom-
mends a broad attack on prejudice rather than the contemporary fixa-
tion on atomized forms of discrimination, particularly those based on
classification such as race: "[I]t follows directly from our major find-
ings that countermeasures should take into account the whole struc-
ture of the prejudiced outlook. The major emphasis should be placed
... not upon discrimination against particular minority groups, but
upon such phenomena as stereotypy [sic], emotional coldness, identi-
fication with power, and general destructiveness.' 97
against hypotheses. SeeJAY, supra note 8, at 221 ("[T~he Frankfurt School was critical of
the reductionist tendencies implicit in inductively oriented, empirical social science. In
the exploration of social phenomena, it placed theory prior to the gathering of 'facts'
...."). The language of The Authoritarian Personality, however, often reads like familiar
social science: there is a hypothesis-anti-Semitism cannot be studied apart from prejudice
in general-and the studies that follow seem to test this hypothesis. Subsequent studies of
the central theories of the book indeed follow that kind of methodology, and they confirm
with better techniques the central thesis that discrimination often involves hostility to all
outgroups, not merely anti-Semitism. See infra text accompanying note 239. After writing
The Authoritarian Personality, however, Adomo claimed that he still adhered to the method-
ology of critical theory that held that one did not simply use experiments to test
hypotheses:
[W]e never regarded the theory simply as a set of hypotheses but as in some
sense standing on its own feet, and therefore did not intend to prove or
disprove the theory through our findings but only to derive from it con-
crete questions for investigation, which must then be judged on their own
merit and demonstrate certain prevalent socio-psychological structures.
JAY, supra note 8, at 240 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). Psychia-
trists gathered at a 1945 meeting to discuss further research on the psychology of anti-
Semitism displayed similar views: "We know essentially the psycho-dynamics of the minority
problem; we also know the social dynamics. We just have to collect the empirical data" Sandor
Rado, Remarks at the Meeting of Psychiatrists and Psychoanalysts for Consideration of a
Research Project on Psychology of Anti-Semitism 4 (Apr. 19, 1945) (unpublished tran-
script, on file with author) (emphasis added).
196 The interviews included what the study called projective questions: questions
designed to shed light on what the individual projected from his own personality onto the
world. See Betty Aron, The Thematic Apperception Test in the Study of Prejudiced and Unpreu-
diced Individuals, in AoRNo ET AL., supra note 9, at 489, 489-90; Daniel J. Levinson, Prjec-
tive Questions in the Study of Personality and Ideoloo, in AoRNo ET A.., supra note 9, at 545,
545-47.
197 AoRNo Er AL.., supra note 9, at 973. In particular, because the study locates the
source of the prejudiced family in a deep personality structure forged during childhood, it
emphasizes changes in child training. See id. at 975. Although it expresses considerable
skepticism that there are resources available for individual psychotherapy, the study also
expresses a hope that some "it] echniques[,] ... developed mainly in the field of individual
psychotherapy, can be improved and adapted for use with groups and even for use on a
mass scale." Id. at 976.
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b. Quantitative Evidence of Generalized Outgroup Hostility
The quantitative data about generalized outgroup hostility are
stunning: a person who agrees with a particular anti-Semitic statement
is nearly as likely to agree with an anti-African-American statement as
another anti-Semitic statement.198 Moreover, since the surveys let in-
dividuals agree or disagree on a scale, the results of the surveys suggest
that individuals who dislike one group, such as Jews, not only dislike
another, such as African-Americans, but also dislike them as in-
tensely.199 Hence, these data indicate not only that someone who ex-
presses an anti-Semitic belief would possibly express an anti-African-
198 See infra text accompanying notes 199-201.
199 Daniel Levinson explained:
The fact that [the anti-Semitism, African-American, and minority scales] in-
volve items dealing with so great a variety of groups and ideas suggests
again that ethnocentrism is a general frame of mind, that an individual's
stand with regard to one group such as Negroes tends to be similar in direc-
tion and degree to his stand with regard to most issues of group relations.
Levinson, supra note 180, at 113. In addition, this outgroup hostility also correlates
strongly with what I call ingroup sympathy. In terms of ingroup sympathy and outgroup
hostility, the quantitative study recognized that the exact contours of like and dislike would
vary somewhat for a given individual. Levinson reported,
While there are probably considerable sectional, class, and individual differ-
ences regarding which groups are regarded as outgroups, it would appear
that an individual who regards a few of these groups as outgroups will tend
to reject most of them. An ethnocentric individual may have a particular
dislike for one group, but he is likely nonetheless to have ethnocentric
opinions and attitudes regarding many other groups.
Id. at 147.
One important limitation to quantitative data is that it does not allow one to identify
how many prejudiced individuals fit a particular kind of generalized discrimination. (I am
grateful to Ellen Saks for pressing me on this point.) The data show the correlation be-
tween the average scores on various scales; they do not show the correlation between any
given individual's score on one scale, such as racism, and his score on another scale, such
as anti-Semitism. See infra note 206. Although The Authoritarian Personality claims that the
majority of subjects did not display the extreme version of the generally prejudiced person-
ality, seeAORNo ET Ar., supra note 9, at 976, it does not precisely address a question lawyers
may find important: Of those engaged in illegal discrimination, how many fit the generally
prejudiced personality, as opposed to some narrower set of prejudices? Nevertheless, the
study strongly hints that a large number of persons share such a generally prejudiced per-
sonality. Indeed, it takes pains to avoid suggesting that prejudice is merely a problem with
isolated, dysfunctional individuals:
Personality patterns that have been dismissed as "pathological" because
they were not in keeping with the most common manifest trends or the
most dominant ideals within a society, have on closer investigation turned
out to be but exaggerations of what was almost universal below the surface
in that society. What is "pathological" today may with changing social con-
ditions become the dominant trend of tomorrow.
Id. at 7.
More recent studies using a modified version of the authoritarianism scales show that,
in a 1995 survey of college students, 1.2% scored very high, 18.1% moderately high, and
46.9% slightly high. See BOB ALTEMEYER, THE AuTHoRirARLAN SPECTER 90 tbl.3.1 (1996).
This suggests that a large number of individuals today are hostile to a large number of
seemingly different outgroups.
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American belief, but also that such a person would be roughly as likely
to disagree with another set200 of anti-Semitic statements.
Overall, The Authoritarian Personality groups various anti-Semitic
statements into several subscales: "Offensive," "Threatening," "Atti-
tudes," "Intrusive," and "Seclusive." 20 1 Three sets of intercorrelations
between these subscales are either .74 or .75: offensive and seclusive
(.75), attitudes and seclusive (.74), and intrusive and seclusive
(.74).202 The correlation of negative attitudes about African Ameri-
cans20 3 and negative attitudes about Jews is .74;204 the correlation of
negative attitudes about Jews and negative attitudes about other mi-
norities (such as religious sects that do not salute flags, foreigners,
Japanese, "Okies," and Filipinos) 20 5 is .76.206 Similarly, the correlation
of negative attitudes about African Americans and other minorities is
.74.207 Although the text does not supply the exact quantitative data
of correlations, it also indicates that individuals who condemn lesbi-
ans and gays tend to condemn other outgroups and vice versa.208 Sub-
sequent follow-up interviews confirmed all of the quantitative data
based on the surveys. These interviews were similarly rated; with few
exceptions, interviewers rated those who scored high on the ethno-
centrism and anti-Semitism scales as high in prejudice in general. As
discussed below, more recent studies continue to show similar kinds of
200 The study conceived of various subscales in a relatively crude way:
Several subscales were formed in order to insure systematic coverage of the
various aspects conceived and in order to test certain hypotheses. The sub-
scales cannot be thought of as dealing with components of anti-Semitism in
any statistical sense; they are not based on statistical treatment of prior re-
sults, nor was any intensive correlational analysis of the present items made.
The subscales are, rather, convenient ways of conceiving and grouping
items.
Levinson, supra note 192, at 62.
201 Id. at 75 tbl.8(II).
202 See id. Certain other subscales have a stronger correlations: offensive and threaten-
ing (.85), offensive and attitudes (.83), and threatening and attitudes (.84). See id.
203 The study included a subscale devoted solely to African Americans, "[s]ince [Afri-
can Americans] ... are a large and severely oppressed group and since imagery of [the
African American] ... has become so elaborated in American cultural mythology." Levin-
son, supra note 180, at 106.
204 See id. at 122 tbl.l1(IV).
205 See id. at 106 tbl.2(IV). The minority subscale also includes what the study consid-
ered as "moral minorities or outgroups": "[z]ootsuiters, criminals, the insane, 'inherently
incapable people' and 'undesirable elements.'" Id. at 107.
206 See id. at 122 tbl.11(IV).
207 See id. at 113 tbl.6(IV).
208 See ADoRNo ET AL., supra note 9, at 15 (noting that people who agreed with the
statement, "'Homosexuality is an especially rotten form of delinquency and ought to be
severely punished'" tended to agree with the statement "that members of some minority
group are basically inferior").
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close correlations, although the exact degree of the correlations
differs.209
These data undermine the atomized viewpoint and bolster the
generalized viewpoint in two ways. First, the statistics undermine the
atomized approach because they show that an atomized viewpoint
such as anti-Semitism includes variation; people who agreed with one
anti-Semitic statement do not always agree with another. Second, the
data show that this variation within atomized groups is often approxi-
mately the same as the variation in prejudice against different atom-
ized groups, such as African Americans. Therefore, to determine how
an alleged discriminator has behaved in the past, looking at his treat-
ment of outgroups in general is often as illuminating as looking at
some narrowly constructed atomized group such as Jews.
c. The Ethnocentric Ideology Explanation
The quantitative data also support the powerful theory that vari-
ous kinds of prejudices are often different facets of a common ideol-
ogy210 of ethnocentrism. The distinction that The Authoritarian
Personality draws between the ways in which ethnocentrism and preju-
dice are "commonly regarded" parallels this Article's distinction be-
tween generalized and atomized understandings of prejudice:
Prejudice is commonly regarded as a feeling of dislike against a spe-
cific group; ethnocentrism, on the other hand, refers to a relatively
consistent frame of mind concerning "aliens" generally. Usually, in
discussions of prejudice against groups there is specific reference to
"race prejudice" or "prejudice against racial and religious minori-
ties." This terminology is used even by people who know that "race"
is a socially harmful idea as ordinarily understood, and who know
that many groups (zootsuiters, "Okies," and so forth) are discrimi-
nated against on neither racial nor religious grounds.2 1'
209 See infra note 239 and accompanying text (discussing more recent authoritarianism
studies).
210 The study purported to treat ideology as a neutral, descriptive term:
Since the term "ideology" has acquired many negative connotations, partic-
ularly in the realm of political thought, we wish again to emphasize that this
concept is used here in a purely descriptive sense: "ideology" refers to an
"organized system of opinions, values, and attitudes." Any body of social
thought may, in this sense, be called an ideology, whether it is true or false,
beneficial or harmful, democratic or undemocratic.
Daniel J. Levinson, Politico-Economic Ideology and Group Memberships in Relation to Ethnocen-
trism, in ADORNo Er AL., supra note 9, at 151, 151 n.1. See generally J.M. BALmN, CULTURAL
SoFrwAR.: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 110 (1998) (describing the power of society's ideology
as simultaneously empowering and constraining).
211 Levinson, supra note 180, at 102. As the quotation indicates, one can define in-
groups by more dimensions than what the narrow framework of race would accommodate:
The term "group" is used in the widest sense to mean any set of people who
constitute a psychological entity for any individual. If we regard the individ-
ual's conception of the social world as a sort of map containing various
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This theory of ethnocentrism does not claim to fully describe every
individual in every interaction.21 2 No theory of prejudice or of any
human behavior can plausibly accomplish this task; indeed, we would
have nothing but a mess of unsorted details if we rejected a theory
because it did not describe every individual or predict every interac-
tion.213 Instead, The Authoritarian Personality describes how many peo-
ple act much of the time.
For the purposes of this Article, the most important feature of the
ethnocentric individual is the individual's need to distinguish between
an ingroup and everyone outside that ingroup. This dichotomization
reflects a basic view of the world that bifurcates the world "from the
parent-child dichotomy to the dichotomous conception of sex roles
and of moral values, as well as to a dichotomous handling of social
relations as manifested especially in the formation of stereotypes and
of ingroup-outgroup cleavages." 21 4 A prejudiced individual identifies
himself with an ingroup;215 because only the individual's self-identifi-
cation matters, the prejudiced individual may imagine himself a mem-
differentiated regions, then each region can be considered a group. This
sociopsychological definition includes sociological groups such as nations,
classes, ethnic groups, political parties, and so on. But it also includes num-
bers-of-people who have one or more common characteristics but who are
not formal groups in the sense of showing organization and regulation of
ways. Thus, it is legitimate in a sociopsychological sense to consider as
groups such sets of people as criminals, intellectuals, artists, politicians, ec-
centrics, and so on.
Id. at 146.
212 In describing the summary of interviews, Frenkel-Brunswik made clear that the the-
ory represents something of an abstraction from the range of individual cases:
It should.., be kept in mind that the summary which follows deals with
composite pictures of these patterns, abstracted from the study of groups,
rather than with individual cases. Were we to lay greater stress on concrete
personalities, the most frequent syndromes or combinations of trends
within single individuals would have to be determined as an intermediate
step, leading to the definition of subtypes within the prejudiced and the
unprejudiced patterns.
Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Comprehensive Scores and Summary of Interview Results, in ADoRNo ET
AL., supra note 9, at 468, 473. The text does identify such subtypes elsewhere. For the
purposes of this Article, however, these subtypes are of relatively little interest: each of the
subtypes engages in generalized discrimination. See T.W. Adorno, Types and Syndromes, in
ADORNo ET AL.., supra note 9, at 744, 751 ("It is one of the outstanding findings of the study
that 'highness' [of prejudice and ethnocentrism] is essentially one syndrome, distinguish-
able from a variety of 'low' syndromes.").
213 However, the claim that there is a need for abstract theory does not mean that rich,
detailed empirical work is not valuable as well. Compare PosNER, supra note 152, at 427
(describing Willard Hurst's book as "a dense mass of description... so wanting in a theo-
retical framework-in a perceptible point-as to be unreadable, almost as if the author had
forgotten to arrange his words into sentences"), with ABEL, supra note 189, at ix-x (empha-
sizing the value of collecting numerous examples to illustrate "the limits of
generalization").
214 ADoRNo ET AL., supra note 9, at 971. As discussed below, cognitive theorists such as
Allport began to treat these habits as cognitive. See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
215 See Levinson, supra note 180, at 104.
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ber of an ingroup even if others would never describe him as part of
that group.216 Additionally, the individual has "uncritically supportive
attitudes" toward the ingroup.217 Nearly all individuals outside that
ingroup comprise outgroups; 2 18 "[a] primary characteristic of ethno-
centric ideology is the generality of outgroup rejection."219 But what
makes this theory one of outgroup hostility, rather than mere ingroup
sympathy, is that the prejudiced personality regards outgroups as "an-
tithetical to the ingroups," thus leading the individual to have "nega-
tive opinions and hostile attitudes" about them.220 Moreover, these
attitudes are often stereotypical; for example, the same behavior may
be viewed favorably by members of the ingroup as loyalty, but nega-
tively by members of an outgroup as clannishness. 22' The final stage
in the development of a discriminatory personality occurs when the
216 For instance, a brown-haired, brown-eyed man may idolize Nordic "Aryans." Many
surveys in these studies show that most women accepted that women should only work in
"feminine positions, such as nursing, secretarial work, or child care." Id. at 117 tbl.8(IV);
see id. at 121. However, when the researchers asked this question again, college and profes-
sional women tended to disagree and college men had a "slight tendency to agree." Id. at
121; see also id. at 146-47 (suggesting that the key to concepts such as ingroups and out-
groups is self-identification, not formal membership).
217 Id. at 104.
218 See id.
219 Id. at 147; see also id. at 122 ("Anti-Semitism is best regarded... as one aspect of this
broader frame of mind; and it is the total ethnocentric ideology, rather than prejudice
against any single group, which requires explanation.").
220 Id. at 104. Although I classify The Authoritarian Personality as an example of a study
of outgroup hostility, the study also contains traces of understandings of ingroup sympa-
thy. See id. at 102 ("Ethnocentrism refers to group relations generally; it has to do not only
with numerous groups toward which the individual has hostile opinions and attitudes but,
equally important, with groups toward which he is positively disposed.").
The Authoritarian Personality still fits within an understanding of outgroup hostility in
two ways. First, at a mechanical level, much of its discussion and analysis emphasizes nega-
tive attitudes toward outgroups. The ethnocentrism scale focuses on negative attitudes
about particular groups. For example, a statement about African Americans describes Afri-
can Americans as "irresponsible, lazy, and ignorant," rather than describing whites as re-
sponsible and well-informed. Id. at 105 tbl.l(IV); cf. Levinson, supra note 192, at 58
(describing anti-Semitism as "negative opinions" about Jews and "hostile attitudes toward
them," without discussing positive attitudes regarding Gentiles); id. at 59 (attempting to
explain why only negative items were used).
Second, and more fundamentally, the theory treats preferences for one group as inevi-
tably linked to negative views about another group; the idea that individuals simply over-
look an outgroup is not seriously considered. See Levinson, supra note 180, at 147 ("It is as
if the ethnocentric individual feels threatened by most of the groups to which he does not
have a sense of belonging; if he cannot identify, he must oppose; ifa group is not 'accepta-
ble,' it is 'alien.'").
There are few exceptions to the tendency to ask about negative attitudes. One state-
ment about women in the ethnocentrism scales does conform more closely to ingroup
sympathy: "Although women are necessary in the armed forces and in industry, they
should be returned to their proper place in the home as soon as the war ends." Id. at 106
tbl.2(IV); see also infra Part llI.C.1 (explaining why ingroup sympathy and outgroup hostil-
ity may have similar effects).
221 See Levinson, supra note 180, at 149.
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prejudiced individual builds these attitudes into a vision of society:
"[O]utgroups should be socially subordinate to ingroups."222
d. The Independent Psychoanalytic Explanation
Apart from the hard data that support the descriptions of both
the prejudiced personality and the ethnocentric ideology, The Authori-
tarian Personality also offers a theory of the origins of the ethnocentric
ideology; it posits that the ethnocentric ideology infects individuals on
the basis of their psychology of personality.2 23 However, the descrip-
tion of the ethnocentric ideology above is easily severable from the
currently less trendy psychoanalytic theory. The ethnocentric ideol-
ogy describes both the quantitative data and the interviews; the psy-
choanalytic gloss speculates about how this ideology might have
developed, and to a much lesser extent, how it might be remedied.
The law of evidence requires only a description of an individual's
current world view and his current motivation to act against all out-
groups. However, legal scholars may nonetheless be interested in
thinking about the origins of this behavior for other reasons, such as
to reduce prejudice in society. Despite this interest, attorneys gener-
ally need not concern themselves with proof of the origins of motiva-
tion in proving discrimination. 224 Moreover, although subsequent
studies repeatedly confirm the idea that much discrimination is gener-
alized, they offer little support for the psychoanalytic emphasis on
family upbringing.2 25
222 Id. at 104. To some extent, the theory suggests a remarkable consistency and hier-
archy in the treatment of outgroups:
The social world as most ethnocentrists see it is arranged like a series of
concentric circles around a bull's-eye. Each circle represents an ingroup-
outgroup distinction; each line serves as a barrier to exclude all outside
groups from the center, and each group is in turn excluded by a slightly
narrower one. A sample "map" illustrating the ever-narrowing ingroup
would be the following- Whites, Americans, native-born Americans, Chris-
tians, Protestants, Californians, my family, and finally-I.
Id. at 148.
223 The text rejects any crude economic determinism of motivations. Nevertheless,
periodic fragments-not obviously necessary to the rest of the text-remaining intimating
that an ethnocentric ideology has some rational economic or class interest origin. See
ADoRNo m" AL., supra note 9, at 8 (asserting that "the tendency of the small businessman to
side with big business in most economic and political matters cannot be due entirely to a
belief that this is the way to guarantee his economic independence" and that "the individ-
ual seems not only not to consider his material interests, but even to go against them")
These fragments may well reflect some of the Marxist origins of some of the authors. See
JAY, supra note 8, at 228.
224 For other legal purposes, the origins of discrimination may matter to the extent
they establish effective policies to combat discrimination; such policies may reduce an or-
ganization's liability for discriminatory acts of its personnel.
225 See ALTEMEER, supra note 12, at 254.
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e. Atomized Traces
Although The Authoritarian Personality consistently and pervasively
depicts a generalized view of discrimination it also recognizes that
prejudice sometimes assumes other forms. First, Daniel Levinson em-
phasized that even when ethnocentric persons have negative views of
various outgroups, these negative views-what we would now call ste-
reotypes-vary to some degree for different outgroups: "What is the
content of ethnocentric ideology regarding outgroups? There are, of
course, individual differences here, and the same individual has differ-
ent conceptions of, and attitudes toward, different outgroups. Never-
theless, certain common trends seem to exist, and these are generally
the same as those found in anti-Semitic ideology. '226
Although this language suggests that anti-Semitism may be an ex-
ample of atomized discrimination, the underlying data support alter-
native conclusions as well. The variety in types of prejudices includes
various views about even an atomized group such as Jews. The stere-
otyping goes beyond an individual's viewing Jews as hyper-competitive
or African Americans as irrational and wildly sexualized. As the quan-
titative scales show, even the same individuals may see Jews as seem-
ingly contradictory stereotypes. Additionally, prejudice involving Jews
might be limited to Jews of certain backgrounds or Jews who trigger
certain stereotypes, such as uncleanliness or hyper-competitiveness.
In the case of Jews, the reason for the existence of seemingly contra-
dictory stereotypes perhaps comes from the distinction between ste-
reotypes of Eastern European Jews and more well-established German
Jews in people's minds.22 7 Likewise, in contemporary times, discus-
226 Levinson, supra note 180, at 176. Levinson also noted:
[T]he correlations among the initial Negro, Minorities, Patriotism, and
Anti-Semitism scales indicate that these trends are closely related, that peo-
ple are notably consistent in their acceptance or rejection of general ethno-
centrism. To attempt to measure this ideology as a totality, however, is not
to deny that it has components with respect to which individuals may vary.
... It would be erroneous, then, to regard high scorers as "all alike";
they have in common a general way of thinking about groups, but there are
wide individual differences in the imagery and attitudes regarding various
groups.
Id, at 145-46.
227 See, e.g., AcEPma &JAHoDA, supra note 180, at 79-82 (distinguishing "Jewish anti-
Semitism," from "the anti-Semite who is overtly committed to an ideology of political liber-
alism"). Additionally, an examination of the data from reports of the psychoanalysis of
various patients suggest how one might reconstruct different categories from these data
based on the stereotypes ofJews. These stereotypes include consideringJews as being "so-
cial climbers" and "fakes," id. at 97, "associat[ing] Jews with low status and inferiority," id. at
102, and believing thatJews are "dirty... generally low class," and "castrated," id. Other
stereotypes treat Jews as being "greedy and promiscuous," "intellectually superior," id. at
100, and "too serious" and as "hav[ing] too much drive," id. at 106. These data, as well as
the quantitative data in The Authoritarian Personality, show that many of the same individuals
held these seemingly contradictory stereotypes about Jews; but the data do not really ex-
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sion of atomized categories such as Hispanics or Asians may mask sim-
ilar differences; relatively wealthy and well-educated Cuban, Chinese,
or Japanese immigrants may evoke markedly different reactions than
more recent and poorer Cuban and Vietnamese refugees.228
Second, the authors of The Authoritarian Personality periodically
suggested that anti-Semitism might have some other sources in addi-
tion to general ethnocentrism. On the quantitative side, the study
found that the various minority and African-American scales correlate
slightly better than any correlates with the anti-Semitism scales. Levin-
son noted that this might merely be a result of the relatively short anti-
Semitism scales. 229 Additionally, he hypothesized that "it appears
likely that there are certain specific determinants of anti-Semitism
apart from those which hold for general ethnocentrism."230 However,
these statements about the special quality of anti-Semitism may be in
part a reflection of the preoccupation of some of the researchers and
their research methods. For example, the protocols for structured in-
terviews of individuals included a laundry list of questions aboutJews,
but only a handful of questions about other specific outgroups.23'
Likewise, although anti-Semitism received its own set of questions, the
protocols lumped together all other minorities in the minorities
scale.2 3 2
Ultimately, then, we reach a plausible conclusion that prejudice
may not always be generalized. However, this conclusion does not in-
exorably lead to the assumption that discrimination exists on atom-
ized lines. The discovery of atomized discrimination is sometimes a
direct result of the particular way in which the researchers conducted
their experiments. Moreover, even if discrimination is not a result of
generalized outgroup hostility, it is not necessarily a result of atomized
racism or anti-Semitism.233 Discrimination may be subatomized, such
as against German Jews. Discrimination may also be generalized in
plore whether individuals held these contradictory stereotypes about the same group of
Jews. Instead, it might have been that some Jews, such as relatively recent immigrants, were
viewed as dirty, and others, such as relatively assimilated Jews, as too ambitious. More
recent surveys of anti-Semitism, however, have tended to only consider stereotypes that
track the hypercompetitive stereotypes rather than the "dirty" and "low class" stereotypes.
See Anti-Defamation League, Anti-Semitism and Preudice in America; Highlights from an ADL
Survey; Differences Between the Views of the Most Anti-Semitic Americans and the Rest of the Public,
Nov. 1998 (visited Nov. 7, 1999) <http://Nvw.adl.org/antisemitism%5Fsurvey/sur-
veyji-chart-Differences-in-views.htm>.
228 See, e.g., Valdes, supra note 16, at 24-27 (discussing diversity among Latinas/os).
229 See Levinson, supra note 180, at 122.
230 Id.
231 See Frenkel-Brunswik, supra note 182, at 323-25.
232 See supra note 203 (describing how the minorities subscale includes questions about
several different outgroups).
233 See supra text accompanying note 34 (noting how an individual understands dis-
crimination in a variety of ways by generalizing along various dimensions).
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ways that encompass parts of several atomized groups, such as hostility
to recent immigrants or the unassimilated be they Jews who wear
traditional dress or Latinos who keep their accents. 234 In the end,
however, these caveats speak to the exact balance between various
forms of relatively generalized discrimination and various forms of rel-
atively atomized discrimination. The evidence nonetheless reveals a
strong basis for seeing much discrimination as generalized; at least, it
expresses some skepticism about the extent to which one can under-
stand the remainder using atomized categories.
f. The Limits and Lessons of The Authoritarian Personality
Despite its widespread citation in law review articles, 2 3 5 and even
some direct citation in cases,28 6 The Authoritarian Personality has a com-
plicated history in social science. In the narrowest sense, The Authori-
tarian Personality and other volumes in the Studies In Prejudice series
have fallen from grace in some academic departments on method-
ological grounds. Shortly after its publication, critics launched what
became a sustained assault on the quantitative F-scales method that
tried to show that individuals who answered "yes" to one prejudiced
statement tended to answer "yes" to other prejudiced statements. The
methodological critics showed that these questionnaires were suspect
on an elementary level; although the long survey identified prejudice
with "yes" answers to various statements, basic survey principles sug-
gest that those who answer "yes" to some questions tend to automati-
cally answer "yes" to other questions.237 This is a familiar problem
234 See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 34 (describing the frequent issues that
various outsiders confront in trying to decide when and how to "fit in").
235 See, e.g., Linz Audain, Critical Legal Studies, Feminism, Law and Economics, and the Veil
of Intellectual Tolerance: A Tentative Case for Cross-Jurisprudential Dialogue, 20 HosrRTa L. REv.
1017, 1081 n.280 (1992) ("The monumental work on the topic, however, building on the
work of Erich Fromm and others, was the experimental study of American authoritarian-
ism completed by Adorno and his colleagues in 1950."); Charles W. Collier, The New Logic
of Affirmative Action, 45 DUKE LJ. 559, 568 & n.22 (1995); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness
and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prdudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L.
Rxv. 1359, 1376 & n.1 18 (describing The Authoritarian Personaliiy's theory of a "personality
structure... particularly susceptible to ethnic prejudice."); Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of
Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. Rxv. 499, 507 n.27 (1991).
236 See Frazier v. Heebe, 788 F.2d 1049, 1058 n.5 (5th Cir. 1986) (Goldberg, J., dissent-
ing), rev'd, 482 U.S. 641 (1987); Crawford v. Bounds, 395 F.2d 297, 314 n.2 (4th Cir.)
(Sobeloff, J., concurring), vacated, 393 U.S. 76 (1968) (per curiam); Miller v. United States,
320 F.2d 767, 772 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (per curiam); People v. Gonzales, 426 P.2d 929,
940 n.10 (Cal. 1967); People v. Henderson, 145 Cal. Rptr. 751, 755 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978).
237 See, e.g., Jos D. Meloen, The F Scale as a Predictor ofFascism: An Overoiew of 40 Years of
Authoritarianism Research, in STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS: THE AUTSOPr rAmuAN PERSONALr=Y TO-
DAY 47, 65 (William F. Stone et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS. For a
full survey of various methodological critiques, see generally STUDIES IN THE SCOPE AND
METHOD OF "THE AUrHORrrAIAN PERSONALITY": CONTINUrrIEs IN SOCIAL RESEARCH (Rich-
ard Christie & Marie Jahoda eds., 1954); STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS, supra; Bob Altemeyer,
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with evaluation of employees or professors. If asked all questions on
the same scale, students and supervisors tend to answer them either
"yes" or "no." Such answering masks potentially real distinctions, such
as general approval of a teacher's lectures versus underlying skepti-
cism about their analytic depth.238
In a broader sense, however, the generalized gaze of The Authori-
tarian Personality remains intact in three significant ways. First, studies
susceptible to fewer methodological objections confirm that many
prejudiced persons harbor prejudice against numerous outgroups
rather than against particular outgroups.23 9 One historian remarked:
ReducingPrudice in Right-WingAuthoritarians, in 7 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE: THE ON-
TARIO SYMPosIuM 131, 131-32 (Mark P. Zanna & James M. Olson eds, 1994).
Although the results of The Authoritarian Personality were initially suspect because of
the questionnaire form, more recent studies disagree as to the effect of such formats. Com-
pare Meloen, supra, at 66 (noting that more recent uses of the F-scale "did not show much
difference in authoritarianism level whether this level was measured by unidirectional or
balanced F scales"), with ALTEMr Y', supra note 199, at 61 (describing "[tihe power of yea-
saying and nay-saying to introduce massive amounts of error into a test's scores [including
scores in The Authoritarian Personality], while at the same time making it look good"). More-
over, one must recall that The Authoritarian Personality attempts to corroborate its theory of
ethnocentrism-generalized discrimination-by also having extensive interviews with sub-
jects, which were in turn rated. However, this also raises the problem of a biased interpre-
tation by the raters-a problem the study acknowledged. See Frenkel-Brunswik, supra note
182, at 333-34.
238 See Richard L. Abel, Evaluating Evaluations: How Should Law Schools Judge Teaching?,
40J. LEGAL EDUC. 407, 431-33 (1990).
239 [A]uthoritarians do tend to be bigots. Indeed, ["right wing authoritarian]
scale scores among White North Americans have correlated with prejudice
against so many different minorities (Blacks, Hispanics, Jews, aboriginal
peoples, Sikhs, Japanese, Chinese, Pakistanis, Filipinos, Africans, Arabs,
feminists, homosexuals... ) that one could say right-wing authoritarians
are "equal opportunity bigots."
Altemeyer, supra note 237, at 136 (citation omitted); see also Geoffrey Haddock & Mark P.
Zanna, Authoritarianism, Values, and the Favorability and Structure of Antigay Attitudes, in
STIGMA AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION: UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AGAINST LESBIANS, GAY MEN,
AND BISEXUALS 82, 91 (Gregory M. Herek ed., 1998) (finding particularly negative attitudes
toward homosexuals among authoritarians with strong prejudice against minorities);Jos D.
Meloen et al., A Test of the Approaches of Adorno et al., Lederer and Altemeyer ofAuthoritarianism
in Belgian Flanders: A Research Note, 17 POL. PSYCHOL 643, 651-53 (1996) (concluding that
scores on various authoritarianism scales, including the older scales of The Authoritarian
Personality and more recently revised scales, all equally predict anti-Semitic, antifeinist,
and antiminority attitudes). More recently, modified versions of authoritarianism scales
have shown that persons with high scores on authoritarianism may also view human life as
an ingroup; such persons have less favorable attitudes toward animals and the environ-
ment. See Hardeo Ojha, The Relationship of Authoritarianism to Locus of Contro Love of Ani-
mals and People, and Preference for Political Ideology, 42 PSYCHOL. STUD. 32, 33-35 (1997); cf.
Sam G. Mcfarland et al., Russian Authoritarianism Two Years After Communism, 22 PERSONAL-
ry & SOCIAL PSYCHOL BULL. 210, 211 (1996) (showing that high scorers on authoritarian-
ism scale tend to have more negative attitudes toward environmentalists). For purposes of
this article, I do not address the question of why "we" might want to define humans as our
ingroup and other animals as an outgroup. But cf., e.g., Carol J. Adams, Comments on
George's 'Should Feminists Be Vegetarians?", 21 SIGNS 221, 223 (1995) ("[Feminist theorists of
vegetarianism] recognize the interlocking nature of the oppression of women and the
other animals. Eating animals is one aspect of patriarchal violence .. ").
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The most important consequence of the sociopsychological studies
[such as The Authoritarian Personality] was the "scientific" legitima-
tion of one of the intergroup relations movement's cardinal tenets:
the conviction that all forms of ethnic, religious, and racial preju-
dice were integrally related.... These findings suggested that any
attempt to strike at the roots of anti-Semitism would require partici-
pation in a general campaign against prejudice. 24 °
In 1993, Richard Christie, one of the leading methodological critics of
The Authoritarian Personality, wrote, "Viewed in a more balanced way
than some of its past critics have viewed it, [The Authoritarian Personal-
ity] seems to us to be strikingly relevant in today's world."241
Second, the generalized gaze continues to mean that social scien-
tists both explicitly presume that discrimination is a general phenome-
non, regardless of the particular stereotypes or particular groups
involved, and implicitly presume that discrimination is a general phe-
nomenon by interchangeably writing about what others would see as
different forms of prejudice.2 42 As Christie explained, critics "think
that the authoritarian personality syndrome's essential core is that the
person fawns before admired authority (representing strength) and
loathes weakness-in Jews, women, homosexuals, or other
outgroups. 2 43
The third and more specific way in which the generalized theory
remains viable is via researchers' loyalty to the ingroup/outgroup par-
adigm; only the notion of exactly what animates the ingroup/out-
group dynamics has changed. 244 Thus, Young-Bruehl suggested:
Although numerous studies continue to confirm that those who express negative atti-
tudes toward one atomized outgroup tend to express negative attitudes toward other atom-
ized outgroups, the number of such studies has declined since its peak in the 1950s. See
John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Prdudice, Discrimination, and Racism: Historical
Trends and Contemporay Approaches, in PzjuDicE, DiscRIMrINATroN, AND RAcIsM 1, 12-13
(John F. Dovido & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986). However, this decline largely reflects
an even deeper and more fundamental theoretical picture of how the same individuals
tend to show greater sympathy for those in their ingroup and greater hostility toward those
in outgroups. As detailed further below, a larger portion of research discusses processes of
stereotyping and prejudicing often with little attention to differences between particular
outgroups. See id. at 13-14.
240 SvoNrrN, supra note 8, at 37-38.
241 William F. Stone et al., Introduction: Strength and Weakness, in SaRENGT AND WEAK-
NEss, supra note 237, at 3, 4.
242 See infra note 274 and accompanying text (noting how current psychological re-
search discusses prejudice by citing studies involving what lawyers might consider as differ-
ent forms of discrimination).
243 Stone, supra note 241, at 4.
244 See id. at 4-5 (suggesting that we can understand why people are attracted to fascism
in terms of "admired" groups and "outgroups," and that, although no longer a personality
explanation of authoritarianism in the modem context, the similar analysis "taken in a
more relativistic and sociological context... can help us to understand [authoritarianism]
in the modem world").
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[T] hese recent psychological theories of prejudice] represent a new
way of claiming that all prejudices are alike.... Even though [these
theories] repudiate psychoanalysis and deny any of the depth psy-
chological dimensions that the Adorno group had tried to consider,
they come to The Authoritarian Personality's conclusion: all prejudices
are ethnocentrism. All are instances of the attitudes and practices
members of in-groups-any in-groups-hold with respect to their
out-groups.2 4
5
2. Early Cognitive Theories: Allport's Nature of Prejudice
Allport's The Nature of Prejudice,2 46 published shortly after The Au-
thoritarian Personality, remains one of the most frequently cited psycho-
logical works on prejudice in both social science and law. Several
court decisions,2 47 as well as the works of prominent constitutional
theorists such as John Hart Ely, 248 invoke Allport's work. For exam-
ple, Linda Hamilton Krieger's study of the implicit psychology of Title
VII jurisprudence implies that Title VII largely reflects Allport's ac-
count of discrimination, an account that Krieger deemed inadequate
in light of more recent developments in cognitive psychology. 249
However, when it comes to atomized versus generalized discrimina-
tion, courts and the overwhelming majority of legal scholarship show
little appreciation of Allport's work. Allport's The Nature of Prejudice is
a generous work, encompassing many different accounts of prejudice.
On the whole, however, it treats much prejudice as generalized.2 50
245 YOUNG-BREUHL, supra note 175, at 74.
246 ALLPORT, supra note 8.
247 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 464 n.16 (1985)
(Marshall,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,
503 n.2 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring); Dukes v. Waitkevitch, 429 U.S. 932, 933 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Frazier v. Heebe, 788 F.2d 1049, 1058 n.5 (5th Cir. 1986)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting), rev'd, 482 U.S. 641 (1987); Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 483 F.2d 82, 83
n.2 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States ex reL Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152,
157 (2d Cir. 1973); Miller v. United States, 320 F.2d 767, 772 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (per
curiam); Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152, 1160 (Cal. 1976), af/'d inpart
and rev'd in part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
248 See ELY, supra note 44, at 252 n.73, 254 nn.77, 79, 257 n.96.
249 See Krieger, supra note 68, at 1176-77 (discussing how Title VII jurisprudence re-
flects Allport's understanding of discrimination).
250 Like those in The Authoritarian Personality, these accounts prominently include ex-
amples of how prejudice affected those perceived as Jews. For example, Allport reported
how only 52% of hotels replied to the letters by "Mr. Greenberg" asking for room reserva-
tions, presumably on the assumption that he was Jewish, compared to 95% who replied to
the letters by "Mr. Lockwood." See ALLPoRT, supra note 8, at 5; see also id. at 65 ("Of 1000
rumors collected and analyzed in the war year 1942, 10 percent were anti-Semitic .... ).
However, more recent statistics suggest that self-reported negative attitudes toward
Jews have declined. See, e.g., Anti-Defamation League, Anti-Semitism and Peudice in America;
Highlights from an ADL Survey; How Prevalent Is Anti-Semitism in America? (Nov. 1998) (visited
Nov. 8, 1999) <http://www.adl.org/antisemitism survey/survey-i.html>. According to one
survey, for example, the number of Americans holding many anti-Semitic beliefs declined
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Like The Authoritarian Personality, The Nature of Prejudice explicitly
reveals its understanding of prejudice early on: "Some cultures, like
our own, abjure prejudice; some do not; but the fundamental psycho-
logical analysis of prejudice is the same whether we are talking about
Hindus, Navahos, the Greeks of antiquity, or Middletown, U.S.A."251
Moreover, as in The Authoritarian Personality, Allport's emphasis on
generalized discrimination flows inexorably from his understanding
of a common prejudiced personality; this type of personality draws
sharp distinctions, especially the distinction between the individual's
ingroup and all individuals outside his ingroup.2 52 But Allport did
not merely rephrase The Authoritarian Personality and other works in
the Studies in Prejudice series; Allport also related the prejudiced per-
sonality to a relatively embryonic cognitive psychology.253
a. Allport's Expanded Concept of Ingroups
Allport's view of discrimination as generalized begins with the no-
tion of ingroups versus outgroups: "Perhaps the best that can be done
[to define an ingroup] is to say that members of an in-group all use
the term we with the same essential significance." 254 Allport's under-
standing of ingroups expands on the concept of ingroups in The Au-
thoritarian Personality. First, Allport distinguished between an ingroup
and a reference group. An individual's ingroup includes only those
groups that would include that individual as a member; a reference
group additionally includes groups to which an individual aspires, but
is not fully accepted.255 Allport gave the example of the African
American who "may wish to relate himself to the white majority in his
community."25 6 Second, Allport further expanded what may define
an ingroup by placing gender on equal standing with other group
from 29% in 1964 to 12% in 1998. See id. Nevertheless, in 1998, 35% of those surveyed
agreed with two to five of 11 anti-Semitic statements. See id.
251 ALLPORT, supra note 8, at 12.
252 See infra text accompanying notes 254-62.
253 See Fiske, supra note 32, at 361 (describing Aliport's analysis of social categorization
as a "core insight" that "still sustains most current theories of stereotyping, prejudice, and
discrimination," and noting his argument that, "[j]ust as people categorize furniture into
tables and chairs, putting their drinks on one and sitting on the other, so, too, people
categorize each other into ingroups and outgroups, loving one and... hating the other");
David L. Hamilton et al., Social Cognition and the Study of Stereotyping; in SOCIAL COGNrrON:
IMPACT ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 291, 291-92 (Patricia G. Devine et al. eds., 1994) [hereinaf-
ter SOCIAL COGNrrON].
254 ALLPORT, supra note 8, at 31.
255 See id. at 37-38.
256 Id. at 37. Some will notice the resemblance between reference groups and the
phenomenon often described as "passing." See generally ArielaJ. Gross, Litigating Whiteness:
Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE LJ. 109, 128-39 (1998)
(describing trials held to determine whether an individual was white or African American
as reflecting fear "that these of... [African-American) blood were passing as white"). The
danger of individuals within a particular outgroup identifying with an ingroup rather than
380 [Vol. 85:313
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boundaries. 257 Third, Allport recognized that ingroups and out-
groups may vary by context. For example, employers who would hire
someone identified as a member of a certain group might not want
their relatives to marry someone from that group.258 In that case, the
ingroup for employees would not necessarily be equivalent to the in-
group for social colleagues-an analytic account of the sell-to-you-but-
not-eat-with-you distinction that Shakespeare's Shylock drew so
poetically. 259
b. The Generally Prejudiced Personality
In addition to the implications of his ingroup/outgroup frame-
work, including a tendency to generalize based on ingroups, Allport
also recognized generalized discrimination in his account of prejudice
as a "trait of personality."260 According to Allport, engaging in preju-
dice is a general way of viewing the world that cannot be cabined
neatly into a narrow, atomized discrimination. Allport explains:
"When [prejudice] takes root in a life it grows like a unit. The specific
with other outgroups limits the analysis of generalized discrimination. See infra text accom-
panying note 482 (discussing peripheral group discrimination).
257 SeeALLPORT, supra note 8, at 33-34. In his preface to the 1954 edition of The Nature
of Prudice, Aliport elaborated on the wide range of characteristics that could define an
ingroup:
The concept of race so popular today is in reality an anachronism.
For most purposes the term "ethnic" is preferable to the term "race."
Ethnic refers to characteristics of groups that may be, in different propor-
tions, physical, national, cultural, linguistic, religious, or ideological in
character. Unlike "race," the term does not imply biological unity, a condi-
tion which in reality seldom marks the groups that are the targets of preju-
dice. It is true that "ethnic" does not easily cover occupational, class, caste,
and political grouping, nor the two sexes-clusters that are also the victims
of prejudice.
Id. at xv to xvi.
258 Allport noted:
Discrimination leads to all sorts of curious patterns. As a traveler I may sit
willingly next to ajew and, if I am a Northerner, next to a Negro; but I may
draw the line on living next door to either one. As an employer I may
admit theJew but not the Negro to my office; but at home I may welcome a
Negro to work in my kitchen, but not a Jew. However, a Jew but not a
Negro may sit in my parlor.
Id. at 55. Allport also recognized that patterns of prejudices and stereotypes might change
over time. See id. at 202-04. Although Allport did not discuss the point explicitly, one of
the changes might be the ability of individuals to identify members of an outgroup by
appearance. At the time of Allport's publication, there were some data that in 55% of
cases, individuals could identify Jews by their appearances alone. See id. at 133. Similarly,
Allport reported that many people would associate certain names, such as Greenberg, with
stereotypes ofJews. See id. at 180. See generally Charny & Gulati, supra note 64, at 66 n.38
("'Looking' like a majority group member does not necessarily require a physical resem-
blance. Rather, the reference is primarily to adopting the attitudes, beliefs, and interests
of the majority.").
259 See WILIAM SHAxsPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENiCE act 1, sc. 3.
260 ALLPORT, supra note 8, at 73.
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object of prejudice is more or less immaterial. What happens is that
the whole inner life is affected; the hostility and fear are
systematic."261
The Anatomy of Prejudice emphasizes a specific version of the
prejudiced personality that Allport named "safety-islanders": they are
fiercely loyal to their ingroups and view all "who live outside the eth-
nocentric circle of safety.. . with suspicion."262 Much of Allport's
principal evidence for this perspective, which, as shown below, is not
his only perspective, arises from survey research on the correlation
between what other theorists might see as different kinds of discrimi-
nation. This research includes favorable and extensive citation of the
ethnocentrism scales from The Authoritarian Personality.263 Addition-
ally, Allport also cited other research that demonstrated that individu-
als who reported negative attitudes toward Jews were also likely to
report negative attitudes when asked about imaginary groups that re-
searchers invented for the surveys, such as "Pireneans" and 'Walloni-
ans."264 Allport noted that "[t]he fact that scapegoats of different
breeds are so often harnessed together shows that it is the totality of
prejudice that is important rather than specific accusations against
single groups."265 Individuals with prejudiced personalities usually
generalize more often than others, and they cling to their generaliza-
tions more tenaciously in the face of contrary evidence.2 66
Although The Nature of Prejudice focuses on hostile attitudes to-
ward those outside the ingroup, Allport also briefly but romantically
recognized that some individuals might display ingroup sympathy,
which he likened to Spinoza's "love prejudice," without outgroup hos-
261 Id.
262 Id. at 72.
263 See id. at 69-73.
264 See id. at 68.
265 Id. at 69.
266 Allport also recognized that some individuals are reluctant to generalize-the con-
dition Allport called "habitual open-mindedness." Id. at 24. He explained:
There are people who seem to go through life with relatively little of the
rubricizing tendency. They are suspicious of all labels, of categories, of
sweeping statements. They habitually insist on knowing the evidence for
each and every broad generalization. Realizing the complexity and variety
in human nature, they are especially chary [sic] of ethnic generalizations.
If they hold to any at all it is in a highly tentative way, and every contrary
experience is allowed to modify the pre-existing ethnic concept.
Id. Allport identified a second possible reason for individuals' resistance against general-
izations: "sef-interest" Id. "For example, [a person] may not have known the right classifi-
cation for edible mushrooms and thus find himself poisoned by toadstools. He will not
make the same mistake again: his category will be corrected." Id. Later psychologists have
developed more elaborate and complicated models to explain why some individuals at-
tempt to overcome their initial stereotyped interpretations of others. See Krieger, supra
note 164, at 1285.
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tility.2 67 For these people, "[t]he familiar is preferred. What is alien is
regarded as somehow inferior, less 'good,' but there is not necessarily
hostility against it."268
C. Ingroup Sympathy: Social Psychology and the 'e-Who?"
Distinction
Although the theories of Allport and The Authoritarian Personality
continue to influence social scientists and remain influential in legal
scholarship and court decisions, the direction of psychological re-
search on discrimination has shifted more toward cognitive social psy-
chology. This field of psychology builds on earlier theories of
ethnocentrism and prejudiced personality in two important ways.
First, it provides additional empirical support for the central tenet of
both The Authoritarian Personality and Allport's theories that individu-
als often disadvantage all those outside their particular ingroup. Spe-
cifically, a great deal of the newer work is starkly empirical and does
not attempt to construct grand theories like those found in The Au-
thoritarian Personality.2 69 Second, some of the modem theories also
provide alternative explanations for the descriptive empirical data.
Many scholars continue to recognize the importance of personal-
ity factors, including the psychodynamic factors emphasized in The
Authoritarian Personality and Allport's work.2 70 However, the newer
works offer additional possible explanations, including status competi-
tion, "normal" cognitive processes of categorization, and prototype
models of decision making.2 71 Even ardent proponents of these new
theories do not claim that they preempt the earlier theories; rather,
like the earlier theorists, they recognize that one may understand prej-
udice from a variety of perspectives.2 72 These scholars assert that dif-
267 See Ai.LPORT, supra note 8, at 25.
268 Id. at 42. Additionally, the next section discussing ingroup sympathy more thor-
oughly examines developed notions of ingroup sympathy. See infra Part IH.C.1 (discussing
how ingroup sympathy violates antidiscrimination principles).
269 See Richard D. Ashmore & Frances KL Del Boca, Conceptual Approaches to Stereotypes
and Stereotping, in CoGNrIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYING AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 1, 30
(David L. Hamilton ed., 1981) (offering various theoretical orientations that "have been
for the most part implicit," because "[m]ost workers have taken a strictly empirical
approach").
270 See, e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 239, at 17 (noting that much of the con-
temporary theories of prejudice are still "based on a Freudian psychoanalytic model");
David L. Hamilton et al., Social Cognition and Classic Issues in Social Psychology, in SocLAL
COGNIoN, supra note 253, at 1, 9-10 (discussing Allport's influence); Fiske, supra note 32,
at 380-81 (discussing the psychoanalytic strands in Allport's The Nature of Prudice and Bet-
telheim and Janowitz's contribution to the Studies in Prdudice series).
271 See infra Part MIl.C.4-5.
272 SeeAshmore & Del Boca, supra note 269, at 31-32 (suggesting that understanding of
various theoretical "orientations" will make it possible "to integrate the sociocultural, psy-
chodynamic, and cognitive viewpoints into a more complete picture of stereotypes and
intergroup behavior"); Fiske, supra note 32, at 374-75 (documenting two types of discrimi-
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ferent theories may better explain the prejudices of different
individuals and that even a single individual's prejudices may spring
from a number of different sources. Overall, although there remain
pockets of work that focus on an atomized perspective, 2 73 a large
share of preeminent work continues to emphasize generalized dis-
crimination.274 Although some of the recent work replicates the ear-
nation: "'hot prejudices' ... [or] 'hot discrimination,' based on disgust, resentment, hostil-
ity and anger," and "'cold discrimination,' based on stereotypes of an outgroup's interests,
knowledge, and motivation" without the emotional overlay); Hamilton et al., supra note
270, at 6 (noting that their focus on the contribution of cognitive psychology to the field of
social psychology does not mean to imply that the "'old' social psychological theories are
wrong or even forgotten"); Hamilton et al., supra note 253, at 316 (explaining how cogni-
tive psychological perspective does not preempt psychodynamic theories, but may comple-
ment them by, for example, making it possible "to analyze and investigate more specifically
how threats to the ego influence one's attention to various pieces of information or the
inferences and elaborations made from it"); Myron Rothbart & Scott Lewis, Cognitive
Processes and Intergroup Relations: A Historical Perspective, in SocIAL- COGNITION, supra note
253, at 347, 376 ("It is our view that most of the stated causes of group hostility have some
validity under some circumstances .... .").
273 SeeAshmore & Del Boca, supra note 269, at 10-11 "[S] tereotypes of a wide variety of
social groups have been studied."). A number of scholars do continue to emphasize kinds
of discrimination that seem to track atomized categories. In the most recent edition of the
The Handbook of Social Psychology, for example, two authors titled their contribution as "Gen-
der." See Kay Deaux & Marianne LaFrance, Gender, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSY-
cHoLOGy, supra note 32, at 788. Nevertheless, unlike other works on atomized categories
their article in The Handbook reveals how discrimination cannot easily be confined in one
atomized category. First and foremost, the article notes that the tendency to see "others"
in polarized terms is not only peculiar to gender, but also tracks nationality groups and
perceived sexual orientation. See id. at 795; see also id. at 815 ("Gay men and lesbians are
also minorities and as such encounter reactions similar to that of other outgroups."). Sec-
ond, the authors noted that what they called "constructionist" perspectives emphasize the
need to question all categories, including gender. See id. at 817 ("From these [construc-
tionist and postmodern] perspectives, all categories must be questioned and no truths are
independent of the social-political system from which they emerge."). Finally, the article is
also quite different from many legal texts for what it does not include: the frequently pro
forma incantation that one must be "careful" about "analogizing" between what one as-
sumes to be "different" kinds of discrimination. See supra note 54 and infra notes 468-72
and accompanying text.
274 See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 239, at 14 (noting that "much of the research
[on prejudice] since the late 1960s emphasizes general processes involved in prejudice
rather than the social issues related to specific prejudices," and reporting that the percent-
age of references to specific racial and ethnic issues declined from 56% in 1969 to 39% in
1985); see also Kevin W. Allison, Stress and Oppressed Social Category Membership, in PREJUDIcE:
THE TARGET'S PERSPEC'rVE, supra note 34, at 145, 146 ("[T]he present examination of the
role of prejudice and discrimination on stress will use an inclusive approach, broadly focus-
ing on 'oppressed groups'.. . .");James M.Jones, Psychological Knowledge and the New Ameri-
can Dilemma of Race, 54J. Soc. IssuEs 641, 655 (1998) (discussing "racism," but citing a
study of attitudes toward gays); id. at 656 ("The American Dilemma rested upon a para-
digm of interracial conflict dominated by the Black-White two-dimensional model. The
New American Dilemma must necessarily encompass a more general paradigm of diverse
sources of conflict between and among groups."). The newest edition of The Handbook of
Social Psychology presents a similar picture; two of its chapters on prejudice also focus on
generalized discrimination. Fiske frankly explained that her chapter in The Handbook "ex-
amines basic stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination processes more generally." Fiske,
supra note 32, at 392 n.1. Although Fiske went on to claim that her work emphasizes "race,
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Her emphasis on outgroup hostility, it also focuses on the more subtle
phenomenon of ingroup sympathy. Individuals with ingroup sympa-
thy do not harbor the ugly negative attitudes canvassed in The Authori-
tarian Personality, but rather simply view those in their own ingroup in
a more sympathetic light, thereby disadvantaging all those outside
that narrow group.275
As discussed further below, several aspects of these newer theo-
ries describe generalized discrimination. First, experiments involving
minimal group situations show that individuals often discriminate in
favor of their ingroup rather than against particular outgroups. 276
Second, experiments confirm that individuals often see those outside
their ingroup as an undifferentiated mass. 277 Both of these data illus-
trate generalized discrimination: individuals prefer those within their
relatively narrow ingroup. Furthermore, not only do individuals often
not discriminate against particular outgroups, but they do not even
focus enough on "them" to differentiate into distinct outgroups.
There are at least two possible ways to understand why such patterns
of generalized discrimination occur.278 One explanation emphasizes
status competition; individuals favor their own group, or disadvantage
others, because they benefit when their group is seen more favora-
bly.279 A second explanation treats ingroup favoritism as a "normal"
cognitive process that may develop even in the absence of competition
or hostility.28 0 More specifically, this explanation implicates decision
making; individuals make decisions in ways that reflect positive images
of ingroups, or negative images of outgroups. Ultimately, each of
gender, and age," id., her version of these categories would also include the treatment of
Hispanics,Jews, and, to a lesser extent, gays and lesbians, see id. at 377-80. Once again, it is
important to notice that the social science scholars have tipped the balance of research in
favor of generalized discrimination rather than atomized discrimination. One may criti-
cize this change in emphasis. See, e.g., James M. Jones, The Concept of Race in Social Psychol-
ogy: From Color to Cultur4 in 4 RmEw AND SocIAL PSYCHOLOGY 117, 127 (Ladd Wheeler &
Phillip Shaver eds., 1983) ("While [the study] obviously does not prove that an increased
emphasis on experimental rigor is responsible for the recent decline in race-relevant stud-
ies, the results are compatible with that interpretation."); cf. Allison, supra, at 146 (arguing
that, although the stress caused by discrimination may create a common reaction in various
oppressed groups, "it is necessary to acknowledge the challenges and limitations presented
by the variable, distinctive, and specific histories of oppression and discrimination exper-
ienced by members of different social categorical groups"). But one must remember that
it is merely a change in the relative mix of theories and research, not a complete rejection
of atomized or subatomized discrimination altogether.
275 See infra Part III.C.1.
276 See infra Part III.C.2.
277 See infra Part III.C.3.
278 See Rothbart & Lewis, supra note 272, at 366 (surveying different explanations for
the ingroup bias in the minimal group experiments, and concluding that "[a] t present
there does not appear to be any single compelling explanation for in-group bias demon-
strated in the minimal group paradigm").
279 See infra Part III.C.4.
280 See infra Part III.C.5.
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these theories suggests a notion of generalized discrimination that in-
volves either ingroup sympathy or outgroup hostility or both.
Although these newer theories offer novel explanations for the key
findings of generalized discrimination studies in the tradition of The
Authoritarian Personality, they do not clearly define the ingroup-out-
group boundary.
1. Wat Is Wrong with Ingroup Sympathy?
The recent attention to ingroup sympathy reflects in part a con-
scious shift in theorists' understanding of the harmful effects of in-
group sympathy. As we saw earlier, The Authoritarian Personality does
not conceive of ingroup sympathy without outgroup hostility. Allport
recognized some ingroup sympathy, 281 but romanticized it as love prej-
udice.282 However, other scholars have considered ingroup sympa-
thy283 as a dangerous phenomenon. When ingroup and outgroup
members compete for scarce resources, such as jobs or housing, in-
group sympathy and outgroup hostility produce many of the same
harms.284 As some leading scholars on psychological theories of dis-
crimination explained, "[u]ltimately, many forms of discrimination
and bias may develop not because outgroups are hated, but because
positive emotions such as admiration, sympathy, and trust are reserved
for the ingroup and withheld from outgroups."28 5
Additionally, the Nobel-prize-winning economist Gary Becker
identified other problems with ingroup sympathy:
281 Allport implicitly recognized both ingroup sympathy and outgroup hostility, but
explicitly devoted The Nature of Prudice to outgroup hostility. See ALLPORT, supra note 8, at
7 ("In this volume... we shall be concerned chiefly with prejudice against not with preju-
dice in favor of ethnic groups."). Allport claimed that he made this decision because "eth-
nic prejudice is mostly negative." Id. at 6.
282 See id. at 25.
283 Note that a great deal of the psychology literature refers to ingroup favoritism.
However, I feel that the term "sympathy" often better captures the phenomenon. Favorit-
ism implies that the individual self-consciously favors his own kind; although this might
sometimes be true, individuals often manifest this phenomenon by simply construing am-
biguity in favor of the ingroup. The notion of favoritism may describe ourjudgment of the
act, but the notion of sympathy better captures the actor's own sense of his actions. For
example, those who believe that "we stick together" but "we are not clannish," may exhibit
ingroup sympathy, but not necessarily as the result of their self-conscious favoritism.
284 See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 239, at 79-80 ("It is important to note that both
the anti-outgroup bias of high authoritarian subjects and the pro-ingroup orientation of
low authoritarians disadvantage blacks relative to whites."); Fiske, supra note 32, at 370
(noting that a study of inter-ethnic comparisons suggests that the relative advantage of the
ingroup "revolves around ingroup favoritism more than outgroup derogation, although
the net effect may be the same in practical terms"); see also MARILYNN B. BREWER & NoRmAN
MILLER, INTERGROUP RELATIONS 48 (1996) ("Preferential treatment of those who share a
common category membership produces biases that benefit the ingroup over noningroup
members even without any negative prejudices against outgroups.").
285 Marilynn B. Brewer & RupertJ. Brown, Intergroup Relations, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 32, at 554, 575.
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Allport makes a distinction between negative and positive prejudice
.... He asserts ... that "we hear so little about love [positive]
prejudice" because "prejudices of this sort create no social prob-
lem." In this he is mistaken, since the social and economic implica-
tions of positive prejudice or nepotism are very similar to those of
negative prejudice or discrimination.2 86
For example, if an individual cannot get the job she wants, she may
care little whether the employer likes a manly atmosphere or actively
thinks women are inept. Some individuals find it more vexing to be
the unjustified object of scorn, 287 but others may find little consola-
tion in such "ignore-ance."28s  (In economic vocabulary, both ingroup
sympathy and outgroup hostility impose search costs for finding work
elsewhere as well as "dignitary harms."28 9) In other circumstances, ig-
nore-ance, if not bliss, may prevent some pains; those who ignore out-
groups may not contribute to the epidemic of hate crimes,2 90 but
286 GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 15 n.3 (2d ed. 1971) (altera-
tion in original).
287 See, e.g., OLnVR WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 7 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Little, Brown & Co. 1963) (1881) (explaining the limitations of early common law cases
that focused exclusively on intentional wrongs, and remarking, "[E]ven a dog distinguishes
between being stumbled over and being kicked").
288 Laura Vasataro, Note, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 418, 421 (1994); see also ABEL,
supra note 189, at 3 (noting that when people use stereotypes or show insensitivity, this
may not "excuse" but might even "aggravate" the harm). After reading an earlier version
of this Article, Ellen Saks, a law professor at the University of Southern California, asked if
there is research on whether individuals suffer more psychological harm if they think they
have been the object of outgroup hostility or the victim of ingroup sympathy. Apparently,
no one has addressed the problem. See Letter from Susan Fiske, Professor of Psychology,
University of Massachusetts at Amherst, to Clark Freshman (Feb. 22, 1999) (on file with
author) ("Although there is a growing literature on targets' reactions, I don't know of any
studies on targets' reactions as a function of whether they think they are victims of out-
group derogation or ingroup favoritism."); E-mail from Ellen Langer, Professor of Psychol-
ogy, Harvard University, to Clark Freshman (Feb. 16, 1999) (on file with author). In part,
the lack of attention to such distinction is understandable because many individuals tend
to think that any discrimination they experience must reflect some kind of hidden hostil-
ity. See, e.g., infra note 316 (discussing how the police officers must have been prejudiced
against Jeffrey Dahmer's Asian victim rather than sympathetic to the apparently normal
Dahmer).
289 See Donohue, supra note 137, at 1609 (stating that "the discriminatory firm imposes
dignitary harms and search costs on minority citizens"); Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimi-
nation in "General Ability"Job Testing, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1157, 1243-45 (1991) (discussing
deonotlogical objections to discrimination).
290 Scholars disagree about the extent of the growth of hate crimes. Compare Lu-IN
WANG, HATE CRIMES LAW § 1.01, at 1-1 to 1-3 (1998) (reporting yearly increase in the inci-
dence of various hate crimes, including those againstJews, lesbians and gays, African Amer-
icans, and Asians), and Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, in AFrER IDEn. A
READ IN LAW AND CULTURE 277, 286 (Dan Danielsen & Karen Engle eds., 1995) (arguing
that statistics on hate crimes against lesbians and gays may underestimate the full extent of
such violence, because victims may fear that police will be unsympathetic and thus fail to
report incidents), withJAMEs B. JAcOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW &
IDENTITY PoLrrcs 6 (1998) (acknowledging "a long history of bigoted violence against Na-
tive Americans, African-Americans, Jews, Catholics, immigrants, Mexicans, Asians, women,
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ingroup myopia may still make it difficult to get the public and legisla-
tors to focus on relief for victims of hate crimes.29'
2. "We" and "Them": The Minimal Group Experiments
In the late 1960s, a number of theorists began to study minimal
group situations in an effort to analyze how individuals evaluate and
interact with outgroups.2 92 In early experiments, researchers divided
homosexuals, and many other groups," but claiming "there is no reliable evidence... that
the incidence of such crimes is greater now than previously, or that the incidence is
increasing").
291 However, the contrast between "ignore-ance" and violence should not be exagger-
ated. Ignore-ance may indeed cause real pain. See WILuAMS, supra note 18, at 61 ("The
attempt to split bias from violence has been this society's most enduring and fatal rationali-
zation. Prejudice does hurt, howeverjust as absence of it can nourish and shelter."). Simi-
larly, ignoring outgroups may render us insensitive to the way others treat them violently.
The message that others are unworthy of attention may even contribute to the selection of
those others as targets of violence. Cf Thomas, supra note 290, at 290 (remarking that
statutes embodying negative attitudes toward lesbians and gays, such as sodomy statutes,
"work in tandem" with violence against lesbians and gays).
Consider, for example, a recent report on the sixtieth-year class reunion from the class
of 1938 in Stone Mountain, Georgia. Among other things, Stone Mountain was the site of
some of the worst hate crimes in American history. The town includes a memorial to
Confederate officials who fought to keep African Americans enslaved. In addition, Stone
Mountain was the site of the 1915 lynching of Leo Frank and the rededication of the
modem Ku Klux Klan. See, e.g., JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-WHirT
RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SouTH SINCE EMANCIPATION 468-72 (1984); ClarkJ. Freshman,
By the Neck Until Dead: A Look Back at a 70 Year Search for.Justice AM. POL., Jan. 1988, at 29.
However, the nostalgic account of the class reunion at Stone Mountain neglects this tragic
aspect of the setting and reports only that "the Avondale Class of '38 is a microcosm of its
generation, if you look at federal statistics: It was a group who married young, worked hard
and stayed out of trouble." Chelsea J. Carter, Class of '38 Worked Hard, Kept Out of Trouble,
Stayed Married, MIAMI HERALD,June 12, 1998, at 17A (emphasis added). The report further
quotes a member of the class of 1938: "'We [the classmates] were a close-knit group'....
'If anybody needed help, somebody always would help.'" Id. In other words, to these peo-
ple "staying out of trouble" apparently means overlooking the plight of those outside their
ingroup; neither the African Americans restricted to the back of the bus nor the Jew kept
out of a downtown law firm apparently did not qualify as a somebody who deserved help.
Similarly, the article nonchalantly reports that many of the classmates came from "one
of the first planned communities in the United States." Id. The article does not report
how such planned communities often included only white Christians with the help of ra-
cially restrictive covenants or racially restrictive lending policies. See KAREN BRODIN, How
JEws BECAME WHITE Fous AND WHAT THAT SAYS ABoUT RACE IN AMERICA 44-50 (1998);
Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transfomation, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1659,
1669-70 (1995) (arguing that lending policies of government agencies made it difficult for
banks to loan money to those who wanted to purchase homes in racially mixed neighbor-
hoods). In short, the nostalgic references to being "close-knit" and "staying out of trouble"
simply overlook the way in which close-knit societies denied opportunities to others; stay-
ing out of trouble meant acquiescing in a segregated society. Perhaps one may discount
these criticisms of the article; this was a feature article about a reunion, and people at
reunions would naturally rather reminisce about the prom than the lynching on the streeL
With those caveats, however, the article does illustrate the way in which our ingroup sympa-
thy often lead us to overlook everyday disadvantages around us.
292 For useful summaries of the studies on minimal group situations, see Brewer &
Brown, supra note 285, at 566-67; Rothbart & Lewis, supra note 272, at 364-68.
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otherwise similar children into different camps. Despite the lack of
any history of competition before the experiments, the researchers
discovered that the two groups soon developed hostile and competi-
tive attitudes toward each other.293 Subsequent researchers found
that ingroup favoritism can develop even without extensive competi-
tive activities, such as sports. In a series of minimal group experi-
ments, researchers told subjects that they had been divided into two
groups either arbitrarily or based on performance on some mundane
task.2 9 4 The studies revealed two persistent patterns. First, those in
one group consistently rated others in their group more highly than
they rated those in the other group. Second, when asked to allocate
resources in prisoner's dilemma-type games, individuals gave more to
those in their own group.295
The majority of these studies have two features that are more con-
sistent with ingroup sympathy than with the type of outgroup hostility
that Allport's work and The Authoritarian Personality depict.29 6 First,
when individuals are asked to rate both ingroup and outgroup mem-
bers before and after their interaction with these members, their rat-
ings of ingroup members tend to increase after the interaction, but
their ratings of outgroup members remain the same.2 97 Second, the
extent of ingroup bias depends more on characteristics of the ingroup
than on those of the outgroup. Specifically, when researchers lead
individuals to believe that the members of their ingroup have more in
common with each other than with outsiders, ingroup members rate
each other more highly. However, information about the cohesive-
ness of the outgroup does not have the same effect.298 As one major
review of these studies concludes, "[t]he results in general . . . are
consistent with the conclusion that in-group bias rests on the percep-
tion that one's own group is better, although the out-group is not nec-
essarily depreciated." 299 Hence, individuals tend to focus their
293 See MUZAFR SHERIF ET AL., THE ROBBERS CAVE EXPERIMENT: INTERGROUP CoNFLi'r
AND COOPERATION 96-119 (Wesleyan Univ. Press 1988) (1961).
294 See sources cited supra note 284.
295 See id.
296 See Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive-
Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 307, 321 (1979).
297 See id. Unfortunately, in many studies it is not possible to distinguish ingroup sym-
pathy from outgroup hostility because studies only present choices that simultaneously ad-
vantage the ingroup and disadvantage the outgroup. See id. A more recent survey work
shows that many individuals report feelings of national pride without harboring hostile
attitudes toward other nations or nationalities. See Brewer & Brown, supra note 285, at 559.
298 See Brewer, supra note 296, at 321-22.
299 Id.; see also Fiske, supra note 32, at 365 (suggesting that more recent studies confirm
Brewer's conclusion and concluding that, "[f]or now, the more robust finding is ingroup
advantage" rather than outgroup hostility); id. at 370 ("The ingroup advantage [in studies
of interethnic comparisons] took the form of ingroup protection, more than... outgroup
derogation.").
20001
HeinOnline  -- 85 Cornell L. Rev. 389 1999-2000
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
attention on the ingroup; those outside the ingroup are seen as "an
undifferentiated group of others." 00 Other researchers have found
that this ingroup sympathy characterizes some individuals, particularly
those who score low on authoritarianism scales.301 But they have also
found that other individuals display outgroup hostility as well.3 0 2
Thus, the minimal group experiments complement the way in
which earlier theorists understood patterns of generalized discrimina-
tion. The earlier theories predicted that individuals develop hostile
attitudes toward all those outside their narrow, ethnocentric world.
As noted above, similar recent surveys confirm this pattern. 03 These
surveys bolster theoretical frameworks such as John Hart Ely's famous
we-they paradigm.3 04 Moreover, recent psychology experiments con-
300 Brewer, supra note 296, at 322.
301 In their most recent survey of intergroup relations and ingroup bias, Brewer and
Brown concluded:
Ingroup members are given the benefit of the doubt in ways that are not
extended to outgroup individuals. These beliefs, in turn, sustain and justify
other forms of intergroup discrimination. Intergroup attribution biases jus-
tify differential outcomes that favor the ingroup. In effect, ingroups are
credited more for successes and positive actions than are outgroups, and
they are less likely to be held accountable for failures or negative actions.
Brewer & Brown, supra note 285, at 561.
302 For example, in one experiment subjects played mock jurors in criminal trials. In
all cases, experimenters told subjects to ignore certain inadmissible evidence that pointed
towards guilt. See Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in
PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINArION AND RACIsM, supra note 239, at 61, 79. The experiment allowed
each subject to view white and African-American defendants, sometimes with the inadmissi-
ble evidence and sometimes without the inadmissible evidence. See id. High authoritari-
ans-those who scored high on a test of authoritarian attitudes-gave white defendants
the benefit of the instruction: they reported as much certainty of the guilt of white defend-
ants when there was the inadmissible evidence as when it was absent. See id. On the other
hand, when it came to African-American defendants, the high authoritarians reported that
they had more confidence in their guilty verdict when they considered the inadmissible
evidence. See id. Low authoritarians showed a different pattern: they had the same level of
confidence in the guilt of black defendants whether or not there was inadmissible evi-
dence. See id. However, they reported anger when the prosecution sought to introduce
the inadmissible evidence against white defendants; they also expressed less certainty about
the guilty verdict when the prosecution attempted to introduce the inadmissible evidence.
See id. "Thus, low authoritarian subjects demonstrated a pro-ingroup bias." Id.
303 See supra note 239 (discussing more recent studies on authoritarianism).
304 See ELY, supra note 44, at 159. The assumption that every preference is really a mask
for underlying hostility is also typical of Ronald Dworkin's work. SeeJohn Hart Ely, Professor
Dworkin s External/Personal PreferenceDistinction, 1983 DuKE L.J. 959, 963. Ely quoted Dwor-
kin's assertion that "'except in very rare cases a white student prefers the company of other
whites because he has racist, social, and political convictions, or because he has contempt
for blacks as a group.'" Id. (citation omitted). Ely also argued that, to be consistent, Dwor-
kin must also believe that all such persons "must wish for Blacks fewer goods and opportu-
nities than are available to Whites." Id. A similar assumption that discrimination always
involves an intent to harm or an intent to subordinate a group is prominent in other
constitutional theories. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE LJ. 2313,
2366 (1997) (stating that whether classifications based on a trait should be suspect de-
pends on "whether there has been a history of using the trait to create a system of social
meanings, or define a social hierarchy, that helps dominate and oppress people," and cit-
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firm that the mere use of the terms "we" and "they" bias individuals.30 5
The minimal group experiments explore the favorable attitudes to-
ward ingroups that both The Authoritarian Personality and Allport ex-
plicitly chose not to study.306 Overall, this approach reveals a world
view less of "we" and "they" than of "we" and "who?'307 The ingroup
booster is not constantly sizing up the competition; "they" are not
even on his radar screen.308
ing "status-based discrimination against religious groups" as an example (emphasis ad-
ded)); Note, Section 5 and the Protection of Nonsuspect Classes After City of Boerne v. Flores,
111 HARv. L. Rxv. 1542, 1545 (1998) (asserting that the term "invidious," in the constitu-
tional prohibition on invidious discrimination "can be equated with an intent to cause
harm").
Nor is this assumption limited to mainstream constitutional theorists. Many writers
associated with accounts of "whiteness" and its "construction" make the same assumption.
See, e.g., BRODKIN, supra note 291, at 151 ("The construction ofJewishness as a model mi-
nority is part of a larger American racial discourse in which whiteness, to understand itself,
depends upon an invented and contrasting blackness as its evil (and sometimes enviable)
twin."). However, as early as 1957, Louis Lusky recognized that discrete and insular minor-
ities might lack power even if they are not detested. See Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A
Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUm. L. REv. 1093, 1105 n.72 (1982). Paraphrasing
his earlier work, Lusky stated that "[i]n my opinion, the phrase 'discrete and insular' ap-
plies to groups that are not embraced within the bond of community kinship but are held
at arm's length by the group or groups that possess dominant political and economic
power." Id. (citation omitted).
305 See Charles W. Perdue et al., Us and Them: Social Categorization and the Process of
Intergroup Bias, 59J. PERSONA=rIY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 475, 475, 479 (1990). Further research
showed that this verbal effect largely reflects preference for ingroups rather than any hos-
tility toward outgroups. SeeJohn F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Stereoiypes and Evaluative
Intergroup Bias, in Am r, COGNMrON, AND STaEOT'ING: INrRAcvriE PROcssEs IN GROUP
PERCEPTION 167, 175 (Diane M. Mackie & David L. Hamilton eds., 1993) ("This interpreta-
tion [of the way we-they language primes biases] is consistent with Brewer's (1979) conclu-
sion that intergroup biases, at least in the minimal intergroup situation, are more a
product of ingroup favoritism than of outgroup derogation.").
306 See supra note 267 and accompanying text (remarking on Allport's rather cursory
discussion of "love-prejudice").
307 Some experiments suggest that the more the individuals become aware of the nega-
tive consequences of their behavior on outgroup members, the less they will treat ingroup
and outgroup members differently. See Brewer & Brown, supra note 285, at 567. However,
the extreme conditions used in one of the studies may limit the conclusion: subjects were
asked to send what they were told would be an unpleasant noise to ingroup or outgroup
members. See id. Outside the laboratory, individuals may be more willing to blame victims
for their own suffering. See, e.g., Christian Crandall & Monica Biernat, The Ideology of Anti-
Fat Attitudes, 20J. APPLIED Soc. PsYCHOL 227, 240 (1990) ("[D]islilking fat people is a mani-
festation, along with disliking other less fortunate out-groups... [that] can be summarized
with one central ideological tenet: Tou are responsible for everything that happens in your life.'
This belief provides a 'logical' basis for the denigration of those less fortunate.").
308 See, e.g., WIt.LAms, supra note 18, at 55 ("My abiding recollection of being a student
at Harvard Law School is the sense of being invisible.").
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3. "They"Are All Alike: Outgroup Homogeneity
In addition to the minimal group studies, a great deal of other
research 30 9 confirms that ingroups, 310 especially historically powerful
ingroups, often view everyone outside their narrow group as a rela-
tively31 undifferentiated mass.312 All this means is that the individual
who, for example, treats white Protestants as his ingroup, often devel-
ops prejudices that make distinctions between his ingroup of white
Protestants and all others. Although no single process explains the
outgroup homogeneity effect,3 13 one prominent explanation tracks
309 As the minimal group experiments suggest, a great deal of psychological research
aspires to discover abstract principles of human relations. One aspect of this goal is to find
the way in which the vocabulary of ingroup and outgroup implies a parity of power. This
vocabulary suggests that men generalize about women, but women may generalize about
men as well. However, research on the outgroup homogeneity effect suggests otherwise.
For example, both men and women see women as more homogeneous. One explanation
for this attitude may be that women, as a historically less powerful group, do not have an
adequate incentive to pay attention to other women. See Patricia W. Linville & Gregory W.
Fischer, Group Variability and Covariation: Effects on Intergroup Judgment and Behavior, in IN-
TERGROUP COGNITION AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR, supra note 73, at 123, 132 ("[B]oth males
and females tend to see females as more homogeneous, which may be interpreted in terms
of men's greater status and power." (citation omitted)); Marilynn B. Brewer, Social Identity,
Distinctiveness, and In-Group Homogeneity, 11 Soc. COGNITION 150, 150-51 (1993) (arguing
that the "difference between [her five-year-old daughter]'s perception of girls and boys in
her class" is an illustr-ation of "relative out-group homogeneity," as well as an illustration of
"in-group differentiation").
310 In at least two narrow circumstances, individuals will view their own ingroup as
more homogeneous. First, in smaller groups, individuals are more likely to see their own
group as homogeneous. See Patricia W. Linville, The Heterogeneity of Homogeneity, in ATriBu-
TION AND SOCIAL INTERACTION: THE LEGACY OF EDWARD E. JoNas 423, 446 (John M. Darley
&Joel Cooper eds., 1998). Second, individuals within the group will perceive greater ho-
mogeneity related to "attributes center to the group's identity." Id. For example, tradition-
ally disadvantaged groups of individuals, such as African-Americans, may view themselves as
more homogeneous on aspects that those individuals see as crucial to group identity. See
id. at 447. See generally Brewer & Brown, supra note 285, at 558 ("In general, minority
groups show ingroup homogeneity effects, while equal-size or majority groups show out-
group homogeneity effects.").
311 "Relatively" is the key qualifier. One sees others in his or her own ingroup in rela-
tively nuanced detail, if not always as distinct individuals. Different theories express this
idea in slightly different terms; one way to express the relative homogeneity of outgroups is
to say that ingroup members sort all those outside their group into a few types. For exam-
ple, men will often see the few women within a male-dominated firm as one of four types:
"mother," "seductress," "pet," or "iron malden." RosAB=m Moss KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN
OF THE CORPORATION 233-36 (1977). Additionally, individuals recognize more subtypes for
their own ingroup. See Linville, supra note 310, at 436. Moreover, individuals ordinarily
perceive that those within their ingroups vary more within the listed types. See id. at 430.
312 For recent review of the studies on out-group homogeneity, see, for example, Lin-
vile, supra note 310.
313 See Fiske, supra note 32, at 368 ("Although reviewers disagree about the cognitive
mechanisms involved, outgroup homogeneity, when it occurs, sets the stage for stereotyp-
ing; for example, people who believe there is little outgroup variance also make stereotypic
judgments about specific, real outgroup members with greater confidence than those who
believe there is much outgroup variance." (citations omitted)); Linville, supra note 310, at
439 ("None of the categorization models alone directly produces the [out-group homoge-
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the we-who? distinction. It perceives the outgroup homogeneity effect
as a consequence of ingroup members paying more attention to dis-
tinctions among themselves. 314 Indeed, from the perspective of an in-
group member, outgroup member may simply be "outsiders" or
"others, '315 not finely categorized into Jews, Catholics, and African
Americans. From the perspective of any particular outsider to the in-
group, this may readily be interpreted as atomized bias. For example,
the person who identifies himself as an Asian may be tempted to con-
clude, "This white male guy thinks all of us Asians are alike." Often,
however, the white male simply overlooks all of "them"-all those not
white and not male-and never really focuses long enough to classify
the other as an Asian.3 16
neity effect]."); Diane M. Mackie, Integrating Social and Cognitive Processes Underlying the Out-
Group Homogeneity Effect: The Homogeneity of Honogeneity, in ATrIUBUrION AND SOCLAL INTER-
ACTION, supra note 310, at 471, 472-73 (noting that "a full explanation of the (out-group
homogeneity effect] remains intriguingly illusive" and reciting Linville's observation).
314 See Mackie, supra note 313, at 479-80. This theory is consistent with the interpreta-
tion that ingroup members see outgroup members as homogeneous on both positive and
negative dimensions. See Brewer, supra note 309, at 157.
315 SeeJerome McCristal Gulp, Jr., Latinos, Blacks, Others, and the New Legal Narrative, 2
HAxv. LAInNo L. Rzv. 479, 479 (1997) (stating that discrimination "is mainly about the
'other'"); Martha Minow, ForewordJustice Engendered, 101 HAxv. L. REv. 10, 71-74 (1987)
(arguing that law should recognize the perspective of those that society deems
"'different'").
316 Peter Kwan's complex reading of the Jeffrey Dahmer case illustrates this assump-
tion. See Kwan, supra note 21. Kwan tried to make sense of the police's decision not to
intervene when Dahmer told them that a naked, bleeding Asian teenager who ran from
him was just his "'boyfriend.'" Id. at 1258. Kwan offered a complex hypothesis that the
officers must have seen the situation through multiple biased lenses of what they perceived
Asians are like; his theory is a rich and literary elaboration of Ely's we-they paradigm:
From the perspective of [the two officers], Konerak was clearly an Asian
male. Dahmer's explanation to the officers thus presented Konerak to
them as fully and simultaneously constructed in terms of his race, class, gender, and
sexual orientation. This explanation caused the officers to disregard the
signs of abuse because it was consistent with their notions of what to expect
in terms of the cosynthesis of the operational categories in play and the
power distribution they implicate. Dahmer's explanation offered the of-
ficers a way of stabilizing an otherwise extremely unstable situation, namely
racial and domestic violence. That stabilization was possible because of the
cosynthetic nature of the categories that Dahmer invoked along with those
that were already presented to [the officers].
Dahmer lied to the officers about Konerak's name: he informed them
that Konerak's last name was "Hmong." It is open to speculation whether
or not either Dahmer or the officers were, in fact, conscious of the signifi-
cance of the term "Hmong." However, from a critical point of view, one
cannot ignore the fact that "Hmong" signifies not just an Asian ethnic
group, but one of the poorest groups of Asian Americans in the United
States. That Dahmer used a term that signified a whole group or commu-
nity of Asians, that he called into view a separate Asian identity, would be
consistent with a strategy of denying Konerak his subjectivity, subjugating
Konerak's individual autonomy to the will of the dominant group, of which
Dahmer and the officers are members. The racial effect of calling Konerak
"John Hmong" is equivalent to the nineteenth century anti-Chinese epithet
"John Chinaman."
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4. "We" Versus "Them": The Status Competition Explanation
Although theories of ingroup sympathy and outgroup homogene-
ity are well-established, there are several different explanations for
why these phenomena occur.3 17 Henri Tafel, who conducted many
of the minimal group experiments, viewed the results as an aspect of
symbolic status competition. His social identity theory posits that indi-
viduals attempt to enhance the status of the group to which they be-
long by associating that group with positive values; this theory is
consistent with the way in which individuals rate people in their own
group more highly, even when that "group" is arbitrarily designed.3 1 8
One example of status competition is the attempt to improve a
school's reputation. Alumni may support attempts to make their alma
mater's admissions policy more selective, because they believe this
change will increase the value of their own degree.3 1 9
Notice that the theory of status competition suggests that discrim-
ination will often occur in very generalized patterns. An individual
who wants to maximize his status through association with an elite
group will want that group to be smaller rather than larger.3 20 Against
the pull of elitism and exclusivity, Allport wondered whether one
Id. at 1281-2 (emphasis added).
The we-who? explanation instead suggests that the officers identified with Dahmer as
part of some common ingroup-perhaps white, English-speaking males-and simply over-
looked his Asian companion-a member of an outgroup. This explanation seems more
plausible than the insinuation that Dahmer or the officers knew the specific meaning of
"Hmong"; it is certainly more plausible than the notion that the term "Hmong" in the late
twentieth century taps into an available stereotype as readily as "John Chinaman" did in the
nineteenth century.
317 See Rothbart & Lewis, supra note 272, at 366 ("At present there does not appear to
be any single compelling explanation for in-group bias demonstrated in the minimal
group paradigm.").
318 See Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theoyy of Intergroup Behavior, in
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 7, 19-23 (S. Worchel & W.G. Austin eds., 1986).
319 This familiar status competition arises not just among relatively well-established
groups, like classmates or fellow alumni, but also in quite minimal groups. See Rothbart &
Lewis, supra note 272, at 366 ("'There is no evidence to date that the experimenter's ad hoc
classifications of subjects into Blues and Greens... were internalized by them into their
self-concepts. If so, their self-concepts must be extraordinarily malleable.'" (citation omit-
ted)). I am grateful to Martha Mahoney for suggesting that the use of colors, such as blue
and green, to name "minimal groups" may invoke a sense of racial overtone from the
groups, thereby making it likely that individuals view these groups more seriously.
320 A great deal of social theory, particularly utilitarianism and economic theory, as-
sumes that individuals maximize their own interest, including their status. See Richard H.
McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimi-
nation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1003, 1007 (1995). For a concise comparison of McAdams's
emphasis on status production with the neoclassical approach associated with the Chicago
School, see John J. Donohue Ill, Discrimination in Employment in 1 THE Nmv PALGRAvE
DICnoNAR" OF ECONOMICS AND TH LAW 615, 618 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). On the other
hand, the hypothesis that individuals always try to maximize their own status by joining a
high status group is not always true. See Marilynn B. Brewer, The Social Sef. On Being the
Same and Different at the Same Tim4 17 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 475, 477 (1991)
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could imagine an ingroup that consisted of all of humanity.8 21 Allport
reasoned that despite the inherent difficulties, this all-encompassing
view might be possible if humanity was an ingroup for a limited
number of purposes.322 Marilynn Brewer's recent optimal distinctive-
ness theory offers a middle course between the extremes of ingroup
sizes. According to her theory, individuals do not simply maximize
status, but try to balance two contradictory needs. Brewer theorized
that individuals "have two powerful social motives: a need for inclusion,
which is satisfied by assimilation of the self into larger collectives; and
an opposing need for differentiation, which is satisfied by distinguishing
the self from others."3 23 Therefore, she emphatically posited that in-
groups are not open to everyone: "Groups that are exclusive rather
than highly inclusive... satisfy both of these needs simultaneously."324
Conversely, Brewer concluded that individuals tend to avoid wide-
open groups because these groups fail to satisfy one's need for inclu-
sion.3 25 We will return later to the dilemma of how much and when
("In the real world, individuals who belong to disadvantaged minorities do not consistently
reject their group identity despite its possible negative implications .... ").
321 See ALLPORT, supra note 8, at 43-46. Allport believed that even the most cosmopoli-
tan diplomat would still feel a pull toward favoring some narrow sense of his own group.
"Even if this diplomat believes ardently in One World, still he cannot escape a sense of
strangeness in his encounters. His own model of propriety and rightness is his own cul-
ture. Other languages and customs inevitably seem outlandish and, if not inferior, at least
slightly absurd and unnecessary." Id. at 43.
322 See id at 44-46.
323 Brewer & Brown, supra note 285, at 564.
324 Id.
325 See Brewer, supra note 309, at 158 ("Equilibrium, or optimal distinctiveness, is
achieved through identification with social categories at that level of inclusiveness where
the degree of satisfaction of the need for differentiation and the need for assimilation is
exactly equal."). Although this Article discusses the appeal of various kinds of groups,
Brewer's theory includes two basic tenets that suggest that different individuals in different
contexts may feel attracted to groups of varying degrees of exclusivity. First, she recog-
nized that each individual feels different degrees of attraction to assimilation and differen-
tiation: some love the life of the hermit, some love the mass movement. "For any
individual, the relative strength of the two needs is determined by cultural norms, individ-
ual socialization, and recent experience." Brewer, supra note 320, at 478. Second, she
recognized that an individual's sense of his group identity is "context-specific." Id. "It
depends on the frame of reference within which possible social identities are defined at a
particular time, which can range from participants in a specific social gathering to the
entire human race." Id.
The implications of optimal distinctiveness theory for individual's choice of his iden-
tity in a given context, such as in a firm, are unclear for two reasons. First, and most
importantly, this theory does not offer a full account of why an individual defines himself
on some dimensions, such as race, rather than others, such as ethnicity or professional task
(for example, scholar versus teacher, or litigator versus transactional lawyer). See Fresh-
man, supra note 55, at 1705-06, 1757-60 (describing the difficulty of identifying the relevant
community). To use one of Brewer's examples, she did define varying levels of inclusive-
ness "within the occupation domain." Brewer, supra note 320, at 476. For example, she
may identify herself with her department, colleagues with her interests, and scholars in her
academic field. See id. at 481 n.2. She did not explain why she would see an "occupational
domain" rather than, say, a caring domain, in which one identifies herself with others who
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we can shift individuals' sense of groups when we explore obstacles to
seeing generalized discrimination. 326
5. Automatic Discrimination: Prototypes and the Discriminatory
Nature of Normal Decision Making
The second explanation turns on the nature of categorization. In
its most exaggerated form, this theory suggests that the very nature of
"normal" cognitive processes, including categorization, leads to dis-
torted perceptions of outgroups 32 7 Before analyzing this theory, we
must remember that psychologists and lawyers use the term normal in
different ways. Normal, in its legal sense often connotes something
that is proper, or at least not something about which one will win a
lawsuit. In tort law, for example, if it is normal, or typical, for doctors
to use a certain procedure, then evidence that a doctor followed that
procedure creates a presumption that it was not malpractice to do
so.3 2s However, when psychologists say phenomena such as ingroup
care about disadvantaged groups, be they lawyers, other academics, or social activists. See
generally Freshman, supra note 52, at 117-21 (arguing that it is often not clear why individu-
als think of themselves as only husbands or wives rather than as children, parents, or care-
takers). Second, high differentiation in one dimension may not necessarily compensate
for low differentiation in a different dimension. Again relying on one of Brewer's exam-
ples, she may narrowly identify herself as a scholar of optimal difference theory, but may
compensate for this narrow identity by, for example, actively participating in the larger
academic community. See Brewer, supra note 320, at 476. Brewer acknowledged disagree-
ment on this issue, but suggested that the balance between assimilation and differentiation
may vary not just for a given individual at a given time for different groups, but also over
time. See Marilynn B. Brewer & Wendi Gardner, Who Is This "We"? Levels of Collective Identity
and Self Representations, 71 J. PERsoiNry & Soc. PSYCHOL. 83, 91 (1996) ("When needs for
intimacy at the interpersonal level are not being met, collective identities may become
more important; prolonged periods of immersion in a depersonalized collective may en-
hance the importance of recognition of the personal, individuated self, and so forth.").
Thus, the evolution of the overall mix of identities over time is apparently optimal, but we
cannot know about any particular identity at any particular time. Therefore, in the em-
ployment context, we cannot know which groups qualify as ingroups for specific positions
at a given firm. See infra Part III.G.8 (asserting that contemporary psychology tells us little
about why individuals may categorize along some dimensions rather than others).
In other work, Brewer suggested that there may be ingroups without the need for
intergroup comparisons. See Brewer & Brown, supra note 285, at 564-65. Nevertheless, it is
unclear whether groups formed without reference to intergroup comparisons tend to har-
bor latent ingroup sympathy. Even if individuals pick fellow Sunday school participants as
law partners without consciously comparing them with individuals who do not attend that
Sunday school, they may nonetheless tend to overlook the value of those others.
326 See infra Part V.B.2.a (discussing peripheral group discrimination).
327 See Hamilton et al., supra note 253, at 307 ("Perceptions, judgments, and decisions
that are seemingly unjustified, given the information available, are no longer routinely
viewed as irrational or as by-products of motivational forces. They may simply reflect biases
in our normal cognitive functioning.").
328 See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 33, at
193-96 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining that evidence of "the usual and customary conduct of
others under similar circumstances" is evidence of the standard of care, but it is not dispos-
itive). Some legal writers, such as Richard Epstein, describe a process as normal to suggest
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sympathy and outgroup homogeneity are normal, they mean some-
thing entirely different. First, the processes are normal in the sense
that categorization of information may be a functional 29 way for an
individual to manage a tremendous amount of information. Second,
psychologists may use the term normal to express that certain patterns
do not necessarily reflect outgroup hostility.33 0 Instead, individuals
may absorb stereotypical expectations from society and then automati-
cally interpret information through these biased lenses.331 More gen-
erally, this difference of meaning may reflect the way in which lawyers
and academic psychologists respond to different professional and
political incentives. Academic psychologists may feel tempted to link
discriminatory attitudes and behavior to normal behavior because aca-
demic psychology rewards those studying mainstream topics more
than those studying peripheral phenomena that affect the relatively
powerless. Similar incentives exist for practicing lawyers and legal aca-
that it is either very difficult to change, normatively desirable, or both. In his critique of
antidiscrimination law, Epstein suggested that people naturally work more easily with peo-
ple like themselves. See EP'sN, supra note 151, at 32. He suggested that overcoming this
tendency would be difficult; allowing ingroup sympathy would be in reality the better op-
tion, because it creates efficiency gains. See id. at 33-34.
329 The psychologists' concept of functionality falls short of the economist's ideal of
efficiency. When psychologists say that it is functional to categorize rather than sort
through a great deal of information, they mean that it fulfills a need from the point of view
of a single individual. The psychologists do not explore, from the point of view of groups
of individuals, or even the sum of all individuals, whether particular kinds of generaliza-
tions will affect other needs, including the needs of other individuals. But see generallyJohn
A. Bargh, The Four Horsemen of Automaticity: Awareness, Intention, Efficiency and Control in
Social Cognition, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SoCIAL COGNMON 1, 1-2 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas
1L Srul eds., 2d ed. 1994) (discussing whether various kinds of automatic judgment are,
among other things, efficient). Thus, when a psychologist states that it is normal to gener-
alize, this does not consider the kind of careful analysis thatJody Armour made in conclud-
ing that racial generalizations are often inefficient when one considers their cost to African
Americans. See Armour, supra note 38, at 793-96. In the authoritative 1998 edition of The
Handbook of Social Psychology, Fiske noted that stereotypes "preserve[ ] mental resources"
and may even "enable[ ] people to perceive stereotypic traits more efficiently." See Fiske,
supra note 32, at 367. Fiske elsewhere recognizes that stereotypes are often inaccurate or
intrinsically bad. See id. at 382 ("scientific, social, and political judgment are involved in
the very definition of accuracy, so stereotype accuracy is a problem unlikely to go away.").
330 See Hamilton et al., supra note 253, at 306 ("[D]istortions in perception and seem-
ingly irrational judgments do not necessarily reflect motivational influences.").
331 See, e.g., id. at 300-03. For an excellent summary of this particular discourse within
psychology, see Krieger, supra note 68, at 1186-1217. Many have found it tempting to de-
scribe the cognitive explanation as nonmotivational; even people devoid of ill motives may
view outgroups in distorted ways. However, this interpretation of the data and theory is not
the only possible interpretation. In terms of the underlying data, it is difficult to tell
whether persons who claim to be unbiased but nonetheless display bias, are simply lying or
being subject to some power genuinely beyond their awareness. Some studies attempt to
correct for this self-censorship in various ways; one example is testing for stereotyping by
observing the amount of time taken to recall an association, inferring that quicker associa-
tion involves stronger stereotyping. See, e.g., Steven J. Stroessner, Social Categorization by
Race or Sex: Effects of Perceived Non-Normalcy on Response Times, 14 Soc. COGNITION 247
(1996).
2000]
HeinOnline  -- 85 Cornell L. Rev. 397 1999-2000
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
demics as well because the field attaches less prestige to those who
deal with the relatively powerless, such as members of the bar practic-
ing family law.33 2
332 Cf Balkin, supra note 173, at 954 (arguing that what individual scholars study is
partly a "product of a set of social forces of normalization and education, reward and pun-
ishment, through which the academic's head gets constructed"); Fineman, supra note 173,
at 759-60 (arguing that lawyers may prefer mediation because it allows them to think of
themselves not as mere partisan advocates, but as "counsel for the situation").
When psychologists claim that ingroup preferences and discrimination may be part of
"normal" cognitive processes, they are responding to different incentives. To be sure,
many psychologists do believe that overcoming prejudice is difficult for some individuals,
although they disagree about just how difficult it is. Compare Hamilton et al., supra note
253, at 315 (claiming that because cognitive theories of stereotyping assume that stereo-
types are self-fulfilling expectations, "[t]he clear implication is that changing stereotypes
will not be easy"), and Margo J. Monteith et al., Prejudice and Prejudice Reduction: Classic
Challenges, Contemporary Approaches, in SOCIAL COGNITION, supra note 253, at 323, 334-35
(noting that even people with low-prejudiced attitudes would have difficulty overcoming
biases because these biases arise from automatic "default" responses), withJacques-Philippe
Leyens & Susan T. Fiske, Impression Formation: From Recitals to Symphonie Fantastique, in So-
CIAL COGNITION, supra note 253, at 39, 57 ("[WMhen it is important to people, they can
control the processes by which they form impressions of others."), and Fiske, supra note 32,
at 391 ("[P]eople can sometimes control even apparently automatic biases, if appropriately
motivated, given the right kind of information, and in the right mood."). Some psycholo-
gists avoid labeling stereotyping as bad on an aesthetic ground: it would not be parsimoni-
ous to include a value judgment. Ashmore & Del Boca, supra note 269, at 16. See generally
Tibor R. Machan, Kuhn, Paradigm Choice and the Arbitrariness of Aesthetic Criteria in Science, 8
THEORY & DECISION 361, 361-62 (1977) (agreeing with Kuhn that scientists use aesthetic
criteria "to select from among competing ideas, including paradigms," but disagreeing
with the proposition that "the close relationship between aesthetic qualities and decisions
about the acceptability of some proposed competing idea ... renders the decision at issue
necessarily irrational or a-rational").
In addition, academic psychologists may also want to label stereotyping as normal to
connect their work to mainstream psychological research, rather than having scholars treat
their research as an isolated specialty. See Hamilton et al., supra note 270, at 4. In part, this
desire to connect with researchers who study other cognitive processes such as expert deci-
sion making dovetails with a more general movement in psychology to see behavior as a
continuum. See Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formation,
from Categor-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation on Atten-
tion and Interpretation, in 23 ADVANCEs IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PsycHOLoGy 1, 4-9 (Mark P.
Zanna ed., 1990). Nevertheless, one wonders if the desire to connect the study of stereo-
types of relatively powerless groups with mainstream psychological theory also reflects the
status dynamics familiar to lawyers; surveys of lawyer prestige rank lawyers for the indigent
lower than, for example, corporate lawyers. See, e.g., CHICAGO LAWvzms: THE SocIAL STRuC-
TuRE OF THE BAR 66 (John P. Heinz & Edward 0. Laumann eds., rev. ed. 1994) (showing
lawyers ranked family poverty law and consumer debtor law less prestigious than securities,
tax, and antitrust). Therefore, perhaps the desire to see stereotyping as normal reflects, at
least in part, an effort to force mainstream psychologists to focus on the problems of stere-
otyping and discrimination, rather than dismiss them in the way that, for example, elite
corporate lawyers might dismiss family lawyers as inferior. Cf Jennifer L. Eberhardt &
Susan T. Fiske, Motivating Individuals to Change: What Is a Target to Do?, in STERoTYPEs AND
STEREOTYPING 369, 398 (C. Neil Macrae et al. eds., 1996) (advising targets of discrimination
to try to make themselves to be seen as members of a larger, less marginalized ingroup).
See generally Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender. Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal
Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682 (1991) (discussing how the notion that federal courts do not
"do family law" may reflect undervaluing of work traditionally done by women). In any
event, there is an understandable temptation to try to identify cognitive psychology as a
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6. Automatic Ingroup Sympathy
Frequently, if not normally, individuals make decisions based on
automatic processes that reflect ingroup sympathy or outgroup hostil-
ity. Different theorists use slightly different vocabulary, but largely
juxtapose two different ideal types of ways in which individuals see
others.33 3 On the one hand, individuals sometimes make decisions by
consciously applying relatively detailed criteria, such as hiring the
plumber who unclogs the drain the fastest. On the other hand, indi-
viduals sometimes make quick, relatively automatic decisions.33 4
These automatic processes often reflect and perpetuate ingroup sym-
pathy and outgroup hostility. In a relatively simple version of a theory
of automatic processes, individuals have a prototype, for example, of
grand unified theory of all information processing, rather than merely a description of the
abnormal processing by a deviant group of bigots. David Hamilton and his coauthors
noted:
Social cognition is not defined by any particular content or substantive is-
sue, but rather by an approach to one's content or issues. As already dis-
cussed, that approach rests on an information processing analysis that
guides one's conceptual and empirical investigation of the cognitive
processes underlying one's topic. As such, its application is not constrained
by content; it can be adopted in the study of any topic in social psychology.
Hamilton et al., supra note 270, at 5.
333 See Robert P. Abelson, A Personal Perspective on Social Cognition, in SocrAL COGNrION,
supra note 253, at 15, 24-31.
334 Two qualifications apply. First, the distinction between automatic and detailed de-
cision making, like the distinction between generalized and atomized discrimination, sim-
plifies discrimination in several ways. Just as discrimination can be generalized or
atomized on different dimensions, so too can some aspects of decisions be automatic and
others detailed. In particular, the fundamental conception of the nature of work, or merit,
can be automatic, even if tests of whether individuals meet certain criteria to perform the
work may be relatively detailed. For example, one may assume that a police officer does
enormous amounts of physical work and then ponder various ways to test for attributes
such as strength. See Case, supra note 70, at 85-94. Assumptions that one automatically
recalls about the nature of various types of work may, as is the case for police, turn out to
be wrong. In reality, police engage in large amounts of negotiation and persuasion. More-
over, our automatic assumptions about the nature of work, as Mary Anne Case suggests,
may have more to do with what we imagine to be typical qualities of ingroups and out-
groups, such as men and women, than with typical differences in the nature of various
kinds ofjobs. See id. at 91-92. Thus, higher statusjobs may often track the qualities associ-
ated with people in various ingroups and outgroups, such as men and women, rather than
differences in the nature of work. See id. at 34 (noting that doctors in the former Soviet
Union, where the field is considered less prestigious, are predominantly female and in the
United States, where physicians are well-respected, they are predominantly male). Like-
wise, as Radin argued, we may associate "tough-minded" traits with maleness; although
early pragmatists thought that qualities such as skepticism and uncertainty were truly
tough-minded traits, today we may associate such contextual thinking more with women.
See Radin, supra note 178, at 137-44.
The second important qualification to the distinction between automatic and detailed
decision making is that a range of ease may exist in how well one can construct processes
that match an individual's abilities with the criteria for a position. See, e.g., Krieger, supra
note 68, at 1231-32 (discussing how validation of various employment practices to prove
that they are job-related may be difficult). A full consideration of job-test validation is
beyond the scope of this Article.
20001
HeinOnline  -- 85 Cornell L. Rev. 399 1999-2000
CORNELL LAW REVEW
an ideal plumber. Rather than showing a potential plumber to vari-
ous kinds of drains, an employer may try to match potential plumbers
to the picture of a plumber in his head. Unfortunately, that picture
will often include markers for relatively narrow ingroups: the typical
plumber may be white and male.3 3 5 Thus, this relatively narrow pic-
ture makes it hard for employers to see the virtues of plumbers who
do not fit that prototype.
Alternatively, a person may first analyze the individual applicant
to see if that person seems to be "the type for the job" or, in evaluating
a prospective neighbor, "like the family next door." Anthropologist
Mark Cohen noted:
At a more subtle level, recruitment usually involves a comfort factor.
Whatever criteria are used to narrow down a long list of applicants,
and however fairly they are applied, we often select from among our
applicants people we feel "in our gut" will be good associates, and
friends, or at least people who will "get along" with their supervisors
and coworkers. There are, of course, always legitimate intangibles
and unmeasurable judgments in any selection. But until people
have a chance to get to know women or members of minority
groups as good colleagues, and even fiends, the comfort factor will
favor white males.3 3 6
This phenomenon does not apply only to employers and employees.
Recent statistics show that women entrepreneurs receive a very small
share of venture capital; one explanation for this phenomenon, which
a Wall Street Journal article cites, is the lack of comfort male venture
capitalists have with women entrepreneurs.3 37
Some psychologists use the slightly different vocabulary of "exem-
plars" to describe why ingroup members have more opportunities. 338
These scholars claim that individuals tend to carry more exemplars for
ingroups.339 All else being equal, if one looks at an ingroup applicant,
picturing that person in a variety of roles will be easier. For example,
a longtime college friend, who happens to be Asian, is also an ex-
championship debater and graduated at the top of his class from one
of the best law schools in the world. Naturally, the firm at which he
335 See, e.g., Fiske, supra note 32, at 366 ("[G]iven no other information, the word 'per-
son' apparently brings to mind a white, heterosexual, able-bodied, youngish man; these are
the U.S. cultural default values .... ").
336 MARK NATHAN COHEN, CULTURF OF INTOLERANcaE 266-67 (1998).
337 See Paulette Thomas, When Venus Seeks Fundingfrom Mars, WALL ST.J., Feb. 24, 1999,
at Bi. One business woman reported that "[i]t's not a discrimination issue," but rather "a
question of education and opening up those networks." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). If these remarks reflect the woman's true views, as opposed to a fear of backlash
from using the framework of discrimination, then she cannot see discrimination, because
she understands discrimination only as outgroup hostility.
338 See Linville, supra note 310, at 430-32.
339 See id.
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spent a summer made him a permanent job offer. "Of course," the
hiring partner said, "you can write your own ticket, whatever depart-
ment you want. But frankly Ijust can't see you as a litigator." In cog-
nitive psychology terms, the partner had exemplars of the hard-
working Asian lawyer, perhaps in something like tax law, but not in a
rough-and-tumble litigation practice. In his mind, the exemplar of
the real litigator, as opposed to the female family-law specialist or the
minority employment lawyer who creates a good impression at the de-
fense table,m0 may exist only for a certain narrow type of white male.
Cognitive theorists predict that, however we think of these stereo-
types, they will often be self-fulfilling in a profound way: The expecta-
tion of the typical plumber will shape the initial impression of a
person.341 Moreover, in a more complicated way, stereotypes may be-
come self-fulfilling, because targets of prejudice themselves respond
to their encounters with bias: The person who sees others in "her
group" being treated badly may decide that trying to pursue further
education is worthless. 342 Similarly, the larger range of exemplars for
ingroup members will make individuals initially believe that they "fit
in" a wider, and often more prestigious, range of positions. In this
model, there exists no pure impression which will later be contami-
nated by prejudice, but rather only stereotype-tainted experiences.
More complicated and nuanced variations on this theme exist, as illus-
trated by the debate on whether a sharp distinction exists between
these two ways of making decisions or whether they fall along a contin-
uum.3 43 Nonetheless, the fundamental specter of generalized dis-
crimination remains.
340 See Barrett, supra note 64, at 166-69 (describing an African-American woman attor-
ney who generally practiced as a criminal defense lawyer, but agreed to defend a law firm
against charges of race discrimination).
341 For a discussion of the self-fulfilling nature of stereotypes, see generally LeeJussim
& Christopher Fleming, Self-Fulfilling Prophecies and the Maintenance of Social Stereotypes: The
Role of Dyadic Interactions and Social Forces, in STEREmOTEs AND STEREOT=PING, supra note 332,
at 161. Sometimes prophecies are self-fulfilling because ingroup members look to confirm
the stereotyped expectations of society. See id. at 165-75 (describing such effects with ste-
reotypes of ethnicity, gender, class, physical attractiveness, and hyperactivity in children).
Sometimes outgroup members themselves will confirm stereotypes "to facilitate smooth
social interactions." Id. at 175; see also Devon W. Carbado & Mini Gulati, Working Identity
11-12 (June 1, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (observing that out-
sider individuals often confront moments when they may be tempted to compromise their
identities to make insiders feel comfortable, such as laughing at jokes that play on
stereotypes).
342 In economic terms, outgroup members generally do not invest in developing their
human capital. See Charny & Gulati, supra note 64, at 78-83.
343 Compare Fiske & Neuberg, supra note 332, at 12 (describing "a continuum of im-
pression formation"), with Marilynn B. Brewer, A Dual Process Model of Impression Formation,
in 1 AmVANCEs rN SoctL CoGNrnON 1, 2-6 (Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr. eds.,
1988) (arguing for "two modes of person perception" (typeface altered)).
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7. Experimental Evidence of Generalized Discrimination
Although studies in the tradition of The Authoritarian Personality
provide a wealth of evidence of generalized outgroup hostility, few
recent social science experiments clearly address the exact contours of
ingroups and outgroups. This dearth of research is largely responsi-
ble for lawyers' and courts' assumption that atomized categories of
discrimination exist; psychology so thoroughly sees biases as related
that it may not test that assumption. 344
A very recent series of experiments, however, suggests that nega-
tive attitudes about members of one presumably distinct group, such
as fat people, will reduce the chances that members of another pre-
sumably distinct group, such as thin African Americans, will receive a
position.3 45 In a series of experiments, Crandall, Thompson, and
Sakalli explored the way in which prejudiced comments would affect
the decision about how to evaluate "fat" and African-American candi-
dates for a graduate program in counseling psychology. 346 A group of
subjects were told to rate candidates on a one-to-seven scale. 347 In the
"Black Prejudice" group, the confederate said, "I would definitely not
pick the black guy. I don't think black people make good counselors.
I know I wouldn't go to a black guy. Personally I just don't like black
people."348 In the "Fat Prejudice" group, the confederate made the
similarly negative comments about fat people.3 49 As an atomized-prej-
udice perspective would predict, subjects who heard the Black Preju-
dice remark gave lower ratings to the thin African-American male
than control-group subjects did.350 However, the atomized-prejudice
perspective would not have anticipated that subjects who heard the
Fat Prejudice remark gave the thin African-American male even lower
ratings than those who heard the Black Prejudice remark, as the ex-
periment showed.351
Crandall, Thompson, and Sakalli interpreted their data by ex-
plaining how prejudiced remarks may change the norms that a group
344 See infra Part III.C.8 (claiming that social psychology does not explore why individu-
als use some categories rather than others).
345 See Christian S. Crandall et al., Creating Hostile Environments: Name-Calling and
Social Norms (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
346 See id. at 9-12.
347 See id. at 12.
348 Id. at 11.
349 See id.
350 See id. at 35 (showing that subjects who heard no biased remarks gave the thin
African-American male a 5.58, while subjects who heard the Black Prejudice remark gave
the thin African-American male a 5.32).
351 See id. (showing that subjects who heard the Black Prejudice remark rated the thin
African-American male 5.32, while subjects who heard the Fat Prejudice remark rated the
thin African-American male 4.73).
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applies.5 52 The authors share a common view that Americans have
ambivalent views about many outgroups, both a belief in abstract
equality and negative beliefs about outsiders.353 For many years,
scholars have noted that Americans may hold commitments both to
justice and to prejudiced attitudes.3 54 One version of the aversive ra-
cism theory, which researchers developed in a series of experiments,
posits that we are more likely to act in accordance with our biases
when no norm makes our behavior seem biased.355 Crandall, Thomp-
son, and Sakalli theorized that bias involving any particular outgroup
legitimizes the more biased values involving an outgroup.3 56 As the
authors of the study theorized, "[t]he ethnic slur serves to validate
intolerance in general, and so this should extend to ethnic groups as
well as non-ethnic stigmatizing conditions, (e.g., physical disabilities,
352 See i& at 25-27.
353 See id. at 26-27.
354 The Authoritarian Personality identifies such ambivalence in several places. For in-
stance, it notes that people often qualify their statements of prejudice with disclaimers such
as "Jews have their rights.'" Levinson, supra note 180, at 60. Levinson took this at least
somewhat seriously:
The concern with democratic values, and the resistance to antidemocratic
ones, must be considered as psychologically and socially important facts in
any attempt to understand prejudice, American variety. Undoubtedly very
many people who are now pseudodemocratic are potentially an-
tidemocratic, that is, are capable in a social crisis of supporting or commit-
ting acts of violence against minority groups. Nevertheless, it is important
to understand the attempted compromise with democratic values: because
it may reveal a democratic potential which might, if supported and
strengthened, ultimately gain the upper hand ....
Id. at 61; see also Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Comprehensive Scores and Summary of lntenvew Results,
in ADoR'o Er AL., supra note 9, at 468, 484 (noting that "American culture" includes both
emphasis on status and "'identification with the underdog'" and that even prejudiced indi-
viduals may include some mix of both). See generally SAMUEL HUNT NGTON, AMERCAN DE-
MocRAcy THE PoLmcs OF DIs-HAtmtoN 39 (1981) (claiming that government can never
completely close the gap between the American ideals and American institutions); GUNNaR
MYRDAL, AN AMERIcAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944)
(discussing how American ideals that all people are equal may coexist with very unequal
treatment of African-Americans). Contemporary psychological theories of aversive racism
make such ambivalence crucial, albeit without reference to Thw Authoritarian Personality. See
Samuel L. Gaertner &John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racim, in PREJUDICE, Disci iI-
NATION, AND RACiSM, supra note 239, at 61, 64.
355 See, e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 354, at 76-77 (examining when individuals
will help an African American in an emergency situation). When individuals believed that
they were the only person who might help, they assisted African-American victims 94% of
the time and white victims 81% of the time. See id. at 77. But individuals helped African-
American victims only 38% of the time and whites 75% of the time when they believed
someone else might be able to help. See id. One explanation for this result is that as the
only bystander, an individual faces a clear norm to help out or risk condemnation-even
from himself-as a bigot; when others are available to help, the norm may appear less
clear. See id. at 85 ("When norms are clear, bias is unlikely to occur; when norms are
ambiguous or conflicting, discrimination is often exhibited.").
356 See Crandall et al., supra note 345, at 8 ("When competing motives or values vie for
expression in a social situation, the perception of social norms about which may be appro-
priately expressed will determine whether discriminatory behavior is emitted.").
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facial attractiveness, fatness, homosexuality, etc.)." 357 Additionally,
outside of the experimental context, the buzz word "political correct-
ness," for example, may insinuate that we really see a quite general
truth: It may be politically correct to pretend that people are equal,
but the correct answer ("politics" aside) is that people are not equal.
The previous discussion of ingroup sympathy offers a second way
to understand the experiment. The specific context is admission to a
program in counseling psychology, and the confederate raises ques-
tions about whether she would go to an African-American or a fat
therapist. This issue may quickly provoke the participants to consider
the type of therapist they would prefer. Therefore, the question may
trigger a relatively narrow prototype of the comforting therapist: In
our society, that prototype will often be a thin and white therapist.358
With this image of a thin, white therapist in mind, the fact that one
would rank both thin African Americans and fat whites as less fit for a
counseling training program is not surprising.
A third way to understand such generalized discrimination is
based on the distinction between automatic and controlled responses.
Many psychologists believe that our negative views of outgroups are
encoded early in life and later recalled automatically; our views about
equality, on the other hand, may be learned later and may be accessi-
ble only when actively recalled.35 9 When we hear a negative attitude
about one atomized group, this statement may activate our automatic
negative attitudes, but it may also force at least some of us to engage
in controlled processes to see if we are acting in a biased way. Because
of the atomized way in which we think about discrimination, however,
these automatic processes may often fail. Thus, when we hear the Fat
Prejudice condition, we may automatically think of our narrow proto-
type of the comfortable therapist; however, because we did not hear
about race, we may not check to see if we are acting in a way that
disadvantages thin African Americans. Additionally, we may be less
likely to check for bias, because we may possess a less firmly held belief
357 Id.
358 In another article, I discussed how individuals may feel tempted to seek comfort
from a therapist or someone performing a partially therapeutic role such as a mediator.
See Freshman, supra note 55, at 1730-32. I briefly noted that such consultation sometimes
creates a legal problem. See id. at 1732 n.128. I now regret for not noting at the time that,
apart from any legal objection, an ethical and policy objection to such identity-matching of
mediator to patient may exist: This practice perpetuates the discomfort that itself causes
much discrimination.
359 See Patricia G. Devine & MargoJ. Monteith, The Role of Discrepany-Associated Affect in
Prejudice Reduction, in AFFECT, COGITroN, AND STEREOTYPING: INTRArIVE PROCESSES IN
GROUP PERCEPTION, supra note 305, at 317, 330 (describing a study in which individuals
read a workshop proposal that discussed "why it is difficult to avoid negative responses
toward homosexuals").
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that bias, involving fat people is wrong.3 60 This theory explains why
the most significant negative effect on the ratings of African Ameri-
cans occurs with the Fat Prejudice condition.
Overall, Crandall, Thompson, and Sakalli's research illustrates
three important points about contemporary psychological under-
standings of prejudice. First, like the research in The Authoritarian Per-
sonality's tradition, it provides additional evidence that discrimination
often reflects generalized patterns. Second, as the previous discussion
suggests, the research may also be consistent with a variety of genera-
lized discrimination models: outgroup hostility unleashed by a change
in the sense of norms about discrimination, ingroup sympathy consis-
tent with a prototype of the ideal therapist, or the limitations that at-
omized discrimination places on our ability to control prejudiced
responses. Third, the research further supports the original argu-
ment of The Authoritarian Personality. One of the best ways to overcome
the prejudice that we see narrowly, such as anti-Semitism or racism,
may be to establish a broad commitment to equality.8 61
360 See Crandall & Biernat, supra note 307, at 240-41 ("Unlike the expression of nega-
tive attitudes toward other out-groups, social sanctions do not seem to be invoked against
those who express anti-fat attitudes. Expressing them is a prevalent, accepted form of so-
cial prejudice .... ."). See generally Christian S. Crandall, Preudice Against Fat People: Ideology
and Self-Interest, 66 J. PERSONALr1Y & Soc. PSYCHOL. 882 (1994) (comparing prejudice
against fat people with symbolic racism).
361 Those who study and teach prejudice reduction today often suggest that we remind
individuals of their nonprejudiced beliefs. Although one might imagine that individuals
could be told, "Remember, gays are people too," the studies instead emphasize reminding
people of general propositions, such as a commitment to equality. See Devine & Monteith,
supra note 359, at 318. Such literature often emphasizes abstract themes, such as genera-
lized nondiscrimination. See Monteith et al., supra note 332, at 328 (describing how
Rokeach's prejudice reduction program depended on making individuals aware of con-
flicts between their prejudiced responses and their views of themselves as "fair, tolerant,
democratic and the like").
Similarly, recent prejudice-reduction strategies focus on attempts to make individuals
view outgroups as part of some larger group that includes both the ingroup and various
outgroups. For example, one experiment tried to show how African Americans and whites
might think of themselves as being fans of a common school. Experimenters tested how
often people at a college athletic event would answer questions from various African-Amer-
ican and white interviewers. When the African-American interviewers wore the same uni-
versity insignia as the people they approached, they were much more likely to receive a
response than if they had a different university affiliation (59% versus 36%). SeeJohn F.
Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The Causes, Conse-
quences, and Challenges of Aversive Racism, in Confronting Racism: The Problem and the
Response 3, 27 (Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske eds., 1998). Both the evidence of
ingroup sympathy-rather than outgroup hostility as the source of discrimination-and
the experiments on generalized discrimination support these prejudice-reduction
strategies.
Some scholars will note that these strategies, like the focus of this Article, generally
emphasize psychological processes as a means of overcoming prejudice. Others will em-
phasize the importance of institutional and structural changes, such as actual redistribu-
tion of resources, or the redefinition of desert and merit. Although I have written about
the importance of questioning concepts of merit, such as what constitutes good legal schol-
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8. The Mix of Discrimination: Who Is "in" the Ingroup?
The more recent social psychological literature tells us that large
cleavages divide ingroups and outgroups, but it pays little attention to
the differences between outgroups; we still need to know the defini-
tion of the ingroup in a given context, such as Deborah's firm in the
Prologue.362 If the ingroup included all groups but African Ameri-
cans, for example, then the current preoccupation of the law and
legal scholarship with racism would make a great deal of sense. Some
of the best data for understanding the bases of generalizations and
ingroups are in the tradition of The Authoritarian Personality. These
data, as we saw, suggest that individuals often see differences along
dimensions of perceived race, religion, nationality, and sexual orienta-
tion. 63 More recent data also show how dimensions related to disabil-
ity and physical appearance such as obesity may delineate ingroups.3 64
Although meaningful differences may appear in some populations
and in some contexts, often the ingroup is quite familiar: My-white,
Christian (usually Protestant), seemingly without mental or physical
disability, and male.365 Additionally, the ingroup is of the appropriate
age, but the age range may vary more in some contexts. 366
In short, Deborah may be correct to hypothesize that those per-
ceived as "good ol' boys" constitute her firm's ingroup. In other
firms, however, the ingroup may include Jews rather than Protestants,
Asians rather than whites, sometimes even women rather than men.
Social science cannot conclusively identify the specific ingroup in
arship, see Freshman, supra note 135, at 1586-1607, the concern with the psychological
origins of bias is also important. Some scholars will agree with one approach, but not the
other; others insistently recommend more fundamental legal change because they assume
that no sufficient legal tool exists to prove individual bias. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 68,
at 1246 (emphasizing the importance of affirmative action on the ground that identifying
bias in particular cases would be too difficult without it).
362 See, e.g., Brewer, supra note 309, at 158 ("Distinctiveness of a given social identity is
context-specific. It depends on the frame of reference within which possible social identi-
ties are defined at a particular time, which can range from participants in a specific social
gathering to the entire human race.").
363 See supra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
364 See supra notes 345-57 and accompanying text.
365 See Fiske, supra note 32, at 366 ("[G]iven no other information, the word 'person'
apparently brings to mind a white, heterosexual, able-bodied, youngish man; these are the
U.S. cultural default values (some defaults, such as heterosexual, may be supported by real-
world probabilities, but others, such as male gender, are not)."); Hamilton et al., supra
note 253, at 312 ("Information that denotes membership in a group that differs from the
'white male norm' is likely to be salient and receive extra attention, and hence will likely be
the basis for categorizing a person.").
366 In many professions, the ideal age is somewhere past "inexperienced" and shy of
'over the hill." The precise ingroup age range will vary. The ingroup ages for music video
production and for law school faculties probably do not overlap. Emphasizing that "we"
may discriminate against older persons although "we" may likely live to that age is impor-
tant; "we" may also mistreat those younger than us even though "we" were once "their" age.
See infra text accompanying notes 491-92.
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every setting. But it can tell us two very important things: First, we will
often encounter discrimination by looking for generalized discrimina-
tion. Second, ingroup formation will often follow certain patterns.
Unfortunately, the majority of cognitive psychology literature
does not identify more precisely the ingroup in a given context. At
the most fundamental level, the literature so thoroughly assumes that
stereotyping is a common process regardless of the content of the ste-
reotypes; therefore, it often does not ask why we stereotype along par-
ticular dimensions.3 67
Much of the recent literature on subtyping and subgrouping sug-
gests that we may group other individuals in many ways.3 68 Some
scholars theorize that, as a general rule, contemporary Americans pay
more attention to some combination of race, gender, and age.3 69
However, this general claim must be strongly qualified. First, the con-
cepts of race and gender are expansive; such discussions often desig-
nate Latinas/os or Jews as a race, and classify at least some persons
perceived as gay or lesbian under "gender. '370 Second, as with any
367 Hamilton explained:
The social cognition approach brought about a shift in emphasis from con-
tent to process. Given the focus on process, it is assumed that all stereo-
types, as cognitive structures, function in the same way and have similar
effects on information processing. Consequently, to identify how stereo-
types affect information processing, the specific content of the stereotypes
used in any given study usually has been of only secondary concern. So in
recent literature, one can find studies of stereotyping not only about signifi-
cant stereotyped groups, like blacks and women, but also about fraternity
members, librarians, and even Groups A and B.
Hamilton et al., supra note 253, at 309; see also id. at 313 ("[W]e lack an adequate frame-
work for understanding the bases of social categorization, an area that promises to be a
focus of continuing research and theoretical debate.").
368 See, e.g., ALLPORT, supra note 8, at 259 ("While psychological principles help us to
understand the process of prejudice, they cannot by themselves fully explain why one
group and not another should be selected as objects of hate."); R. Richard Banks &Jen-
nifer L. Eberhardt, Social PRychological Processes and the Legal Bases of Racial Categorization, in
CONFRONTING RAcISM: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE, supra note 361, at 54, 56-58 (dis-
cussing the "probabilistic view of category formation"); Fiske, supra note 32, at 377 (noting
that people "use multiple social features to create subtypes"). Many acknowledge that an
individual's categorization of others depends on the cultural context. See id. at 376.
369 See, e.g., Fiske, supra note 32, at 375-76; see also Myron Rothbart & Marjorie Taylor,
Category Labels and Social Reality: Do We View Social Categories as Natural Kinds?, in LANGUAGE,
INTERAcrnON AND SOCIAL COGNITION 11, 12 (Gin R. Semin & Klaus Fiedler eds., 1992)
(theorizing that a tendency exists among people "to infer deep essential qualities on the
basis of surface appearance").
370 Fiske included Jews under her discussion of race while acknowledging that others
would discuss Jews as an ethnic category. See Fiske, supra note 32, at 379-80. Fiske also
included "Latino Americans" in this race discussion without any similar caveat. See id. at
379. Similarly, in her discussion of gender, Fiske also noted how some women will be
typed lesbian regardless of their actual sexual orientation or practices. See id. at 378 (dis-
cussing "gender stereotypes" of "the feminist/athlete/lesbian"). Fiske's analysis does not
give any significant attention to disabilities, although disabilities seem to readily fit her
criteria for her emphasis on race, gender, and age categories: visibility, social significance,
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generalization about prejudice, some individuals more quickly tend to
classify along some lines rather than others.3 71 Third, as with The Au-
thoritarian Personality, much of the evidence points to atomized dis-
crimination because of the cramped nature of particular studies. Just
as the anti-Semitism scales of The Authoritarian Personality included
more items for Jews than for various minorities lumped together into
the minorities scale, some recent studies track only differences be-
tween African Americans and non-African Americans. For example,
one series of studies showed that whites were more likely to help a
white with an auto problem than an African American.3 72 It would be
tempting to cite the study for the proposition that whites have more
sympathy for other whites. Unfortunately, because there exists no re-
port of data on gender, disability, ethnicity, or other traits, such con-
clusion would be premature.
Likewise, many continue to cite Kanter's important work, Men
and Women of the Corporation,373 for the idea that institutional context
matters: The majority within a given organization, like a firm, focuses
its attention on the minority.3 74 The limitation of this insight, how-
ever, is that the theory cannot predict which features individuals will
use to sort people into minority and majority. In the United States
today, many people frequently assert that Jews and gays are mostly
invisible or concealable minorities.375 In 1946, however, an experi-
ment by Allport and Kramer showed that many individuals were quick
to label individuals alongJewish and non-Jewish lines-often quite ac-
curately.376 Later attempts to replicate the experiment produced vary-
ing results.37 7 Although drawing stark contrasts between visible and
invisible minorities may be fashionable, Erving Goffman may have
best characterized the problem when he said that those with some
stigmatized trait often fall between these extremes.378
and effect on interactions. See id. at 375-76. But see id. at 366 (asserting that the word
"person" in the United States conjures up an image of someone who is, among other
things, "able-bodied").
371 See Brewer & Brown, supra note 285, at 556-58 (discussing studies that show that
some individuals will be more attentive to gender, and some more attentive to Jewishness).
372 See Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 354, at 68-72; see alsoJohn B. McConahay, Mod-
em Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RA-
CiSM, supra note 239, at 91, 92 (explaining that a Modern Racism Scale merely "asks
subjects or survey respondents to agree or disagree with a set of beliefs that whites may or
may not have about blacks").
373 RoSABETH MOOS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1977).
374 See Brewer & Brown, supra note 285, at 557.
375 See, e.g., Halley, supra note 70, at 945.
376 See supra note 258 (noting that many people are able to identify Jews by sight).
377 See Brewer & Brown, supra note 285, at 557-58.
378 See ERVING GoFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTIY 74
(1963). Goffman noted:
Given these several possibilities that fall between the extremes of complete
secrecy on one hand and complete information on the other, it would seem
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D. Summary of Social Science Paradigms
Despite the various changes in methodology and terminology,
much of the social science perspective on discrimination since the
1940s tells a remarkably coherent story. First, no single account of
discrimination explains why every individual discriminates in every
single incident. Second, much discrimination is so generalized that to
speak of racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, or homophobia will be mis-
leading. Instead, discrimination often revolves around a general con-
trast between an individual's ingroup and everyone else. In cases of
outgroup hostility, an individual despises all of "them"-even an imag-
inary "them." 379
The more recent emphasis on ingroup sympathy points toward
the same conclusion. Individuals often feel better about people in
their ingroup without sorting them into any category at all.380 In-
group preference often means that an individual simply overlooks
those outside his ingroup.38 ' Finally, evidence exists that, in addition
to generalized outgroup hostility and ingroup sympathy, some preju-
dice may be focused on smaller groups: some along atomized lines,
some along subatomized or intersectional lines, and some along vari-
ous other subtypes.382 Thus, in combination, these conclusions sug-
gest that courts and lawyers are not justified in simply assuming that
discrimination is usually atomized and that other patterns of genera-
lized discrimination are unusual; indeed, perhaps the usual case
might be generalized.
As we have seen, anti-Semitism has faded from our consciousness,
in part because theorists began to view anti-Semitism as part of a
larger phenomenon of prejudice. What does this mean to us now?
One lesson may be that we should view discrimination and civil rights
struggles very differently from the way that the fixation with atomized
discrimination too often frames them. We need not assume that some
natural difference exists between race and gender; furthermore, we
need not apologize for seeing whether, for some purposes, genera-
lized discrimination operates such that we may speak of discrimina-
tion and prejudice rather than atomized "isms" such as racism, sexism,
and others. Despite these caveats, we need not assume that genera-
lized discrimination is the best explanation for discrimination in every
possible circumstance and issue of public policy. Even theorists who
that the problems people face who make a concerted and well-organized
effort to pass are problems that wide ranges of persons face at some time or
other.
Id.
379 See supra Part HI.B.1.
380 See supra Part III.G.
381 See id.
382 See supra Part III.B.l.e.
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studied generalized discrimination did not suppose that any single
theory of discrimination provided a blanket explanation of all discrim-
ination by all persons. Additionally, historic context leaves open the
possibility that some forms of discrimination may arise in some con-
texts in ways that the historic theories of generalized discrimination
might not have fully anticipated. At this point, however, generalized
discrimination has slipped so far from our consciousness, both as law-
yers and as individuals swept up in narrow conversations about race
and gender, that we have ample room to consider generalized dis-
crimination without worrying that it will preempt attention to other
understandings of discrimination. The next Part considers in greater
detail how lawyers and courts might take evidence of generalized dis-
crimination more seriously in a large number of cases.
IV
How SOCIAL SCIENCE THEORlEs AFFECT PROOF
OF DISCRIMINATION
Part One showed that courts and lawyers often assume that dis-
crimination occurs in atomized patterns. Those dealing with allega-
tions of discrimination will frequently want to use evidence of how
defendants treated others like the victim,38 3 but the assumption of at-
omized discrimination often leaves both plaintiffs and defendants
without a meaningful basis for comparison. The essential lesson the
social science studies of discrimination teach is that lawyers should not
merely investigate discrimination by searching for how defendants
treated those in identical atomized groups as particular plaintiffs.
Likewise, courts should abandon the atomized presumption that
those seeking to introduce evidence of generalized discrimination al-
ways bear a burden to prove the logical relevance of such evidence.
This Part addresses the more technical consideration of how various
dispute resolution mechanisms should use evidence of generalized
discrimination, including an analysis of formal evidentiary rules that
govern courts and the various less formal considerations that govern
alternatives to litigation, such as mediation, arbitration, and investiga-
tions of discrimination.
A. Evidence of Generalized Discrimination in Court
Courts might take one of three approaches to evidence of genera-
lized discrimination. Although I describe these three positions as sim-
ple rules, the use of generalized discrimination, like any evidence of
discrimination, may vary widely, because courts often leave such ques-
tions to trial courts to determine under an open-ended balancing
383 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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test.38 4 The first and strongest position would treat evidence of gener-
alized discrimination exactly like evidence of atomized discrimination,
without applying any additional hurdle. The second, more moderate
position would treat the relatively generalized nature of discrimina-
tion as one factor in balancing the use of such evidence: The less at-
omized the discrimination, the less likely it would be admitted, much
as courts are less likely to admit evidence of older acts. Third, in-
dependent of how one chooses between the first two positions, one
might question whether defendants should not ordinarily have the op-
portunity to offer evidence of generalized discrimination unless and
until the plaintiff alleges generalized discrimination or offers such evi-
dence first.
1. Balancing Evidence of Prior Discrimination
In discrimination cases, courts admit evidence of other acts of
discrimination based on the interplay between the broad rules for ad-
missible evidence, the often baffling tension between various rules
governing admission of other acts of discrimination, and the rules
against unfair prejudice or jury confusion. Those offering other-acts
evidence frequently claim that such evidence meets the very broad
standards for relevant evidence:38 5 How a defendant treated someone
similar to the plaintiff in the past makes it more likely that the person
was similarly motivated to treat the plaintiff for the same reason. On
the other hand, opponents of this evidence would invoke the equally
well-known standard that evidence of how one acted in the past ought
not to be admitted for the purpose of proving that one acted the same
way on some other occasion. This is the so-called anti-propensity
rule.38 6 The anti-propensity rule, however, often crumbles in re-
384 I acknowledge in advance that individual judges may decide evidentiary rulings
based on ideas other than evidence of generalized discrimination outlined in Part III and
the formal evidentiary framework outlined in this Part. See Freshman, supra note 16, at 258
n.77 (acknowledging the criticism of doctrinal analysis on the ground that trial judges use
instinct, not logic, to make evidentiary rulings).
385 See FED. R. EvIm. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."). For examples of
relevant evidence, see Spulak v. K-Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1156 (10th Cir. 1990) ("As a
general rule, the testimony of other employees about their treatment by the defendant is
relevant to the issue of the employer's discriminatory intent."); Stumph v. Thomas & Skin-
ner, Inc., 770 F.2d 93, 97-98 (7th Cir. 1985) (ruling that statements by other employees that
the defendant decreased their duties and made them feel unwelcome, causing them to
retire, are relevant to the issue of whether the defendant wished to eliminate its older
employees); Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc., 711 F.2d 1524, 1532 (11th Cir.
1983) (determining that testimony of another employee was relevant to prove employer's
discriminatory motive); and Harping v. Continental Oil Co., 628 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir.
1980) (explaining that "the testimony of the similarly situated employees and the reasons
for their discharge are relevant in proving a pattern and practice of age discrimination").
386 See FED. R. EvD. 404(b).
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sponse to two other typical evidentiary moves. First, courts admit evi-
dence of past acts for some purposes, including proving motivation
and the absence of mistake. 38 7 This proof-of-motivation exception is a
key factor in discrimination cases. Second, when evidence is admitted
for one purpose, such as proving motivation, but not for another,
such as propensity, courts may then admit the evidence, but instruct
the jury to consider such evidence only for the permissible purpose.38 8
Ultimately, however, those resisting such evidence have one final stan-
dard to invoke: the rule against admission of evidence that may cause
undue prejudice or jury confusion.38 9
Overall, these competing evidentiary standards produce both fre-
quent litigation and some broad guidelines. Plaintiffs often offer evi-
dence that defendants treated people other than the plaintiff in a
discriminatory manner. Defendants typically attempt to show that
they treated others in a nondiscriminatory manner. Plaintiffs may try
to prove that defendants had a policy of discrimination; defendants
may want to prove policies of nondiscrimination through official state-
ments, diversity training, and the hiring of equal opportunity of-
ficers. 390 Courts of appeals frequently state that they defer to trial
courts when they balance the value of evidence for proving motivation
against the risk of provoking unfair prejudice and jury confusion.391
Nevertheless, the appellate courts overturn such decisions more fre-
387 See id.
388 See FED. R. EVID. 105.
389 See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."). This concern with juries is of little import in trials
without ajury; many discrimination claims were so litigated under Title VII prior to 1991.
See, e.g., PAUL H. TOBIAS & SHARON SOBERS, LITIGATING WRONGFUL DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
§ 2:10, at 33 (1998). However, the 1991 amendments granted parties the right to ajury
trial on issues of compensatory damages, such as emotional distress or pain and suffering,
punitive damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (c) (1994), and, by judicial interpretation,
factual issues overlapping with such issues even if they relate to other claims. See, e.g.,
Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 422 (5th Cir. 1998). Additionally, this
rationale continues to have little application to arbitrations, in which the arbitrators, as
discussed in greater detail below, consider large amounts of evidence for what it is worth.
See infra note 422 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, even if this reasoning does not
affect the admission of evidence when arbitrators or judges consider cases, the arguments
below about admissibility should track how arbitrators or judges may think about the weight
given to evidence of generalized discrimination.
390 See Edelman et al., supra note 64, at 75 (describing these "symbolic structures,
which serve as visible efforts to comply with law").
391 See, e.g., Hollanderv. American Cyanamid Co., 172 F.3d 192, 202 (2d Cir. 1999) ("A
district court's discretion in choosing whether or not to admit [statistical] evidence [of
discrimination] is broad."); Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control, 165 F.3d 767 (10th Cir.
1999) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of dis-
crimination against two other employees after plaintiff left the job, on the ground that the
potential for unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value).
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quenfly than such a standard of review suggests. 39 2 The courts of ap-
peals are more likely to hold that such evidence should be excluded if
it is old,3 9 3 or if it involves a person less directly connected with a
decision or victims in different positions.394 The net result is that
courts often run through the various factors in a kind of balancing
test; judges then label the result as a fact-dependent outcome. 395 In
addition to other distinctions, courts are far more likely to grant re-
quests for discovery than requests for admission of evidence. In prin-
ciple, at least, parties may discover not only facts that courts would
ultimately admit into evidence, but also facts likely to lead to the pro-
duction of admissible evidence. 396
392 See, e.g., Schrand v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152, 156 (6th Cir. 1988) (revers-
ing trial court's decision to allow testimony from two former employees in a discrimination
case on the ground that they testified about incidents that were too old).
393 See, e.g., Betkerir v. Aultman Hosp. Ass'n, 78 F.3d 1079 (6th Cir. 1996) (ruling that
a remark made several years prior to the decision in question was not relevant); Russell v.
Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995) (deciding that an older incident in which a
coworker threatened to shove a "shotgun up [plaintiff's] 'black ass' was too tenuously re-
lated" to create a material issue of fact).
394 See, e.g., Wallace v. SMG Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1398-1401 (7th Cir. 1997)
(affirming summary judgment that Japanese employer did not discriminate in favor of
Japanese employees, partly on the ground that another employee's statement that "all
Americans are stupid" was not entitled to great weight, because the person did not have
the authority to fire the employee); Tolerson v. Auburn Steel Co., 987 F. Supp. 700, 713
(E.D. Ark. 1997) (holding that evidence that an employee disliked the plaintiff was irrele-
vant, because that employee was not a decision maker, and dislike of plaintiff did not touch
on race), affd, 131 F.3d 1255 (8th Cir. 1997); cf Spicer v. Virginia, Dep't of Corrections, 66
F.3d 705, 710-11 (4th Cir. 1995) (determining that the employer was not liable for harass-
ment by another employee, when the employer took prompt action upon discovering har-
assment); Allen v. City of Athens, 937 F. Supp. 1531, 1543 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (deciding that
jokes about African Americans were not direct evidence of discrimination, because deci-
sion makers did not make them and because the remarks could have been over 10 years
old). But cf Kneibert v. Thomson Newspapers, Mich. Inc., 129 F.3d 444, 455-56 (8th Cir.
1997) (ruling that a statement by a person who was not a decision maker was relevant,
because that person may have known the true reasons behind an employment decision).
For criticism of the distinction between particular decision makers at a particular moment,
see Sturm, supra note 36, at 662-63. Cf Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substan-
tive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591, 593-94 (1980-1981) (suggesting that courts may
reach different results by adopting a narrow or broad time frame). Such criticisms,
although also based on social science data, are similar to criticisms of the intent require-
ment, independent of the argument that we should pay more attention to generalized
discrimination. Generalized or atomized discrimination evidence may exist whether the
time frame is short or long and whether the scope of decision makers is narrow or broad.
395 See generally Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. Rxv. 1, 50 (1983)
(mentioning the use of balancing tests).
396 Parties are entitled to discovery of facts if they are "reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence." FED. R Crv. P. 26(b) (1); see also Grebeldinger, supra
note 122, at 174-75 (explaining the mechanics of Rule 26(b) (1)).
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2. Strong Position: No Additional Hurdles to Evidence of Generalized
Discrimination
The strongest application of generalized discrimination occurs
when evidence of generalized discrimination faces no additional hur-
dles other than the open-ended balancing already applied to any evi-
dence of prior discrimination. However, not all evidence of
generalized discrimination would be admissible. Under current case
law, courts might exclude such evidence if it (1) involved incidents in
the distant past, (2) implicated individuals with less clear authority to
make particular decisions, or (3) involved victims in different kinds of
jobs.3 97 However, courts cannot continue to presume that evidence
ordinarily fits only atomized patterns.398 This strong position makes
more sense to the extent that one believes that generalized discrimi-
nation accounts for a larger share of the total number of incidents of
discrimination. If most discrimination reflects outgroup hostility or
ingroup sympathy, then analyzing evidence without regard to atom-
ized distinctions between examples of race and sex discrimination
makes sense. For example, both race and sex discrimination may be
understood as inevitable consequences of the exact same ingroup
sympathy for white males.
Short of the strongest position, two other relatively strong posi-
tions are available. First, courts might admit evidence of generalized
discrimination when parties plead or otherwise articulate the logical
relevance of generalized discrimination. This approach might not
change the result in older cases; their reported decisions claim that
parties did not allege any explanation to show how different kinds of
discrimination were related, such as ingroup sympathy or outgroup
hostility.399 Second, courts might simply flip the presumption: Evi-
dence of generalized discrimination is not subject to additional hur-
dles unless the party opposing its admission can articulate some
special reason to believe that the discrimination at issue could not
have been generalized. 40 0
397 See Grebeldinger, supra note 122, at 191-96, 201-03; supra notes 393-94 and accom-
panying text.
398 See supra Part II.C (describing how courts sometimes assert that discrimination, as a
matter of logic, is always atomized, and how courts at other times hold that the parties have
not explained how different forms of discrimination are related).
399 See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. I qualify this statement with "might"
because of the usual risks of inferring precisely what parties did or did not argue from a
reported decision. See, e.g., Valdes, supra note 70, at 154-58 (describing a case in which the
plaintiff claimed sex discrimination based on effeminacy, but in which the court treated
the claim as being one for sexual orientation discrimination and thus not actionable).
400 This requirement reflects the evidentiary principle that the burden of proof falls
on the party trying to prove the less likely event. The less likely one sees atomized discrimi-
nation, the more reason a court should impose such a burden.
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Courts might examine the particular nature of stereotypes in a
specific case. In some scenarios, defendants might claim that any dis-
crimination that occurred only reflected atomized discrimination.
For example, a woman might allege that she was denied a construc-
tion job because a foreperson told her that she "didn't look strong
enough." In that case, the defendant might argue against admitting
evidence that an African-American male was told "you wouldn't fit in
around here." The employer might say that such racist remarks, how-
ever wrong, did not relate to the more innocuous statistical stereotype
that women tend to be weaker than men.40 1 Of course, the court
might not accept this characterization of the examples; the plaintiff
might argue that both examples could also prove that the employer
acted consistently on ingroup sympathy for white males, but later ar-
ticulated different pretextual rationalizations.
In other cases, plaintiffs might try to draw distinctions to exclude
evidence of generalized nondiscrimination. An African-American
woman, for example, might allege that an employer did not ade-
quately investigate her claims that a supervisor or co-worker
threatened to fire her if she did not have sex with him. The employer
could offer evidence that it did investigate two prior incidents when a
white woman alleged such sexual harassment. The African-American
female plaintiff might discount such examples by claiming that Afri-
can-American women have historically been stereotyped as sexually
available seductresses and that such stereotyping caused employers to
investigate allegations against "pure" white women, but to readily pre-
sume that a woman of color consented to any sexual advances.40 2
Again, the court might not necessarily accept these arguments; the
defendant might persuade the court that a jury ought to hear these
distinctions and make up its own mind in light of the totality of
evidence.
3. A Moderate Position: An Additional Balancing Factor
Courts might also treat the relatively atomized or generalized na-
ture of evidence as yet another factor in determining when to admit
evidence. Just as courts are more likely to admit more recent evi-
dence, courts might tend to admit more atomized evidence if all other
factors are equivalent. This does not mean that courts would exclude
401 See, e.g., EEOC v. Spokane Concrete Prods., 534 F. Supp. 518, 522 (E.D. Wash.
1982) (describing a scenario in which a female applicant for a construction job was re-
jected based on an "eyeball" test of strength).
402 See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structures of Subordination: Women of Color at the Intersection of
Title VH and the NLRA. Not!, 28 HAuv. C.R.-C.L. L. RFv. 395, 400-01, 401 n.22 (1993) (assert-
ing that "women of color constitute a distinct political subject"); Marder, supra note 168, at
939 n.274 (citing sources that discuss the distinct identity of women of color); cf Fresh-
man, supra note 55, at 1724-26 (discussing stereotypes of gays and lesbians).
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all evidence of generalized discrimination or generalized nondiscrimi-
nation. For example, if a white woman alleges failure to investigate
harassment, a court might be equally inclined to admit evidence of
how a firm investigated allegations of harassment by a white woman
two years ago or by an African-American male one month ago. This
relatively moderate position is more plausible to the extent one be-
lieves that generalized discrimination often motivates discrimination,
but that the atomized theory more often explains discrimination to-
day. Based on this same assumption, courts might be more likely to
admit relatively generalized evidence when better atomized evidence
was not available. When "better" atomized evidence is available,
courts might reason that the "attenuated" generalized evidence would
confuse the jury.40 3
Similarly, if courts see generalized discrimination as a significant
phenomenon, but one which occurs less frequently than generalized
discrimination, they might sequence discovery differently: Courts
might delay discovery of generalized discrimination until after parties
have exhausted discovery of atomized discrimination. Courts, how-
ever, should be careful about drawing such a distinction. Parties may
not be able to fashion their theories and strategies for a case until they
have been able to consider the potential patterns in a broader
number of examples.40 4
4. Should Defendants Face Additional Hurdles?
Regardless of how one resolves the evidentiary questions above,
one might also ask whether employers should face additional hurdles
to admitting evidence of generalized discrimination. 40 5  Plaintiffs
403 This moderate position might be consistent with Judge Calabresi's concurrence in
Hollander, in which he stated that "in appropriate circumstances, evidence of discrimina-
tion against one group of people can support an inference of discrimination against an-
other group," such as when there were only a small number of employees like the plaintiff.
Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 172 F.3d 192, 204 (2d Cir. 1999) (Calabresi, J., con-
curring). However, because Judge Calabresi's very brief concurrence did not address the
various theories of generalized ingroup sympathy and outgroup hostility presented in this
Article, one should be careful not to imply too much from the opinion. Judge Calabresi
might agree that, in at least some circumstances, generalized discrimination exists such
that "different" kinds of discrimination are better understood as different consequences of
the same discrimination.
404 See supra note 396 and accompanying text (discussing how the standard for discov-
ery is broader than the standard for evidence).
405 In earlier work, I suggested that defendants could never admit generalized evi-
dence of nondiscrimination unless and until a plaintiff invoked a theory of generalized
discrimination. See Freshman, supra note 16. Since then, I have revised my views in light of
a more thorough consideration of psychological accounts of discrimination discussed
above, which indicate that generalized discrimination often explains discrimination. I
have also altered my views after consideration of the Supreme Court's decision to recog-
nize a specific affirmative defense based on effective anti-harassment policies. See supra
notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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might argue that courts should exclude evidence of generalized non-
discrimination unless the plaintiff offers such evidence. 40 6 This analysis
may differ depending on whether employers seek to offer evidence as
part of a particular defense, such as evidence of an effective an-
tiharassment policy. Under well-established law, a defendant cannot
rely on evidence of nondiscrimination involving persons other than
the plaintiff as a complete legal defense. For example, an employer
who discriminates against a single African American is liable even if
the proportion of African Americans in the workplace mirrors the
percentage of African Americans in the relevant population.40 7 Re-
cently, however, the Supreme Court explicitly established a specific
defense in one context: If an employer faces charges based on the
harassment that a supervisor committed, it may avoid liability by an
affirmative defense that it had an effective antiharassment policy.408
a. Specific Employer Defenses
When a specific defense is available, a requirement that a plaintiff
initiate the use of evidence of generalized discrimination is hard to
justify. For at least some purposes, evidence of any nondiscrimination
policy may be relatively interchangeable for different plaintiffs. For
example, if an employer wants to establish that employees knew about
an established antiharassment policy with accessible investigators, it
might make sense not to distinguish between employees who knew
that such policies covered sexual harassment rather than racial harass-
ment and employees who were not aware of the distinction; the fact
that employees knew that there was an investigator of harassment or
discrimination claims might be relevant.
On the other hand, the relevance might be less weighty if the
effectiveness of such policies and investigations is an issue. As we have
seen, both legal decisions and legal discourse often track atomized
patterns. Women might believe that their firm investigated com-
plaints by African-American men, but doubt that such investigation
meant that the firm took sexual harassment seriously. Again, how-
ever, a court might accept such distinctions and argue that a jury
could manage them without becoming confused or overwhelmed.
406 By extension, plaintiffs might also bar discovery of generalized nondiscrimination
unless a plaintiff alleges generalized discrimination, seeks such discovery, or intends to
offer such evidence.
407 See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454 (1982); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978). An employer accused of discrimination may offer evidence of a
minority presence in her workforce to help disprove discriminatory motivation. See Waters,
438 U.S. at 580. But "[a] racially balanced work force cannot immunize an employer from
liability for specific acts of discrimination." Id. at 579.
408 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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To the extent an employer relies on generalized nondiscrimina-
tion to defeat a claim for punitive damages, a simpler solution is possi-
ble. In general, courts often bifurcate trials so that information
relevant only to punitive damages does not infect decision making on
other issues. To use the most prominent example, courts typically do
not allowjuries to hear information about a defendant's wealth, which
is irrelevant to liability but highly relevant to the amount of punitive
damages, until after the jury has determined liability. Similarly, courts
might well hold that employers may not offer evidence of generalized
nondiscrimination to limit punitive damages until the punitive dam-
ages phase of a trial.
b. Nonspecific Defenses
When defendants do not invoke the kind of specific defense avail-
able in supervisor harassment cases or punitive damages cases, plain-
tiffs may offer different arguments. For at least two reasons, plaintiffs
might seek to limit defendants' evidence of generalized nondiscrimi-
nation until a plaintiff tries to prove generalized discrimination. First,
the plaintiff might invoke the general fact that modem civil proce-
dure gives plaintiffs the ability to prove their case in a variety of ways.
Courts refer to the plaintiff as the master of her own complaint.40 9 At
common law, a plaintiff had to adopt one factual and legal theory
early in her case; modem procedure allows the plaintiff to prove her
case on multiple theories and to prevail if she can succeed on at least
one theory.410 However, these arguments may also suggest why a de-
fendant should not face any more hurdles to offering evidence of gen-
eralized discrimination than a plaintiff. Plaintiffs already face certain
procedural advantages, so why stack the deck in favor of plaintiffs fur-
ther? In addition, defendants might likewise argue that modem pro-
cedure also lets defendants plead multiple and inconsistent defenses,
such as an employer's claims that (1) a supervisor never made any
racist remarks, (2) if he did, they were too infrequent to constitute
harassment, and (3) if they constituted harassment, the employer
should not be responsible for the supervisor's harassment. Moreover,
when a party tries to show that it made a decision for a nondiscrimina-
tory reason, the range of acceptable reasons is exceptionally wide. 411
409 See, e.g., Powell v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, No. 94G 1113, 1994 WL 130766, at *2
(N.D. IM. Apr. 14, 1994) (holding that a plaintiff could elect to allege a due process viola-
tion under the state constitution and avoid federal question jurisdiction, because "the
party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon" (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citation omitted)).
410 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
411 See, e.g., Marder, supra note 168, at 941 (asserting that prosecutors who "use their
peremptory challenges to remove ... jurors ... could probably offer various seemingly
unrelated reasons").
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The sole remaining argument that plaintiffs might advance is that
the evidentiary scales should be tipped in their favor. Whether a court
tips those scales in one direction or another hinges on both empirical
and philosophical questions. The empirical question depends on a
court's overall judgment of whether the existing set of antidiscrimina-
tion laws falsely labels innocent persons as discriminatory more fre-
quently than it falsely exonerates discriminators. 412 Experts disagree
about this question.413 The conclusion that existing law seriously un-
derestimates discrimination might be a reason to prevent employers
from offering evidence of generalized discrimination when the plain-
tiff has not alleged generalized discrimination. 414 The philosophical
question is whether a false label of discrimination produces more dis-
utility than a false label of nondiscrimination, which leaves a genuine
victim of discrimination without relief. As with any comparison of util-
ity between persons, disagreement on this question exists as well.4 15
The question also depends on philosophical debates about the
degree to which employers and housing owners have a type of prop-
erty right to make business decisions as compared to the degree to
which employees have the right to be free from discrimination.416 Ul-
timately, the question of whether defendants face an additional hur-
dle in using evidence of generalized discrimination turns in large part
on a separate and more general debate about the nature of antidis-
crimination law. The question does not go to the heart of the theoret-
ical argument about the value of recognizing generalized
discrimination and its use in the courts, other dispute resolution de-
vices, and studies of bias. As a practical matter, however, courts and
412 In statistical language, this distinction corresponds to the question of Type I and
Type II errors. See, e.g., Gulp, supra note 47, at 242-43.
413 Compare id. at 242-46 (stating that current antidiscrimination law is overly biased
against victims), and Krieger, supra note 68 (suggesting the same), with Malamud, supra
note 67, at 2254 (acknowledging that "wrongful . . . employer actions are significant
problems in the American workplace," but cautioning that it is impossible to fix the exact
share of employer decisions that are wrongful).
414 On the other hand, employers might question why the scales should be balanced
by imposing an evidentiary disadvantage on this particular kind of question. In principle, a
particular employer who wants to introduce evidence of generalized discrimination might
argue that any overall underenforcement of discrimination claims should be remedied by
adjusting some other principle. For example, one might tip the scales in favor of plaintiffs
by expanding the reach of effects tests. In a sense, this employer would be like any eco-
nomic actor who would resist paying a particular tax regardless of the benefit, on the
ground that some general tax-and-transfer scheme should remedy the problem.
415 The question of whether one may compare very different goods on a single scale of
utility has produced a large literature on incommensurability. See, e.g., Charles Taylor,
Leading a Life, in INCOMMENSURABILrrY, INcOMPARABILrrY, AND PRACnCAL REASON 170, 182
(Ruth Chang ed., 1997) (describing the problem as one "where people make decisions
between rather different goods").
416 Compare EPSrEIN, supra note 151, at 32-41 (emphasizing employers' rights), with
Kelman, supra note 289, at 1243-45 (emphasizing employees' right to be free from
discrimination).
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commentators may be more likely to accept evidence of generalized
discrimination if evidence of generalized discrimination and evidence
of generalized nondiscrimination seem to be treated in superficially
neutral ways, even if the considerations discussed above would sup-
port limiting employers' ability to initiate the use of evidence of gen-
eralized nondiscrimination.
5. Disparate Impact Analysis
The same arguments outlined above about the admission of rele-
vant acts of prior discrimination also track arguments about disparate
impact. In one sense, when we ask how to define the relevant group
as being advantaged or disadvantaged by a particular practice in a dis-
parate impact case, we are considering the same questions about the
plausibility of different mixes of generalized and atomized discrimina-
tion discussed earlier. Just as courts limit evidence about individuals
according to job category and location, courts consider such factors
when examining statistical evidence. 417 The more strongly we believe
that a larger share of discrimination tracks generalized patterns, the
more we are willing to allow statistical analyses that compare, for ex-
ample, the effects of general-ability job testing on white males versus
all others, rather than merely whites versus African Americans or
whites versus Latina/os. If we are more skeptical of the existing
amount of generalized discrimination, then we may allow such gener-
alized statistical comparisons only if we find that a better analysis using
atomized patterns does not exist; if an atomized group contains too
few members to make statistically significant comparisons, then we will
more likely look at the statistics involving generalized groups. 418 Be-
tween these extremes, we may use the relatively atomized or genera-
417 See, e.g., Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1563 (Ith Cir. 1997) (ruling that nation-
wide statistics were not probative of what happened at a specific location); EEOC v. Texas
Instruments Inc., 100 F.3d 1173, 1185 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The probative value of statistical
evidence ultimately depends on all the surrounding facts, circumstances, and other evi-
dence of discrimination."); cf Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d 119, 124 (5th Cir.
1992) ("Particularly in age discrimination cases where innumerable groupings of employ-
ees are possible according to ages and divisions within the corporate structure, statistics are
easily manipulated and may be deceptive.").
418 There also exists an argument that disparate impact analysis should use generalized
discrimination more. To the extent that disparate impact analysis, like strict scrutiny analy-
sis in constitutional law, is a means by which we arrive at the conclusion of intentional
discrimination, the arguments indeed parallel the disparate treatment analysis above. But
if courts apply disparate impact analysis to some inequality that might not result from in-
tentional discrimination, courts should be even more willing to use generalized discrimina-
tion in disparate impact cases. This conclusion is ambiguous under current law and legal
theory. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) ("[G]ood intent or
absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to
measuringjob capability."), with Malamud, supra note 67, at 2324 (claiming that the legiti-
macy and meaning of disparate impact evidence are not beyond challenge).
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lized nature of discrimination as one factor in our case, just as courts
now use factors like time, job type, and job location.
B. Generalized Discrimination and "Alternative" Dispute
Resolution
Our discussion thus far has emphasized how courts should treat
theories of discrimination and relevant evidence, but we must also ad-
dress how other dispute resolution processes should treat such evi-
dence. We need to discuss other processes not merely because other
processes have value or because other processes in general occur in
many cases; rather, alternative processes are particularly significant in
the employment discrimination context.419 Many firms include arbi-
tration clauses in their employment agreements; however, the issue of
exactly when courts will enforce those agreements has split the circuits
in ways that the Supreme Court has yet to resolve.420 Additionally, the
419 In general, only a small percentage of disputes end up in court. The proportion is
even smaller for discrimination claims than for tort claims. See Richard E. Miller & Austin
Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 L. & Soc'v REV. 525,
537 tbl.2 (1980-1981); see also id. at 561 ("Discrimination problems generate an unusually
low number of claims... ."). Of those cases filed in court, only a very small percentage are
resolved by trial. SeeJOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTrION 218 (2d ed.
1996) ("Almost 95% of the cases filed in court are terminated before a full trial and judg-
ment."). Decisions short of a verdict, however, do affect a substantial number of cases. See
id, (noting that courts dismiss about one-third of cases on a motion to dismiss or a motion
for summary judgment); Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996J. Disp.
RESOL. 1, 9 n.21 ("Empirical research shows that in approximately one-third of the cases
that settle, settlement comes after a definitive ruling of some type by the court (typically on
pretrial motions)."). Overall, so few discrimination claims ever reach the courtroom, and
so few get resolved by ajudge orjury, that to describe other dispute resolution mechanisms
as alternatives is somewhat of a misnomer. Moreover, many discrimination claims are dis-
missed on summaryjudgment. See Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396
(7th Cir. 1997) (citing ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS: REPORT OF THE DiREcroR-1995, at 163 (1995)). See generally
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts Among
Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1871 (1997) (referring to ADR as "'appropriate'
dispute resolution" and surveying new disputes arising out of the ADR context).
420 The major unresolved split is whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-16 (1994), requires arbitration of contracts involving employment. The plain lan-
guage of sections 1 and 2 of the Act seems to exclude all employment contracts. See id. § 1
(stating that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce"). The majority of circuits, however, have concluded that this clear language does
not exclude arbitration of employment contracts from the strong federal policy in favor of
enforcing arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465,
1467 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("We agree with the District Court that section 1 of the FAA does not
exclude all contracts of employment from the coverage of the FAA."); Asplundh Tree Ex-
pert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 602 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that a consultant's employment
agreement did not fall within the scope of the FAA's exclusionary clause). The Supreme
Court has expressly refused to consider this question, and in the one case raising the issue,
it took the position that the contract at issue was not an employment contract, because the
arbitration provision was contained in the employee's registration with securities regula-
tors. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991). The ques-
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Clinton Administration has emphasized other forms of ADR, includ-
ing mediation, as a primary device for the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) to use in handling discrimination
claims. 42 '
In arbitration, theories of discrimination have an even greater im-
pact than they do in court both for procedural reasons and, less
clearly, for substantive reasons. As a procedural matter, arbitrators
need not follow evidentiary rules and tend to admit evidence "for
what it is worth. '422 As a substantive matter, at least to the extent that
ion therefore remains unresolved. SeeJOHN T. DuNLop & ARNOLD M. ZAcK, MEDiArTION
AND ARBITRATION OF EMPLOymENT DisprTms 68-69 (1997) (noting that questions remain
about when courts will enforce agreements to arbitrate employment disputes). The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) opposes arbitration as a condition of em-
ployment, and it has argued in policy statements and in court that such agreements are not
enforceable. See EEOC, Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Dis-
crimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment (July 10, 1997) <http://www.eeoc.gov/
docs/mandarb.txt>.
Whether the FAA excludes employment contracts has significant consequences. If the
FAA does not compel arbitration, state laws on the enforceability of such contracts would
apply, and many states might not enforce such agreements. See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482
U.S. 483, 493 (1987) (holding that the FAA preempts a California law prohibiting arbitra-
tion of claims for wages). But see Cole, 105 F.3d at 1472 (assuming that state courts would
enforce arbitration agreements in employment disputes even if the FAA would not require
them to do so).
421 See supra text accompanying note 65.
422 See, e.g., 3 IAN R. MAcMEn. ET AI.., FEDERAL ARBITRATION L xW § 35.1.2.1, at 35:5
(1999) ("[N]either the Federal Rules of Evidence nor other judicial evidentiary rules as
such govern arbitrators, unless the parties so agree. Generally, arbitrators are bound only
by their own concept of relevancy."). An arbitrator's tendency to admit more evidence
than courts follows in part from the incentives that the FAA provides. See United States
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994). Under the FAA, courts may refuse to enforce
arbitration awards only in certain, very narrow circumstances. See id. §§ 10-12. One such
circumstance is when arbitrators refuse to admit relevant evidence. See id. § 10(a) (3) (al-
lowing courts to vacate awards "where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct... in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy"). Courts interpreting
this language in reported decisions have given arbitrators considerable leeway before set-
ting aside arbitration awards. See, e.g., Marshall & Co. v. Duke, 941 F. Supp. 1207, 1211
(N.D. Ga. 1995). Nevertheless, arbitration training materials frequently emphasize the in-
terest in avoiding the risk of having an award set aside by encouraging arbitrators to admit
evidence for what it is worth. See, e.g., In reRohr Indus. Inc., 93 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 145,
156-57 (1989) (Goulet, Arb.) ("As the advocates for both sides in a labor arbitration often
are not lawyers, the arbitrator must give them wide latitude in making their cases. So this
arbitrator, like many others, will permit almost anything presented at the hearing to be
admitted 'for what it is worth.'"); Marvin F. Hill, Jr. & Tammy M. Westhoff, "I'll Take It for
What It Is Worth"-The Use of Hearsay Evidence by Labor Arbitrators: A Primer and Modest Propo-
sa 1998J. DIsP. RESOL. 1, 9 ("There is no altruism in this; an arbitrator who adopts more
restrictive standards runs a higher risk of being overturned by a reviewing court." (quoting
an arbitrator) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Videotape: Managing the Arbitration
Process (American Arbitration Association 1993) (on file with author) (suggesting that
arbitrators admit evidence for "what it is worth"). But see MARVIN F. HILL, JR. & AnmoN V.
SiNicRopi, EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION 3-5 (2d ed. 1987) (recognizing the rationale of limit-
ing evidence by rules of "fairness and due process"). In the long term, no arbitrator re-
ceives future arbitration assignments in this manner. An overturned award means the
parties have to pay for the whole arbitration again, including the arbitrator's fees.
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discrimination claims are contractual, arbitrators may fashion their
understanding of the law by applying the "common law of the
shop."423 More recently, courts and others have suspected that arbi-
trators may do this in discrimination claims based on statutes. The
Supreme Court has stated emphatically that, to the extent arbitrators
are permitted to consider statutory employment discrimination
claims, they must try to apply the same legal principles that the courts
apply.4 24 Nevertheless, arbitrators may have some de facto leeway in
this area because of the lax standards courts have generally applied to
arbitration awards before confirming them as judgments. Therefore,
an arbitrator may be so insulated from effective review that different
arbitrators may apply different legal principles. 425
In mediation, judging the consequences of evidence of genera-
lized discrimination is more difficult for several reasons. In its purer
forms, mediation involves a neutral mediator who facilitates an agree-
ment between the parties; the mediator lets the parties raise any facts
they desire. 426 Because these issues need not concern legal remedies
423 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)
("The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his knowl-
edge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to
bear considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment.").
Some commentators believe that arbitrators may attempt to make substantive law even
outside the context of labor law. See Freshman, supra note 55, at 1706-08, 1750-57 (offering
examples of privatizing family law through ADR to reflect the substantive principles of
various communities, including Jews, Muslims, lesbians, gays, and bisexuals); Stephen J.
Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L.
REV. 703, 707-27 (1999).
424 See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391, 396 (1998) (stating
that if a statutory question is submitted to arbitration, then "the ultimate question for the
arbitrator would be not what the parties have agreed to, but what federal law requires").
425 The exact degree to which arbitrators may differ from judges and juries in employ-
ment discrimination cases is currently evolving. Two recent decisions by the D.C. Circuit
and the Second Circuit suggest that arbitration awards will be subject to more searching
review when allegations of employment discrimination arise. See Halligan v. PiperJaffray,
Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998) (reversing an arbitration panel's finding of no age
discrimination based in part on the failure of arbitrators to provide a written explanation
of their decision, even though arbitrators typically do not provide such a written opinion),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1286 (1999); Cole; 105 F.3d at 1487 (stating that courts must deter-
mine that arbitrators used the correct legal standard, although courts need not review
factual determinations). Additionally, securities regulators have recently amended their
rules to state that employees of securities firms may take their statutory discrimination
claims to court. See Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims, SEC Release No. 34-40109, File No. SR-
NASD-97-77 (June 22, 1998).
426 See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUcH BUSH &JosEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION
104-08 (1994) (noting that mediators must let parties play an active role in mediation and
not limit the range of discussion); Freshman, supra note 55, at 1732-34 (arguing that
mediators in principle should let parties decide cases according to the parties' own values,
but in practice often play a more directive role).
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or legal outcomes, 42 7 such as the request for an apology that a court
would never order,4 28 the mediator need not make evidentiary rulings
at all. According to many academic theories of mediation and a great
deal of training materials, parties may readily discuss evidence of gen-
eralized discrimination, nondiscrimination, or any other topic with
which they are concerned at the time.429 In practice, however,
mediators often set the topics for discussion and decide when to move
negotiations along.43 0 Therefore, mediators must often consider
whether to allow discussion of evidence of generalized discrimination
or simply to move the process along.
Whether evidence of generalized discrimination will have an im-
pact on settlement is a more complicated question. Many predict that
settlement in mediation largely reflects an estimation of what courts
themselves would do.43 1 To the extent that this theory is accurate,
427 For example, in some states, mediators discuss the law at the risk of losing their
court certification as mediators; without certification, individuals are not eligible for ap-
pointment by courts as mediators. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False
Dichotomies: The Need for Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator's Role 24 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 949, 960-70 (1997) (describing Florida statute). I earlier criticized the way that
many mediators pay too much attention to legal values and too little attention to other
values, such as community values that the parties may find meaningful. See Freshman,
supra note 55, at 1732-42.
428 Negotiation scholars often discuss the way that parties in negotiation may reach
win-win or integrative solutions that better serve both parties' needs than what a court
might order as a remedy. See generally ROGER FISHER & WIuLAM URY, GETFING TO YES (2d
ed. 1991) (discussing how parties may reach agreements that meet both parties' interests);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View ofLegal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solv-
ing, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754 (1984) (discussing how parties may reach solutions in negotia-
tion that better meet both parties' needs). Exactly how often such solutions are possible is
a controversial question. Compare Menkel-Meadow, supra, at 794 (arguing that problem-
solving negotiation focuses on solutions rather than strategy), with Gerald B. Wetlaufer,
The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 85 GEO. L.J. 369, 369-72 (1996) (arguing that many
negotiations end with one party winning at the expense of another).
429 See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 426, at 2 (positing that individuals may develop
moral growth" through mediation).
430 A leading study of various mediators concludes that, in practice, mediators play a
much more active role than theories of mediation and training materials for mediators
might suggest:
[W]e turn the spotlight on the mediators as the pivotal players. Mediators
are not passive participants in any sense. Rather they actively construct the
ways a dispute will be handled .... They participate in the definition of the
problem, choreograph the agenda and meetings, [and] exercise control
over communication and information ....
Deborah M. Kolb, Preface to WHEN TALK WoRs: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS at xiv (Jeffrey Z.
Rubin ed., 1994); see also MARJORIE CoRMAN AARON, EVALUATION IN MEDIATION IN DWIGHT
GoLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DispuTEs 267, 270 (1996) (recognizing that even mainstream
mediation theorists say that mediators may engage in "reality-testing" and "asking difficult
questions").
431 See AusrN SARAT & WILIAM L.F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS
126 (1995) (noting that if lawyers can predict what courts will do, it "relieves both lawyer
and client of the moral responsibility for figuring out what is fair and of communicating
that in a persuasive way to the other side"); Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43
424 [Vol. 85:313
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generalized discrimination will have significance in mediation only if
it would affect the outcome in court. On the other hand, others rec-
ognize that while a court's hypothetical behavior is an important influ-
ence on settlement in mediation, it is not the only determinant. At
least in theory, parties might settle in mediation based instead on a
sense of the wrongness of their conduct, even if the evidence of that
wrongness would not be admissible in court. Employers, for example,
may settle based on how their clients might react. Thus, for several
reasons, parties may settle in mediation based on evidence of genera-
lized discrimination even if courts might not admit that evidence. 43 2
Similarly, theories of discrimination may matter to equal employ-
ment officers and investigators on behalf of organizations to varying
degrees. Like mediators, various in-house investigators of discrimina-
tion follow a variety of practices. Because few formal rules and influ-
ential professional organizations exist for such investigators, 433 they
may enjoy a broader discretion to use evidence of generalized discrim-
ination. For example, some investigators at one extreme see their
role as tracking the liability that a court would impose. 43 4 Other inves-
tigators do not track the law exclusively; they instead view nondiscrimi-
nation and diversity as valuable in themselves in the sense that diverse
employees may both better predict the tastes and more adequately
service the needs of a diverse customer base.435 Still other investiga-
tors may seek to be advocates for minorities and rely on theories of
discrimination, such as an emphasis on proportional representation
of minorities, that courts may not use.43 6 Those sincerely concerned
with identifying discrimination will find concepts of generalized dis-
crimination helpful even if courts would not admit evidence of gener-
alized discrimination.
Finally, although we often see dispute resolution as the resolution
of individual disputes between parties, we may also view studies of bias
by the bar, the judiciary, and the legislature as other kinds of preven-
tive dispute resolution. In many jurisdictions, courts and bar associa-
OHIO ST. LJ. 29, 35 (1982) (arguing that parties may base "their judgments during media-
tion upon inaccurate assumptions about what result would follow from adversary process-
ing"); Susan S. Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAw & PoL'y 7, 13
(1986) ("When parties resist settling, mediators often make statements about the parties'
alternatives. Since most cases were referred by the court, it is the logical alternative to a
mediation settlement.").
432 Cf Freshman, supra note 55, at 1736 (arguing that parties might settle based partly
on what members of some community they value would do).
433 See, e.g., Edelman et al., supra note 64, at 78.
434 See id. at 89 (discussing the professional who seeks to remain neutral and to not
advocate for either management or employees); id. at 89-90 (describing the duties of the
technician, who merely gathers required data).
435 See, e.g., David A. Thomas & Robin J. Ely, Making Differences Matter. A New Paradigm
for Managing Diversity, H1A{v. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 79, 79-80.
436 See Edelman et al., supra note 64, at 80-82.
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tions have tried to study the origin of bias in the legal profession.
With tiny exceptions, these studies have followed a profoundly atom-
ized framework: Some committees study gender bias,437 others study
race bias, 438 and still others study sexual orientation bias.43 9 Few even
acknowledge how subatomized groups, such as women of color, may
face greater or more complicated burdens.440 The studies have also
suffered from a lack of attention to the role of generalized discrimina-
tion. For example, a Texas study on gender discrimination referred
to the difficulty women face because of an "'old boy' network."441
Generalized discrimination would allow us to consider how this type
of network affects not only women, but also all those individuals
outside that rather small ingroup.
Generalized discrimination may shed light on similar enterprises
by the Legislature and the Executive. The congressionally mandated
study on "the glass ceiling" expanded its focus beyond women, but
might have expanded the focus further had it applied the concepts of
generalized ingroup sympathy and outgroup hostility.442 Similarly, by
applying these concepts, President Clinton's advisory board on race
might have focused less intensely on African Americans or race dis-
crimination, and more broadly on generalized discrimination. 443
V
THE PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF ATOMIZED DIsCiIInNATON: BARRiEPs
TO SEEING GENERALIZED DISCRIIINATION AND BROAD "COALITONS"
This Article has thus far led us to a riddle: If a greater focus on
generalized discrimination would potentially help litigants (some-
times plaintiffs and sometimes defendants) in a significant number of
cases, and if it is consistent with an overlapping consensus in the social
437 See, e.g., Procter Hug, Jr. et al., Ninth Circuit: The Gender Bias Task Force 32 U. RIcn.
L. REv. 735 (1998).
438 See, e.g.,Judith Resnik, Gender Matters, Race Matters, 14 N.Y.L. ScH.J. HUM. RTS. 219,
222 (1997) (studies considering race or gender bias but not the combination or other
forms of bias).
439 See, e.g., AD Hoc Comm. ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION BIAS, Los ANGELES CotmNv BIA
AsS'N, THE LOS ANGELES CouNTv BAR ASSOCIATION REPORT ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION BIAS,
reprinted in 4 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 295 (1995).
440 SeeJudith Resnik, Asking About Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS 952, 974-75 (1996) (argu-
ing that studies have largely ignored the way that discrimination may affect groups at the
intersection of various categories, such as African-American women).
441 Wayne N. Outten & Jack A. Raisner, "Glass Ceiling" Lawsuits Threaten "Old Bay" Net-
work, EMPLOYMENT L. STRATEGIST, Nov. 1996, at 1, 1.
442 See, e.g., FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMM'N, supra note 101 (reporting the results of
research revealing artificial barriers to the advancement of minorities and women in the
private sector).
443 See, e.g., Editorial, Race Panel's Lost Chance, L.A. TimEs, Sept. 21, 1998, at B4 (criticiz-
ing "President Clinton's race initiative"); Michael A. Fletcher, Clinton Gets Race Report, Re-
jects Criticim, WA SH. PosT, Sept. 19, 1998, at A8 (describing criticism of the report by
President Clinton's advisory board on race from civil rights activists and others).
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sciences, then why is more attention not given to generalized discrimi-
nation? Of course, the ease with which generalized discrimination
could help parties in particular cases should not be exaggerated, be-
cause some practical limitations may exist.4-" In addition, in particu-
lar scenarios or institutions, the best explanation for discrimination
may be the hostile attitudes of one historic outgroup, such as Koreans,
toward another historic outgroup, such as African Americans. Never-
theless, a startling gap still remains between the significant role gener-
alized discrimination might play in courts, arbitrations, mediations,
investigations of discrimination in many cases, and our national con-
versations about racism, on the one hand, and the highly atomized
nature of those practices, on the other hand. This riddle also raises
more general questions about how individuals come to understand
whom they care about: their sense of identity, empathy, and coalition.
Why do we label discrimination affecting us as, say, race discrimina-
tion rather than as a byproduct of some historic ingroup sympathy
that holds back individuals outside a narrow group?
One way to think about this riddle is to look to barriers to seeing
generalized discrimination and barriers to empathy and coalition. In
looking to such barriers, this Article borrows from scholars of negotia-
tion who often ask why individuals do not reach agreements, particu-
larly settlements in litigation.445 That search makes sense for two
reasons: First, most cases settle out of court, raising questions about
the minority of cases that do not.44 6 Because atomized discrimination
is the usual discourse in law and society generally, that question makes
less sense here. Second, negotiation scholars also look to barriers to
agreement because of a presumption that agreement, rather than liti-
gation, will often lead to better outcomes-outcomes that make both
parties better off than the likely court outcome.447 That rationale
does apply here, because greater attention to generalized discrimina-
tion may have both valuable proof effects and coalition effects.
This Part explores several kinds of barriers. First, it explores bar-
riers that may simply be cognitive phenomena, largely bad habits that
become entrenched habits and prisms (and prisons) for viewing the
world. These barriers apply to both clients and lawyers. Second, it
explores the use and limits of rational-choice models of barriers to
seeing generalized discrimination.
444 See supra Part 1I.C.2.
445 See, e.g., BARRIERS TO CoNrar RESOLUTION (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995);
Samuel R_ Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the
Selection of Cases for Tria 90 MICH. L. REv. 319 (1991). But cf. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error.
Transforming the Practice of Judging and Federal Judicial Power (Oct. 1999) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author).
446 See Gross & Syverud, supra note 445, at 320.
447 See supra note 428.
20001 427
HeinOnline  -- 85 Cornell L. Rev. 427 1999-2000
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
A. Cognitive Barriers
1. Client Barriers
Clients think about why discrimination occurred; they will think
about atomized discrimination for two kinds of reasons: First, like all
of us, they live in a society in which the metanarratives448 of discrimi-
nation-from media discussions to many civil rights organizations to
presidential commissions on race-reinforce the idea that discrimina-
tion is atomized. All metanarratives convey the assumption that dis-
crimination occurs against particular groups. Periodic exceptions to
the rule exist, of course, such as discussions of "rainbow coalitions" or
the more generalized discussions of race that generally contrast peo-
ple of color with whites, rather than specifically contrasting African
Americans with whites. Second, individuals also make assumptions
about solidarity with a single identity: They must think of themselves
for all purposes as African American, as women, or as disabled, rather
than imagining different kinds of identities for different purposes.449
Indeed, to speak of different loyalties other than a single loyalty may
seem traitorous.450 Both reasons reveal why clients might want to tell
lawyers that they suffered discrimination on some atomized basis; like-
wise, both explanations suggest why clients might not volunteer exam-
ples of generalized discrimination to lawyers, even when such
examples could bolster their case.
2. Lawyer Barriers
Lawyers also face at least some of the same cognitive barriers that
clients face. Like clients, lawyers live in a world that constantly sup-
plies images of atomized discrimination. And lawyers may face some
of the same loyalties to atomized communities that individuals do.
Out of a sense of automatic empathy with the client's world view,
some lawyers driven by incentives to maximize income may absorb cli-
448 For a discussion of metanarratives, see supra note 173.
449 That critical scholars so frequently protest to the contrary is a testimony to the
pervasive nature of this assumption. See, e.g., FRNEMAN, supra note 178, at 54; Freshman,
supra note 52, at 103 (arguing that "It]he fantastical story and the everyday tale-the
metanarrative of the sexual family-present a world of cramped choices" and that "[w]e
may surrender the whole of our life-alone, forgoing even the romantic loves of our life-
or we must separate, fleeing to a distant land or sending our parents to a distancing institu-
tion"); Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Unbearable Lightness of Identity, 2 ArR.-Asi. L. & POL'Y
REP. 207, 212 (1995) ("[I~dentities are always fluid, dynamic, and multiple... .");James M.
Jones, Psychological Knowledge and the New American Dilemma of Race, 54 J. Soc. IssuFs 641,
656 (1998) ("By accommodating the possibilities for multiple simultaneous group identi-
ties, one does not have to barter one's racial identity for the instrumental value of a larger
social identity.").
450 See Freshman, supra note 52, at 119 (arguing that to imagine invoking one's iden-
tity as a child of an older parent rather than solely as a spouse may seem disloyal to the
spouse); infra Part V.B.2.b.
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ent loyalties to atomized communities and the assumption that such
loyalties must be total for all situations. Other lawyers may make a
more strategic decision not to challenge such world views on the often
automatic assumption that such challenges may alienate a client and
cost potential business.451 Others may make a more self-conscious
and principled argument that lawyers should not challenge claims by
relatively disadvantaged persons who bring discrimination claims, be-
cause lawyers may violate client autonomy by overwhelming these per-
sons' choices about their own values.452
Lawyers, however, also face another set of cognitive barriers, be-
cause they are experts trained and socialized by legal education. Law
school pervasively teaches lawyers about atomized discrimination.
First, the largest exposure to discrimination occurs in required
courses in constitutional law. These courses teach students about dif-
ferent levels of scrutiny for different kinds of classifications. 453 This
structure may make much sense in teaching how the majority of the
Supreme Court has considered equal protection cases. Law schools
want lawyers to know that making a constitutional claim of discrimina-
tion based on a racial classification subject to strict scrutiny454 may be
much easier than making a claim of discrimination based on an age
classification that is subject only to minimal rationality review. 455
Likewise, at a more profound level, some commentators would
defend the classification on the merits as a reasonable response to the
"problem" ofjudicial review that so preoccupied legal scholars in the
wake of Lochner v. New York.456 Many commentators found the notion
of judicial review troubling and took comfort in the idea that review
would be confined to isolated cases rather than a regular practice of
second guessing a democratically elected legislature. 457 To these com-
mentators, thinking of discrete and insular minorities458 as politically
powerless was easier. Of course, in principle, one might argue that
the view that various sets of individuals are powerless because they
themselves see no solidarity with other discrete and insular minorities
451 Cf Clark Freshman, Is There a Market for Autonomy. Arbitration and Barriers to
Informed Consent 6-7 (Apr. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing
that lawyers have little incentive to discuss how clients might customize arbitration).
452 See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of
Client Narrative 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival
Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Burr. L. Rxv. 1 (1990).
453 See Freshman, supra note 16, at 247-48.
454 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
455 See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976).
456 198 U.S. 45 (1905). On the "problem" of judicial review, see, for example, ELY,
supra note 44, at 14 (referring to the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as "the
clause to which the Court has tended to refer to 'support' its sporadic ventures into across-
the-board substantive review of legislative action").
457 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 44, passim.
458 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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is not inconsistent with the view that discrimination that disadvantages
many such outgroups may occur.45 9 Nevertheless, as a cognitive phe-
nomenon, the emphasis on different kinds of discrimination in re-
quired law classes and required introductions to theories of judicial
review makes it easy for lawyers to fall into the habit of only seeing
atomized discrimination.
This kind of habitual and automatic tunnel vision is consistent
with recent cognitive psychology and economic theory. Both show
how experts may get stuck in certain patterns of viewing the world
even when such patterns are not rational in an individual case. Cogni-
tive psychology that models expert decision making, such as decision
making by experienced lawyers, suggests that these experts often
make strategic decisions by recalling a similar previous pattern; this
kind of decision-making process often saves time, but it leaves open
the possibility that lawyers will recall a pattern without considering
more effective alternatives. 460 Two economic theories point to a simi-
lar direction. The theory of bounded rationality suggests that individ-
uals do not carefully weigh the costs and benefits of many different
strategic alternatives as decision analysis might suggest, but instead
make automatic decisions by comparing in a gestalt way with previous
similar decisions.46' Similarly, path-dependence theories suggest that
459 Lusky, however, usefully reminds us that even a numerical majority may be
powerless:
The minorities problem springs from the existence of fairly well defined
"out-groups" disliked by those who control the political and other organs of
power in society. Such dislike arises not because the members of the
groups have done or threatened acts harmful to the community, but be-
cause membership in the group is itself considered a cause for distrust or
even hostility. These unpopular groups are often called "minorities," and
the dominant group "the majority"; and for the sake of convenience that
terminology is followed here, even though the "minority" can be and some-
times is a numerical majority.
Louis Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interes 52 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1942).
460 See Gary L. Blasi, What Lartyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the
Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 347-48 (1995).
461 Consider one recent description of bounded rationality:
In the literature on evolutionary game theory, players do not explicitly de-
liberate; rather, each player's action is determined by an automatic behav-
ioral rule that may change over time as a result of evolutionary forces. The
theory explores the implications of such automatic behavior and relates the
outcomes to those that emerge under conventional game-theoretic solution
concepts.
MartinJ. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, Games with Procedurally Rational Players, 88 AM. ECON.
REv. 834, 837 (1998). At least since Gary Becker, this phenomenon has been treated as
rational because of the cost of obtaining and processing information:
The making of decisions is costly, and not simply because it is an activity
which some people find unpleasant. In order to make a decision one re-
quires information, and the information must be analyzed. The costs of
searching for information and of applying the information to a new situa-
tion are such that habit is often a more efficient way to deal with moderate
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once a particular practice, such as a particular kind of corporate gov-
ernance or a particular way of gathering evidence in discrimination
claims, is established, that practice will become entrenched over
time.4 62 This applies even when there might originally have been
many other effective practices and even though, over time, changes
may make the original choice of practices less desirable. 463
B. Strategic and "Rational" Barriers
1. Material and Psychic Reparations and Rational Choice
One large barrier to using generalized discrimination is a set of
phenomena that I group as reparations logic. Reparations logic in-
cludes claims for resources today that are based upon evidence that
individuals are members of groups that were harmed in the past.4 64
From the logic of that kind of claim, rational-choice theory would pre-
dict that an individual will want to make the group look smaller and
more like him. The smaller the group, the fewer the ways in which
reparations need to be split.465 If the group is more like him, then he
has a greater chance of qualifying as a member of the group and
or temporary changes in the environment than would be a full, apparently
utility-maximizing decision.
GeorgeJ. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 Am. EcoN. REV. 76,
82 (1977). Although this explanation has considerable appeal, it neglects the possibility
that an individual obtains utility from the confidence that his decision reflects the best
choice and from the satisfaction that he has exercised deliberative judgment or deep au-
tonomy in making this decision. See Freshman, supra note 55, at 1764-66; Freshman, supra
note 451, at 4-5.
462 SeeJack Knight & Douglass North, Explaining Economic Change: The Interplay Between
Cognition and Institutions, 3 LEA.. THEORY 211 (1997). Knight and North argued:
Explanations of economic performance should place primary emphasis on
social context as opposed to failures of individual cognition or rationality.
The important point to note here is that this should be the priority not only
in the cases in which the institutional framework is the central feature of
the explanation, but also in those instances in which cognition and beliefs
are the primary source of explanation.
Id. at 224.
463 See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLuM. L. REv.
1253, 1281 (1999) (noting that corporate governance patterns may be inefficient, because
they were adopted in the past, and that there are inadequate incentives to change them);
Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HLv. L. REv. 641, 643-44
(1996) (arguing that "[today's road, dependent on the path taken" in the past, may be
kept even if it would not be chosen today).
464 Reparations arguments may be appealing, because ingroups today recognize past
injustices. See Mahoney, supra note 132, at 26 ("Reparations-oriented... justifications for
affirmative action fit well with positioned white perception .... [R]acism is something a
second party does to a third party."). Reparations arguments also may seem appealing
because they suggest that forgiveness can simply be purchased like any other commodity.
See MARTHA MINOw, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENO-
CIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 131 (1998) ("[R]eparations elevate things over persons, commod-
ities over lives, money over dignity.").
465 See generally Minow, supra note 464, at 132 (describing how Eric Yamamoto argued
that reparations may often "perpetuate or deepen social divisions").
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thereby of making a claim for compensation. As we will see next, this
reparations logic covers not just a narrow sense of reparations, such as
monetary payments, but a far broader range encompassing both mate-
rial reparations and psychic reparations.
a. Material Reparations
Material-reparations claims refer broadly to backward-looking jus-
tice claims for tangible goods. Material reparations include the actual
payments to Japanese Americans interned during World War II, pay-
ments to Israel by Germany for the Nazi Holocaust, and proposed pay-
ments to the descendents of slaves.466  Probabalistic material
reparations refer to programs that do not guarantee payments to par-
ticular individuals, but rather increase the chances of material bene-
fits. One example is affirmative action; one rationale for affirmative
action is that members of a particular group suffered discrimination
in the past that justifies some compensatory preference for members
of that group today.467
b. Psychic Reparations
Psychic-reparations claims include claims based on past injustice,
but not made on any particular material resources. The best example
of this kind of claim is reflected in a vignette describing the experi-
ence of an African-American woman, Trina Grillo, who received can-
cer treatment in a hospital.468 In the vignette, Grillo recalled
vomiting from chemotherapy for the cancer that would eventually
take her life; a nurse told her that she "understood" because she once
had morning sickness from a pregnancy.469 The implication is that
comparing racism to other "isms," like sexism, is like comparing the
tragedy of cancer to the relative inconvenience of pregnancy; the for-
mer marks the end of life and the latter often heralds the beginning
of a new one.470
In national discourse more generally, we glimpsed a similar kind
of psychic-reparations mentality in the hostility of some471 prominent
466 See, e.g., id. at 91-117 (describing various efforts to get reparations); Eric K. Yama-
moto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibility and InterracialJustice, 3 AsIAN PAC. Am. LJ.
33, 39 (1995) (discussing reparations by Asian-American churches to natives of Hawaii).
467 See supra Part ll.C.1 (discussing current litigation of affirmative action cases).
468 See Grillo & Wildman, supra note 54, at 397.
469 Id. at 408 n.36.
470 A former student of mine once noted that cancer patients might be offended by
Grillo's assertion that the pain inflicted by racism is as bad as the pain suffered by a cancer
patient receiving chemotherapy treatment.
471 "Some" is a key qualifier, because Archbishop Desmond Tutu recently said while
visiting the United States that he saw treatment of lesbians and gays as a major civil rights
problem. See Karen Lee Ziner, Brown University Public Affairs Conference Overflow Crowd Hears
NobelLaureate, PROVIDENCEJ., Feb. 22, 1999, atAl, available in 1999 WL 7330170 (reporting
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African Americans to the use of the repeal of the military's exclusion
of African Americans as a rationale for the repeal of exclusions of
those deemed by the military to be lesbian, gay, or bisexual. 472 Simi-
larly, various attacks by certain extreme Jewish groups on recognizing
non-Jewish victims of the Nazi Holocaust also reflect an appeal of
psychic reparations. 473 One might also glimpse some form of psychic
reparations in the resistance of some backers of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to the inclusion of people with disabilities in that legislation.474
c. Unlocking Reparations Logic
Reparations logic seems debilitating to genuine coalitions. Nev-
ertheless, several arguments might dilute, if not displace, the spell of
reparations logic. First, the reparations spell seems to depend on the
assumption that there may be only one sense of identity for all pur-
poses; even if one wanted to maximize one's claim to reparations, one
could still try to define groups for other purposes at other times.475
For example, even if one wanted to argue that African Americans re-
tain a special claim on affirmative action,476 one might also use a no-
tion of generalized discrimination to prove discrimination in other
instances. To some extent, then, reparations logic may seem like a
cognitive mistake similar to the mistake that lawyers may make when
they automatically apply one sense of group identity and discrimina-
that Archbishop Desmond Tutu denounced hate crimes including the killing of Matt Shep-
ard, who was gay). Also, many African-American organizations back efforts to amend Title
VII to explicitly prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. See Human Rights
Campaign, Nationwide Support for the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) (visited Nov.
14, 1999) <http://v.hrc.org/issues/leg/enda/support.htmI> (listing Coretta Scott
King's support for such an amendment); Human Rights Campaign, Organizations Endorsing
the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) (Mar. 1999) (visited Nov. 14, 1999) <http://
wv.hrc.org/issues/leg/enda/endaorg.html> (listing support by National Black Caucus of
State Legislators and National Conference of Black Mayors).
472 See John Sibley Butler, Homosexuals and the Military Establishment, Soc'y, Nov.-Dec.
1993, at 16 ("Powell scoffed at the idea that the historical suffering and exclusion of blacks
could serve as a metaphor for changing the official policy of excluding homosexuals from
the military."). For an important critique of such arguments, see Devon W. Carbado, Black
Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights: The Deployment of Race/Sexual Orientation Analogies in the Public
Debates About Don't Ask, Don't Tell _ J. GENDER, RACE &JusT. (forthcoming ) (crit-
icizing gay rights employment of race/sexual orientation analogies and the antiracist re-
sponses to those analogies).
473 See supra note 189.
474 See RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CML RIGHTS 44 (1984) (revealing
that opposition to bills that proposed protection for the disabled came not from "conserva-
tives blocking change for ideological reasons," but "apparently came from those who were
committed to protecting the groups already covered by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,
notably blacks").
475 See supra text accompanying note 450.
476 See, e.g., Brest & Oshige, supra note 137, at 900 ("[N]o other [minority] group
compares to African Americans in the confluence of the characteristics that argue for in-
clusion in affirmative action programs.").
20001
HeinOnline  -- 85 Cornell L. Rev. 433 1999-2000
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
lion from constitutional law cases to all potential considerations of
discrimination. This argument is the simplest and perhaps most
promising reply to reparations logic.
Other commentators may make the more extreme claim that rep-
arations logic falsely assumes that a fixed set of positions forces various
outgroups to fight with each other over tiny portions of crust, rather
than working together to redistribute the pie. To use a familiar scena-
rio, some may say that faculty diversity programs should not pit one
group against another for a few limited diversity slots, but should work
to redefine merit in general. Some might even say that we should
abolish tenure in order to free more slots for hiring.477
Though they suggest interesting proposals for reform, these criti-
ques do not entirely displace reparations logic as a rational choice.
Individuals may accept the possibility that competition for scarce
goods might not exist in an ideal world, but may discount the possibil-
ity of profound reform so much that, at least in the short term, paying
attention to reparations logic seems rational. Indeed, the assault on
affirmative action, which might seem to reduce the appeal of one kind
of material reparations, may also act to reinforce the appeal of psychic
reparations. One result of the assault on affirmative action may be the
further resignation that law and society will provide no meaningful
response to claims of injustice;478 therefore, the fight over psychic rep-
arations becomes all the more appealing: "If we can't get better jobs,
we should at least get people to acknowledge that we've suffered."
Furthermore, people may doubt the extent to which we can use
one notion of identity for one purpose, such as outgroups to prove
discrimination, and another sense of identity for another purpose,
such as African American for certain reparations claims. Once the
search for different identities for different purposes begins, some may
fear that it may be difficult to confine; discussion about outgroups in
general may degenerate into a discourse about how we are all vic-
tims.479 Even if this result does not wipe out narrower reparations
claims everywhere, predicting where such a move may be used may be
difficult. The reparations mentality may retain some of its appeal.
477 Cf. Freshman, supra note 52, at 103 (arguing that focusing on extreme possibilities
"leave[s] unexamined other possibilities").
478 Cf Culp, supra note 53, at 520 (criticizing as simplistic the view of "academic col-
leagues who agree . . . that the [Supreme Court] is wrong" when it ignores evidence of
discrimination, but who argue that "if we correctly applied rules of standing in these cases,
our current jurisprudence could be saved"); Jones, supra note 166, at 2318 (arguing that
"Title VII is the judicial equivalent of the last fading smile of a Cheshire cat of social justice
that has long since disappeared").
479 Cf. Freshman, supra note 55, at 1767 n. 244 (arguing that some may criticize the
idea of informed consent in various kinds of ADR, because informed consent may be asso-
ciated with efforts to restrict the ability of women to exercise their reproductive rights).
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2. Status Barriers
Psychological research suggests that two other general phenom-
ena may make it hard for individuals who see themselves within atom-
ized groups to see themselves as part of some larger outgroup defined
by generalized discrimination. These two related phenomena focus
on the relatively advantaged and the relatively disadvantaged within a
particular atomized group. Often, the relatively advantaged in any
particular outgroup includes those individuals who have physical traits
that let them pass for ingroup members, such as relatively light-
skinned African Americans. 480 Other relatively advantaged individu-
als have made efforts to assimilate into an ingroup, such as minority
religious members who give up their religion, immigrants who try to
shed their accent, and those who use cosmetic surgery to look more
like a dominant ingroup member. For the relatively advantaged, the
phenomenon of peripheral group discrimination describes how those
who barely fit within an ingroup, such as the most advantaged of an
outgroup, often have the most negative views about various out-
groups. For the relatively disadvantaged, the phenomenon of hori-
zontal hostility describes how relatively disadvantaged individuals
within a particular atomized outgroup may themselves display hostility
against the relatively advantaged within their group, particularly those
who might be seen (by themselves or others) as having "escaped" their
particular outgroup.
a. Top-Down Resistance: "Wanna-Be" Discrimination
Peripheral-group discrimination helps explain why those on the
cusp of acceptance by some ingroup often have the most negative
views of those outside the ingroup.48' Pledges to fraternities, on the
periphery of full fraternity membership, have far more negative views
of other fraternities than do members or officers of a particular frater-
nity.4 82 Peripheral group members may, in part, express negative
views of outgroups in order to prove that they are truly ingroup mem-
bers and not "one of them."483 In a similar way, the popular maxim
480 The types of physical traits that mark individuals as "in" or "out" vary with time. See,
e.g., Case, supra note 70, passim (arguing that men with physical features or habits that
seem feminine may be labeled gay, but that the features and habits that seem feminine will
vary in time and place).
481 See Jeffrey G. Noel et al., Peripheral Ingroup Membership Status and Public Negativity
Toward Outgroups, 68 J. PERSONAITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 127 (1995).
482 See id. at 134 ("[Pleripheral-public subjects, relative to those in all other conditions,
were the most directly derogatory toward the outgroup on trait adjective ratings.").
483 Some theorists have supposed that peripheral group members could express such
negative views to comfort themselves about their status. See HENRI TAJFEL, THE SocIAL PsY-
CHOLOGY OF MINoRrMES 15 (Minority Rights Group Report No. 38, 1978). Experiments,
however, show that peripheral ingroup members express negative views in public, but do
not report them in private. See Noel et al., supra note 481, at 136.
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about the zeal of the convert also suggests that those more recently or
more tentatively within an ingroup are most vigilant and extreme
about drawing contrasts with the very groups with which they them-
selves previously identified.
Many African Americans, for example, might argue that Justice
Thomas's alleged hostility to the plight of poor African Americans,
including his criticism of his own sister, reflects his own attempt to
secure his status. 484 Some would also extend these insights to the lack
of sympathy that some immigrants or descendants of relatively recent
immigrants have for more recent immigrants. More settled immi-
grants from Cuba, for example, may display less sympathy for or even
hostility toward more recent immigrants from Cuba.4 85 Earlier this
century, relatively prosperous and settled German Jews also often dis-
played hostility toward more recently arrived Eastern European
Jews.486 In a very contemporary example, lawyers seeking recognition
for HIV-positive status as a disability argued in their briefs that recog-
nizing such a "physical" disability did not raise any of the supposed
complications of "mental" disabilities. 48 7 In a sense, those with physi-
cal disabilities, on the periphery of acceptance, sought to solidify
themselves within an ingroup by construing the mentally disabled as
an outgroup. In a broader sense, because the line between mental
illness and mental health seems so tenuous, many of us may prove our
"sanity" or "normalcy" through hostility to those labeled mentally ill-
even though some of us may have very similar traits.488
Often the discrimination involved in peripheral group discrimi-
nation is not so much an attempt at discriminating against some physi-
cally distinct other person, but rather an internal struggle within the
same person. As Abel astutely noted, "straights are terrified of their
homosexual feelings, and all of us know we are only temporarily able-
484 See JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF CLARENCE
THOMAS 40 (1994) (reporting how Justice Thomas "publicly singled [his sister) out as a
case study of the kind of dependence that public assistance breeds").
485 Cf Valdes, supra note 16, at 25 (arguing that Latinos must "cultivate a sense of
sophisticated commonality, or post-postmodern pan-ethnicity, among the 'different'
groups of Latinas/os in American society").
486 Cf., e.g., BRODKIN, supra note 291, at 157 (noting that for German Jews in the
United States, "the desire to assimilate brought with it a reluctance to fight the growing
anti-Semitism directly for fear of jeopardizing their place in society"); infra Part V.B.2.b
(noting the lack of sympathy between different kinds of Jews).
487 See Interview with Susan Stefan, supra note 63. Exactly how we distinguish a physi-
cal disability from a mental disability is often not clear. Cf., e.g., Freshman, supra note 52,
at 122 (arguing that many of the symptoms arising from dementia may sometimes be
deemed a mental illness and other times a physical illness resulting from brain
deterioration).
488 For an excellent study of societal attitudes toward those labeled mentally ill, see
Stefan, supra note 88.
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bodied."48 9 Similarly, even though we will all eventually grow old, we
may nonetheless want to prove our youth so desperately that we avoid
thinking of the problems of the elderly-reflecting our ingroup sym-
pathy for the younger-or even become hostile to the old.490 At the
opposite end of the age spectrum, we were all once children, but
nonetheless lack empathy with children, in part, because of our desire
to prove our adult status. 491 Moreover, to whatever extent one can
distinguish between physical and mental disabilities, we may also avoid
thinking of our own deterioration in mental abilities as we age by
avoiding consideration of people with mental disabilities.
All such peripheral group discrimination impedes our ability to
recognize generalized discrimination. Clients do not want to describe
the hardships of other atomized groups out of fear of undermining
their own sense of themselves. Indeed, part of the reason many peo-
ple do not describe their experience of discrimination of any kind is
that they prefer not to think of themselves as part of any outgroup,
however atomized or generalized it might be defined.492 If individuals
have to be part of an outgroup, they would at least like to think of
themselves as "virtually" part of an ingroup; if they cannot figure out a
way to deny membership in some atomized group, they would at least
like to disclaim that their group has anything to do with some other
outgroup. 493 Lawyers in private practice may not want to question this
489 ABEL, supra note 189, at 123.
490 A large number of commentators assume that we will not discriminate on the basis
of age, because some physical part of each of us was once young and will someday be old.
See, e.g., Charny & Gulati, supra note 64, at 58 n.4 ("Age discrimination is fundamentally
different from other types of discrimination since aging is something that occurs for all of
us."). This assumption, however, fails to account for the problem of peripheral group
discrimination. Just as those who were once part of, or might still be named by some as
part of, some outgroup such as African Americans may be the most vociferous critics of
African Americans, those of us who hope to grow old may be the least empathetic to other
older people. The younger "we" of today may simply have no empathy with the old "we" of
tomorrow. See RictARD PosNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 320-21 (1995).
491 Again, we may also have a lack of empathy because we cannot deal with the pain we
experienced as children. See, e.g., ALICE MILLER, THE DRAMA OF THE GIFTED CHILD 6 (1981)
(noting that psychoanalytic patients often "recount their earliest memories without any
sympathy for the child they once were").
492 For many successful members of outgroups, it seems like a kind of ritual of admis-
sion as a "good" minority to deny that one ever experienced discrimination. When I was
traveling as an adviser to a student team, I heard an African-American student saying that
he had never experienced racism. As it happened, a colleague told me that one of the
other judges in the school competition said "that black boy he needs to work on his Eng-
lish." I then told the student this, and he immediately recognized that this might be a
stereotyped response to him, because many people see African Americans as poor in gram-
mar. Nevertheless, one year later I heard from yet another teacher that the same student
still claimed to have never experienced discrimination.
493 Andrew Sullivan's notion of "virtually normal" gays and lesbians, for example, may
appeal to those relatively privileged lesbians and gays who fear a "rainbow coalition" will
drag them "down." See Andrew Sullivan, The Conservative Case, in SAmE-Sx MARmGAGE: PRO
AND CON 146, 154 (1997) ("[T]he notion of stable gay relationships might even serve to
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preference. In addition, lawyers themselves-by some measures often
on the periphery of elite status-may be even more blinded by periph-
eral group discrimination than their clients. Moreover, lawyers for ad-
vocacy organizations may be influenced by the peripheral group
discrimination by the relatively advantaged who fund and dominate
some of these organizations. 494
b. Bottom-Up Resistance: Anti-"Wanna-Be" Discrimination
Horizontal hostility also describes a similar pattern of resentment
and hostility: Whereas peripheral-group discrimination shows how in-
dividuals closest to an ingroup may distance themselves from the out-
group, horizontal hostility describes how individuals further from the
ingroup may resent outgroup members closer to the ingroup. When
groups are divided between relatively assimilated or mainstream and
relatively unassimilated, then individuals who identify with the less as-
similated frequently have more resentment toward those who are
slightly more mainstream. Among Jews, for example, nonpracticing
Jews are more assimilated than Reform Jews, Reform Jews more than
Conservative Jews, and Conservative Jews more than Orthodox Jews.
Conservative Jews have more negative views of Reform Jews than of
OrthodoxJews, and ReformJews themselves have more negative views
of nonpracticing Jews than of Conservative Jews.495 In a number of
different contexts, hostility exists against "wanna-be's"-those out-
group members who seem closer to the ingroup.496 In a very contem-
porary illustration of this phenomenon, residents in the last leper
colony in the United States opposed letting those who left the colony
earlier return to the colony to use its facilities.497
buttress the ethic of heterosexual marriage, by showing even those excluded from it can
wish to model themselves on its shape and structure."). For criticisms of such gay and
lesbian theory, see, for example, Hutchinson, supra note 20, at 566. During protests over
then Governor Pete Wilson's veto of a bill to ban sexual orientation discrimination, I wit-
nessed such peripheral group discrimination directly. An acquaintance who graduated
from a fancy law school turned to me in a relatively upscale gay video bar and said, "What's
wrong with these Republicans? Don't they realize how wealthy we are and how we'd vote
for all of them if it weren't for this one thing?"
494 Within gay rights organizations, some leaders describe their mission as promoting
gay rights (or combatting homophobia per se) as if that could neatly be separated from
generalized discrimination. At an American Association of Law Schools meeting on gay
and lesbian legal issues, for example, one law professor asked Elizabeth Birch, Director of
the Human Rights Campaign (HRG), about why HRC did not do more for poor lesbians
and gays. Birch replied that the organization was about gay issues, not about issues of
poverty, however worthwhile those might be.
495 SeeJudith B. White & Ellen J. Langer, Horizontal Hostility: Relations Between Similar
Minority Groups, 55J. Soc. IssuEs 587, 549-50 (1999).
496 SeeJudith Bess White, Horizontal Hostility: Relations Between Similar Minority Groups 6
(1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author).
497 Barry Shlachter, Complex Where Lepers Were Treated is No Longer Needed; Louisiana
Center's Researchers Discovered Cure MIMn HERArm, Feb. 19, 1999, at 25A
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Horizontal hostility helps explain yet another barrier to recogniz-
ing generalized discrimination. Judith White and Ellen Langer, pio-
neers in theorizing about horizontal hostility in psychology, theorized
that horizontal hostility may arise because outgroup members may
view the distinctiveness of their group, such as Jewishness, as valuable
in itself; therefore, the outgroup members may resent anyone who
may undermine that distinctiveness by appearing relatively assimilated
to the mainstream. 498 From this perspective, attention to generalized
discrimination would arouse particular suspicion; generalized discrim-
ination may undermine group identity based upon the idea of suffer-
ing peculiar to a group, such as the idea that we are Jews because we
have suffered from anti-Semitism, not from some more generalized
form of discrimination.
C. The Limits of Rationality Analysis
Often, the discussion of barriers in negotiation and economic
theory eventually leads to a conclusion that the barriers are irrational
and suggests ways to overcome these barriers.49 9 Therefore, to suggest
that evidence of generalized discrimination somehow proves that
grand coalitions are rational and that fighting between various sets of
individuals outside an ingroup is simply irrational would be tempting.
First, to the extent that the discussion is about how one actually exper-
iences utility, there is nothing rational in the first instance about the
experience itself. A key insight of feminist theory is the discovery that
many people, including women, vicariously experience harm to
others, such as children, as if the harm had happened to them.500 But
498 See White & Langer, supra note 495, at 556 ("Distinctiveness is not a tangible good,
and therefore it is easily overlooked. But if we assume that the distinctiveness of a minority
group identity has value and treat it as we would a more tangible resource, then an intui-
tive understanding of horizontal hostility is possible."). While much of the discourse on
the psychology of discrimination may seem very modem and scientific, postmodernist
scholars allude to similar ideas. See, e.g., Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Free-
dom in Late Modernity 34-35 (1995) (discussing how the breakdown of communities based
on a sense of a particular place may lead people to "resort to fierce assertion of 'identities'
in order to know/invent who, where, and what they are"); cf. Jonathan Simon, Inevitable
Dependencies: A Comment on Martha A. Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family,
and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies, 5 COLUM.J. GENDER & L. 152, 165 (1995) (book
review) ("It is difficult to imagine how Durkheim would even locate 'France' today, with its
economy determined by German bankers, and its increasingly multicultural and multil-
inguistic population.").
499 Cf. BARRIERS TO CoNFucr RESOLUTION, supra note 445, at 6 ("Strategic barriers can
cause rational, self-interested disputants to act in a manner that proves to be both individu-
ally and collectively disadvantageous.").
500 For a general discussion of women's emotional experiences, see CAROL GiLLIGAN,
INA DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN's DEVELoPMENT (1982). One of
my closest friends also shows how this applies to nonhuman animals as well. One day, my
friend came back crying after a walk. I asked what was wrong, but he sobbed without
answering for a while. Finally, he said, "It's the worst thing that ever happened to me."
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limiting this insight on rational choice terms to the first instance is
important. Arguably, individuals would have more utility if they felt
greater solidarity with a wider group; the development of sympathies
might prove to be a general stance that leads to greater utility.50 1 Sec-
ond, if one returns to some narrow sense of the group about whom
one cares, then the questions of risk seeking and risk aversion still
remain. Individuals who speak of inevitable coalitions often make the
worthwhile point that one strategy to maximize success would be for
various relatively disadvantaged persons to unite to make a more gen-
erally egalitarian world.502
Although this is one strategy, it does not address the "Archie
Bunker" objection: What if an individual prefers a world of vast ine-
quality, in which he might "win the lottery" (literally or metaphori-
cally) and occupy a high status position? On strictly rational terms, we
might say that the expected value of such a strategy, much like the
expected value of winning the lottery, is low. But we cannot call pur-
suit of lotteries irrational until we know more about the individual's
relative risk aversion. Indeed, even if we were to say that the expected
utility would be greater from some other strategy, such as Blackjack,
we cannot eliminate the possibility that defying the odds is itself a
source of utlity.503
If we expand the analysis from the individual person outside an
ingroup, we can see that an individual might rationally seek only to
redefine an ingroup so that it would include him or only a few others
like him on some relatively atomized basis. The individual might have
a better chance of remedying his own condition with a more genera-
lized commitment to nondiscrimination, but he might cling to his
strategy, much like the fictional Archie Bunker who fought the very
kind of progressive politics that might have offered the best chance of
improving his position.504 Moreover, this strategy might be rational,
Eventually, it became clear to me that the worst thing that ever happened "to him" was
seeing a cat that had been brutally abused.
501 Some critics of utilitarianism probably would want to reply with the paradox of
hedonism: one cannot maximize happiness by trying to be happy, but rather by being
involved in worthwhile projects. See, e.g., Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in
JJ.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UnLrrARINsM: FOR AND AGAiNST 75, 125-35 (1973).
502 See, e.g., Nancy Ehrenreich, Beyond Intersectionality 23-24 (Nov. 7, 1998) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author); Mahoney, supra note 132, at 64-85. Ehrenreich
suggested that "an individual's investment in his privileged status blinds him not only to
others'subordination, but to his own as well... [because) a failure to see the inequities in
another's situation actually prevents the individual from recognizing some aspect of her
own." Ehrenreich, supra, at 23.
503 See Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It Matters, 1994 Wis. L.
REv. 71, 90-91 (explaining that the idea of people entering the lottery with hopes of "win-
ning big" is only a partial explanation for why they do so).
504 Moreover, to the extent that a person maintains constant preference for higher
position and status, the individual tends to take risky strategies to achieve preferred posi-
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as McCaffery suggested of lotteries in general,505 because many indi-
viduals lack information about various alternatives. Just as individuals
may play the lottery in part because they lack information about other
investment opportunities,5 06 individuals may pursue atomized strate-
gies rather than a general commitment to nondiscrimination because
of a lack of information about the possibilities of generalized nondis-
crimination. In the end, the overlapping consensus in social science
suggests that the exclusive fixation with atomized discrimination is a
particularly bad bed.
VI
CONCLUSION
We should pay more attention to the potential for recognizing
generalized discrimination. Greater attention to generalized discrimi-
nation points to new directions for everyday lawyering, legal theory,
and our public discourse. At the most mechanical level, greater atten-
tion to generalized discrimination may provide lawyers with new tools
for identifying and remedying discrimination in contexts in which
older tools, including even intersectionality, may fall short. Many
cases, like Deborah's in the Prologue, will arise in which attention to
generalized discrimination will highlight bias; fixation with atomized
discrimination will often leave us with so few points of comparison
that we will be unable to reach either a meaningful conclusion or a
conclusion with the same degree of confidence. On a far more theo-
retical level, generalized discrimination prompts theorists to think
more carefully about when it may be appropriate to speak of various
"isms" and when it may be appropriate to think about more genera-
lized notions of discrimination. Within the academy, this considera-
tion may give us pause when others habitually warn against making
analogies between different forms of discrimination. The framework
of generalized discrimination shows how often there will not be analo-
gies, but rather different consequences of exactly the same genera-
lized ingroup sympathy or outgroup hostility. In terms of public life,
the framework also suggests that we should open up our national dis-
tion or status. See id. at 94 (suggesting that one explanation for why individuals play lotter-
ies involves "'elevation effects,' [so named] because they explain risk preference by a
desire to exalt oneself into a different social status"). According to McCaffery, individuals
act to change their social status because this changes their utility far more than helping the
lot of their entire group:
[I]ncreases in income that raise the relative position of the consumer unit
in its own class but do not shift the unit out of its class yield diminishing
marginal utility, while increases that shift it into a new class, that give it a
new social and economic status, yield increasing marginal utility.
Id. at 95 (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
505 See id. at 90-91.
506 See id. at 107.
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course on race to include discussion of generalized discrimination as
well.
In all of these contexts, we must think hard about how various
concepts of discrimination-atomized, generalized, and every other
combination-may shed light on particular cases, problems, and con-
versations. Perhaps some social scientists have been too quick to as-
sume that so much discrimination is generalized. Perhaps the authors
of The Authoritarian Personality went too far in forgetting anti-Semitism
and in studying prejudice in general. One attractive feature of the
atomized-discrimination model is its comforting message that we al-
ready know the best concept for any particular instance of discrimina-
tion. But with its complicated message, the generalized-
discrimination model also offers us some hope that many of us may
come together to somehow completely dismantle the division of
worlds into ingroups and outgroups, rather than simply trying to
make room in the ingroup for people narrowly like "us."
Our challenging and sometimes imprecise tasks in battling dis-
crimination resemble some of the difficulties in tackling other ills we
consider diseases. We must persevere even when we recognize the
difficulties of defining and treating diseases, be they cancer or racism,
illness or prejudice. We may undoubtedly gain some solace from the
way that natural scientists balance their focus between general re-
search, on diseases that target parts of a body, and research on partic-
ular viruses, such as HIV. This Article should no more suggest that we
divert all attention to generalized discrimination and cease considera-
tion of atomized frameworks, such as racism and sexism, or
subatomized frameworks, such as intersectionality, than a medical arti-
cle should suggest that we study only the general nature of disease but
not its more specific features. Instead, this Article makes a far more
modest claim that lawyers, courts, legal scholarship, and much of our
social discourse have become too fixated on atomized categories. Just
as the focus on subatomized frameworks, such as women of color,
yielded some insights and concrete results in some areas, generalized
discrimination deserves more attention that may lead to concrete re-
sults in other areas. Our task-for an "us" that "we" have yet to be-
come-is to make our world free of disease, be it the Alzheimer's
disease that corrupts the physical cells of our brains or the prejudice
that warps our minds and degrades our souls.
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